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Preface 
 
In the thesis I explain why an immanent approach in philosophy means taking 
contingency to be “irreducible”.  I show why Deleuze and Guattari believe this to 
be the case and why they think Hegel fails to do this.  I then go on to show in 
what way Hegel incorporates contingency into his system and how he also 
creates his own sense of “necessity” that emerges from the systematic 
treatment of contingent concepts.  In this way I show how Hegel can respond to 
the demand for immanence made by Deleuze and Guattari.  I suggest that 
freedom, for Hegel, consists in the systematic treatment of contingency in our 
lives and in our thinking.   
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Note on references 
 
I have used “Logic” throughout the thesis to refer to the A.V. Miller translation of 
Hegel’s Science of Logic. 
 
In footnotes I have used “Enc Logic” to refer to the Encyclopaedia Logic 
translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris. 
 
All works by Hegel, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari have been referred to in 
footnotes by the title of the work (or abbreviation) followed by the page number 
and/or section number (e.g. “Difference and Repetition p.1” or “Phenomenology 
of Spirit §74”), while works by other authors are referred to by author, date and 
page number (e.g. “Bentall 2004 p.1”).  
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 8 of 365 
 
Chapter 1: Deleuze, Guattari and the irreducibility of contingency 
 
Introduction 
 
In this thesis I will present Hegel as a systematic and immanent thinker.  Few 
would disagree with the claim that Hegel saw himself as a systematic thinker; 
however, as we will see, some commentators believe that Hegel was 
unsuccessful in this regard, and commentators tend to disagree about what 
“systematic” means for Hegel.  In this thesis I will be arguing for what Thom 
Brooks calls a “strong systematic reading” of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: for 
Brooks, “a systematic reading of Hegel’s work interprets this work within the 
context of Hegel’s philosophical system”.1  According to even a “weak” 
systematic reading of the Philosophy of Right, it is vitally important that we 
recognise “the peculiar structure of Hegel’s argumentation”, and one way that 
we can do this is by looking at Hegel’s logical writing (the Science of Logic and the 
Encyclopaedia Logic); a strong systematic reading, on the other hand, will 
advocate the same but will emphasise the importance of more “specific features 
of the system” than the weaker reading.2  I would suggest that my systematic 
reading of the Philosophy of Right is a particularly strong one because I will be 
demonstrating that a detailed analysis of large parts of the Science of Logic 
(which I will refer to as the “Logic”) can help us to understand what is going on in 
the Philosophy of Right. 
                                                          
1
 Brooks 2007 p.22 
2
 Brooks 2007 pp.24, 27 
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So much for Hegel as a systematic thinker, for now; as I mentioned above, I will 
also be looking at the immanence of Hegel’s thought.  We will see that the issue 
of the immanence of Hegel’s thought is difficult because we must first work out 
what “immanence” consists in.  Stephen Houlgate argues that Hegel should be 
read as a thinker who proceeds immanently, since Hegel’s method for examining 
categories is designed to allow these categories to develop of their own accord: 
if we follow Hegel, we gain an immanent insight into our concepts because we 
do not presuppose the “system of development” that our concepts undergo, but 
instead allow the logic to “make its own way” and thereby allow the system of 
development of concepts to emerge from the subject-matter itself (from what is 
implicit in the concepts themselves) and not from our own presuppositions.3  For 
example: for Houlgate, the concept of “pure being” itself turns into the concept 
of “nothing”, and into “becoming”, “determinate being”, “something”, and so 
on.  For Houlgate, it is important that we recognise this immanence in Hegel’s 
thought because it is the immanence of Hegel’s approach that allows him to 
claim that he is getting to what the concepts are themselves and not 
dogmatically imposing a framework of development upon them.  That is to say, 
Hegel wants to avoid the accusation that he gives the account he does of these 
concepts on the basis of a set of presuppositions, rather than because the 
concepts do in fact logically lead on from one another in the way he describes.   
                                                          
3
 Houlgate 2006 p.52 
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Houlgate tells us that, when we follow Hegel and proceed without 
presuppositions, we allow what is “implicit” in a concept to become “explicit”.  
What this means is that the concept turns into what it already is: pure being is 
already nothing, for example.  That is to say, when we think “pure being”, we are 
already “unconsciously” thinking “nothing”, and just need to think pure being to 
bring out this implicit concept: by “simply” thinking being we discover that it is 
identical to nothing.4 
 
In this thesis I will be arguing that this is how we should read Hegel in this 
respect: it is indeed the case, for Hegel, that we move from one concept to 
another because of what is implicit in that concept, since it is only in this way 
that we can talk about the “self-movement” of the Concept that Hegel 
emphasises throughout his work.  However, I want to suggest that we need to 
further examine this implicit/explicit relation.  We must do this, I argue, because 
Hegel cannot take it for granted at the start of his examination of concepts in the 
Logic that concepts unfold in this or that way.  The method of the Logic must 
itself emerge immanently from the subject matter of the Logic, if Hegel is to 
                                                          
4
 See also Houlgate 2005, p.17: “If human beings are indeed historically self-determining, they 
cannot simply be this, but must actively determine themselves in history to be self-determining.  
In other words, we must make ourselves into self-determining beings in history, because we are 
self-determining, self-producing beings.  However, if we always already are self-determining 
beings, then the process of making ourselves into self-determining beings cannot simply bring 
into being something which is not already a reality.  Rather, it must be the process of making us 
into what we already are.  To put it a little less paradoxically, this process involves humanity 
making itself explicitly what it already is implicitly.  This means that we must come to be self-
consciously what we already are ‘unconsciously’.” 
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proceed in a way that is truly immanent.  I will argue in this thesis that there is a 
danger that, in trying to read Hegel as proceeding immanently and without 
presuppositions, we come to see the development of concepts as “always 
already” determined in a certain direction and thereby fail to properly bring out 
the self-development of these concepts; that is to say, we fail to see how a 
concept changes into a new concept (rather than always having been that 
concept from the beginning, and so not needing to change at all).5  If we do not 
explain what we mean by making “explicit” what is “implicit”, I argue, we run the 
risk, through our lack of questioning, of allowing presuppositions to sneak in and 
guide our discourse despite our best efforts to the contrary (that is to say, we 
assert that pure being is obviously nothing, one just has to look to see that, but 
in this way we fail to prove this to be the case, and so all we are saying is that 
pure being turns into nothing because it seems obvious to us that it does). 
In order to reassess what “immanence” means for Hegel, I will be drawing on an 
unlikely source: the writing of Deleuze and Guattari.  This might seem 
controversial, since an enormous distance separates the thought of Hegel from 
the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, but I believe that their criticisms of Hegel 
can help us see what immanence in fact means for Hegel.  As we will see, 
immanence requires that we acknowledge the “irreducible contingency” of 
reality, for Deleuze and Guattari, and they believe that they are utterly un-
Hegelian when they assert this.  Hegel, they suggest, reduces everything to 
                                                          
5
 See conclusion to chapter 7 below: I argue that Alison Stone, for example, takes Houlgate’s 
approach in this direction and thus fails to read Hegel as a thinker of immanence. 
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necessity, and so cannot be truly immanent: Hegel’s idealism means that reality 
is always mediated by the “illusions” of dialectic.6 
However, I want to suggest that we can explain how Hegel’s dialectic is intended 
to proceed immanently if we take Hegel to have a conception of immanence 
similar to that of Deleuze and Guattari.7  It is tempting to assume that when 
Hegel tells us to follow the development of a concept, he is telling us to hold in 
mind a preconception of how speculative thinking works: the problem with this 
is that in that case we would not truly be proceeding without presuppositions.  
On my reading8, Hegel does not begin philosophy with a conception of 
speculative thinking, or of negativity, but asks us to begin simply with the 
“resolve” to think.9  Furthermore10, this resolve is something contingent and 
which can never ultimately be proven to be the only way to proceed, so that 
Hegelian immanence (in its intention at least) is called immanent precisely 
because it begins from an irreducible contingency. 
 
It is in this way, then, that I intend to employ the thought of Deleuze and 
Guattari: not to reconcile Deleuze and Guattari with Hegel, or to prove one side 
right on this matter, but to set out a criterion for immanent thinking – the 
                                                          
6
 Beistegui 2010 pp.25-6: “The movement and immanence of speculative dialectics are not real, 
but abstract, and false.  Despite Hegel’s claim that the negative is the very engine of actuality, it is 
in fact nothing real.  It is only an illusion.” 
7
 Deleuze and Guattari think that Hegel fails to stick to this conception, that he betrays his own 
philosophical ambitions, but I want to argue that nonetheless he does have this conception of 
immanence, whether he achieves it or not. 
8
 And I am following Houlgate in this respect 
9
 Logic p.70;  Houlgate 2005 p.49 
10
 And perhaps I am not following Houlgate in this respect 
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criterion that it acknowledge the irreducible contingency of reality – and see 
from what Hegel says about his own project whether he intends to meet this 
criterion.  Deleuzians would undoubtedly say that Hegel fails to meet this 
criterion (since he ultimately reduces everything to necessity by claiming that the 
development of history is necessary, that we must live in the state, and so on), 
but my point is not to judge Hegel’s success or failure, but to explore the way 
that Hegel saw his own project. 
 
It should also be noted that the need to rethink the role that contingency plays in 
Hegel’s thinking has already been recognised by other commentators on Hegel, 
such as John Burbidge.  Burbidge has argued that by placing “historical 
development at the heart of systematic thought”, Hegel has been able to show 
that contingent events determine the way that we see the world.11  Opposed to 
this “historical” view is “classical metaphysics”, Burbidge tells us, which takes 
everything that happens to follow from first principles, so that events flow from 
abstract, transcendent principles to the more concrete.12  What I am arguing in 
this thesis is that we risk reading Hegel as a classical metaphysician if we talk of 
the progress from the implicit to the explicit and do not recognise the moment of 
contingency that determines what becomes implicit within a concept: or to put it 
another way, we fall into classical metaphysics if we assume from the start that 
                                                          
11
 Burbidge 2007 p.9 
12
 Burbidge 2007 p.10 
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there is a set of speculative principles that determine what it means for 
something to be “implicit” in a concept. 
It might be worth noting here in what respect my reading of Hegel differs from 
that of John Burbidge.  Burbidge writes:  
In the last analysis, the question comes down to what we do with contingencies.  On the one 
hand, there is the position adopted by Hegel, who says that contingencies are necessary 
constituents of a process that moves toward ever more development and richer complexity.  On 
the other hand, there is either the “modern” concern to eliminate from our human existence all 
evils and unexpected contingencies… or the “post-modern” expectation that contingencies will 
reign unimpeded...  Only time will tell which response will ultimately prove justified.
13
 
I differ from Burbidge in my reading of Hegel in that I do not think that it is the 
case that it is down to us what we “do with contingencies”, and nor do I think it 
is the case, for Hegel, that we need to “wait and see” whether Hegel turns out to 
be right or not.  What I think Burbidge is failing to take into account here is the 
“retroactive” necessity that we find described in Hegel (I get the term 
“retroactive” from Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition and from the work of 
Žižek, who also uses this term to describe an aspect of Hegelian logic14), and 
which I describe in chapter 7 below: retroactive necessity is necessity according 
to which what was originally contingent becomes necessary (and so is not simply 
                                                          
13
 Burbidge 2007 p.193 
14
 I have followed Žižek in that I want to suggest that, for Hegel, reality is something incomplete, 
so that we cannot determine what is possible and necessary until after the fact and must create 
possibility (see e.g. Žižek 2004 p.56), but that the “retroactive” establishment of what was 
necessary and possible is not a mere “fabrication” as it is for Deleuze (Difference and Repetition 
p.263), but is something concrete that describes reality.  I go further than Žižek, I think, in the 
respect that I justify reading Hegel as a thinker of “retroactivity” by a detailed analysis of the 
Logic. 
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retrospective, since it was not necessary from the start).  An example I give in 
chapter 7 is the way that ethical life is governed by principles that came into 
being contingently, but which come to be necessary to us, as something that we 
cannot imagine doing without.  Thus our systematic acceptance of contingent 
principles makes these principles in fact necessary, since they become something 
built into our way of thinking about ethical life.  I will argue in this thesis15 that 
the same applies to more abstract principles, such as “being”: though it is 
contingent that pure being is thought as nothing in our thinking, it has 
nevertheless become something truly necessary, so that we cannot think pure 
being without thinking nothing.  On my reading, Hegel would say that, though it 
might have once been the case that we could have had a different conception of 
being, our thinking is now in fact structured in the way he describes in the Logic, 
and this is a necessary fact about our thinking.  It should be noted that 
retroactive necessity is not the same as retrospective necessity: Hegel is not 
saying that our concepts were necessary all along, but that they have become 
necessary, and I think that the Deleuzian/Žižekian term “retroactivity” captures 
this transformation from contingency to necessity and distinguishes it from a 
“retrospective” movement that would simply allow us to see what was always 
already the case. 
My aim in the current chapter is to look at the work of Deleuze and Guattari, in 
order to explain the concepts that I think can help us to establish to what extent 
and in what sense Hegel as a thinker of contingency and immanence. 
                                                          
15
 See chapter 3 below 
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1: The image of thought 
 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes: “Where to begin in philosophy has 
always – rightly – been regarded as a very delicate problem.”16  To begin in 
philosophy means finding a concept with which to begin, but Deleuze and 
Guattari tell us in What is Philosophy? that “there is no concept with only one 
component” and so “even the first concept, the one with which philosophy 
‘begins’, has several components, because it is not obvious that philosophy must 
have a beginning, and if it does determine one, it must combine it with a point of 
view or ground.”17  For Deleuze and Guattari, every concept presupposes other 
concepts and also presupposes a point of view or a ground upon which the 
concept rests (and the concepts and point of view that a concept presupposes 
are its “components”).  This “point of view or ground” that the concept combines 
with is the “plane of immanence”, or the “image of thought” that that 
philosopher has.  Deleuze and Guattari write: 
The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of 
thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find 
one’s bearings in thought.  It is not a method, since every method is concerned with concepts 
and presupposes such an image.
18
 
                                                          
16
 Difference and Repetition p.164 
17
 What is Philosophy? p.15 
18
 What is Philosophy? p.37 
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So, we can see from the passage just quoted that the plane of immanence is the 
image of thought that a philosopher has.19  For Deleuze and Guattari, each 
philosopher will have her own sense of what it means to “think”, and this sense 
of what it means to think is never fully and explicitly expressed in the concepts 
she uses.  A philosopher will often present a concept as if it were something 
eternal, that responds to an ultimate question that “no one can deny” needs to 
be answered20, but for Deleuze and Guattari problems are specific to certain 
ways of thinking, and these ways of thinking change often.  Descartes’ 
philosophy is an example that Deleuze and Guattari give in What is Philosophy?  
Deleuze and Guattari try to show that the “cogito” is created in order to solve 
the problem of how to find certainty in thinking, and that this problem is a 
product of Descartes’ image of thought, and not the universal problem that 
Descartes thought it was: that is to say, while the problem of how to find a 
certainty with which philosophy can begin was undoubtedly a problem for 
Descartes, this does not mean that it is a problem for everyone else, since not 
everyone will have the same conception of what is required to begin thinking, or 
agree that the problem of where to begin thinking is a relevant or important 
problem.  Deleuze and Guattari write: 
Not only do Descartes, Hegel and Feuerbach not begin with the same concept, they do not have 
the same concept of beginning.  Every concept is at least double, triple, etc.  Neither is there a 
                                                          
19
 See also What is Philosophy? p.61, where Deleuze and Guattari write of the “plane of 
immanence or image of thought”; and see Beistegui 2010 p.12: “the plane of immanence is ‘the 
image of thought’”. 
20
 What is Philosophy? p.61: “everyone knows what thinking means” according to an image of 
thought; Difference and Repetition p.164: “it is presumed that everyone knows, independently of 
concepts, what is meant by self, thinking and being.” 
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concept possessing every component, since this would be chaos pure and simple.  Even so-called 
universals as ultimate concepts must escape the chaos by circumscribing a universe that explains 
them.
21
 
So, if beginning in philosophy means finding a first concept, we will have 
difficulty beginning, since every concept presupposes something else.  If each 
concept presupposes something else, in what sense can we say that any concept 
is the “first”?  If there were a concept that possessed every component, then we 
could begin with that concept, since whatever that concept presupposed would 
already belong to that concept and so there would be nothing prior to that 
concept.  But we cannot talk meaningfully of a concept of everything, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, since a concept must “circumscribe” something that explains that 
concept: a concept does not have a meaning simply taken in-itself, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, but must be explained by something else that it relates to.  Every 
concept relates to an image of thought, since it is the image of thought that a 
philosopher has that makes the creation of a concept necessary.  For Deleuze and 
Guattari, “all concepts are connected to problems”: it is the problems that they 
respond to that give concepts their force by explaining what the concept is 
doing.22  As Deleuze writes in “What is the Creative Act?”: 
There has to be a necessity, in philosophy and elsewhere; otherwise there is nothing.  A creator is 
not a preacher working for the fun of it.  A creator only does what he or she absolutely needs to 
do.
23
 
                                                          
21
 What is Philosophy? p.15 
22
 What is Philosophy p.16 
23
 “What is the Creative Act?” p.318 
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That is to say, for Deleuze, concepts only arise from a process of creativity, and 
such creativity only takes place out of a necessity: though the question of which 
problem occupies the creator is a contingent matter, because the author of the 
concept is responding to a problem she has encountered while thinking and 
which she cannot ignore, this problem is necessary.  A philosopher thus has an 
image of thought which leads her to make a certain use of thought and to expect 
certain things of it.  When thought fails to be useful and does not meet the 
expectations of the philosopher,24 then she has found a problem which she tries 
to solve by creating concepts that connect thought up in new ways.  In What is 
Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari illustrate this point by examining Descartes’ 
“cogito” (which is “Descartes’ I” and “a concept of self”).  They first explain how 
this concept is constructed: 
This concept has three components – doubting, thinking, and being (although this does not mean 
that every concept must be triple).  The complete statement of the concept qua multiplicity is “I 
think ‘therefore’ I am” or, more completely, “Myself who doubts, I think, I am, I am a thinking 
thing.”
25
  
That is to say, the concept of the cogito has the three components of “doubting, 
thinking, and being”.  But more than this: 
As intensive ordinates the components are arranged in zones of neighbourhood or indiscernibility 
that produce passages from one to the other and constitute their inseparability.  The first zone is 
                                                          
24
 N.B. this is why, strictly speaking, the schizophrenic does not create concepts: she expects no 
more than chaos from thought.  It is the “schizoanalyst” who creates concepts. 
25
 What is Philosophy? p.24 
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between doubting and thinking (myself who doubts, I cannot doubt that I think), and the second 
is between thinking and being (in order to think it is necessary to be).
26
 
So, the concept of the cogito does not just “have” these three components; they 
are also given a determinate relation to each other by the concept: for example, 
thinking implies being; doubting is a form of thinking and so cannot doubt 
thinking; and so on.  An important thing to note here is the way in which the 
components of the concept are connected: that is to say, the components are 
connected so that they are inseparable.  “Inseparable” does not mean 
“identical”.  They are inseparable because there are “passages from one to the 
other”, and the components maintain their own identity as they relate to each 
other.  For example, it is not the case that thinking and being are identical in the 
cogito, but that “in order to think it is necessary to be”: it is in this way that 
thinking and being are connected, for the Descartes of Deleuze and Guattari.  By 
creating passages between these components, concepts provide a new way of 
navigating thought. 
A very important point to note (as we will see) is the fact that these components 
of the concept already have senses and functions of their own prior to being 
connected in the concept, and each of these senses and functions will be 
emphasised more or less in the concept.  In Deleuzian terms, each component is 
a “variation” (of senses and functions) and each “phase” of this variation will be 
emphasised more or less in the concept: 
                                                          
26
 What is Philosophy? p.25 
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Doubt includes moments that are not the species of a genus but the phases of a variation: 
perceptual, scientific, obsessional doubt…  The same goes for modes of thought – feeling, 
imagining, having ideas – and also for types of being, thing, or substance – infinite being, finite 
thinking being, extended being.  It is noteworthy that in the last case the concept of self [the 
cogito] retains only the second phase of being and excludes the rest of the variation.  But this is 
precisely the sign that the concept is closed as fragmentary totality with ‘I am a thinking thing’: 
we can pass to other phases of being only by bridges or crossroads that lead to other concepts.  
Thus, ‘among my ideas I have the idea of infinity’ is the bridge leading from the concept of self to 
the concept of God.  This new concept has three components forming the ‘proofs’ of the 
existence of God as infinite event.  The third (ontological proof) assures the closure of the 
concept but also in turn throws out a bridge or branches off to a concept of the extended, insofar 
as it guarantees the objective truth value of our other clear and distinct ideas.
27
 
The concept therefore does not determine once and for all what are the 
important senses of each of its components.  Indeed, each component will 
continue to have a life of its own, and it is this life of the conceptual component 
that will lead to new concepts.28  It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to concepts as “fragmentary totalities” in the passage quoted above: 
concepts are themselves whole but made out of components that have their 
own connections beyond those of the concept in question, so that it is only a 
part of the component that is relevant to the concept.  So Deleuze and Guattari 
tell us in the passage just quoted that the fact that the self is a being of a certain 
sort – a “finite thinking being” – connects it up to other sorts of being that lie 
outside of the concept of the cogito: extended being does not belong to the 
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cogito because it is non-thinking and so we need a new concept to deal with 
that; infinite being – God – does not belong to the concept of the cogito but 
connects to it because we can think about infinite being. 
By creating the cogito, Descartes believes he has solved a problem, namely, the 
problem of how to find a truth in thought that he can be certain of.  By 
connecting doubting, thinking and being in the way that he does, Descartes 
makes it so that doubting leads logically to being, so that the act of doubting 
proves that he exists.29  Without the cogito, Descartes claims that he cannot be 
certain of anything: he needs to relate all truths to his own subjective being so 
that he can proceed by the “natural light” if he is to be certain of anything.30  And 
so the concept of the cogito solves Descartes’ problem by connecting up thought 
in this way, by connecting Descartes’ doubt to being: it is necessary to start with 
subjective certainty if we are to proceed to have knowledge, for Descartes, and 
the cogito is the concept of this subjective certainty. 
So, the creation of a concept is the connection of components, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, and these components have a life of their own; for this reason 
philosophy cannot begin with a concept, for Deleuze and Guattari, since any 
concept will have components that already have a living existence in our 
thinking.  In what follows we will see further how the Deleuzian concept of the 
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concept is complicated by the fact that a concept’s components have a life of 
their own. 
2: Schizophrenia 
 
As I have suggested above, Descartes chose to connect these components in the 
way he did because he was possessed by a problem, and this problem was his 
own and not a universal problem, even if it is one shared by others.  Deleuze and 
Guattari write: 
There is no point in wondering whether Descartes was right or wrong.  Are implicit and subjective 
presuppositions more valid than explicit objective presuppositions?  Is it necessary ‘to begin’, 
and, if so, is it necessary to start from the point of view of a subjective certainty?  Can thought as 
such be the verb of an I?  There is no direct answer.  Cartesian concepts can only be assessed as a 
function of their problems and their plane.
31
 
Concepts are assessed only as function of their “problems” and their “plane”: 
that is to say, the value of a concept cannot be determined in abstraction from 
the problems to which they are connected and the plane upon which they exist.  
As we have seen, the problem and the plane are closely connected to each other 
in Deleuzian thinking: a philosopher’s plane of immanence is her image of 
thought (see above), and the image of thought of a philosopher determines what 
that philosopher finds problematic in thought, and so determines what is 
required of a concept (since concepts respond to problems).  The most important 
thing to note here is that problems and planes are to some extent indeterminate 
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for Deleuze and Guattari: that is to say, we become possessed of certain 
problems that we must solve and find ourselves on certain “planes” of thought 
without being able to fully determine what these problems are and what our 
way of thinking is: 
Precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and does not immediately take 
effect with concepts, it implies a sort of groping experimentation and its layout resorts to 
measures that are not very respectable, rational or reasonable.  These measures belong to the 
order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness and excess.
32
 
One’s image of thought, or plane of immanence,33 is not entirely explained by 
one’s concepts (as we have seen), and so the problems that arise from it and 
which one runs into are not encountered only when we try to think with 
concepts, but also in our everyday, non-philosophical thinking.34  Descartes’ 
cogito emerges not just for philosophical reasons, but also for “prephilosophical” 
(or “preconceptual”) reasons35: Descartes has a certain mode of existence that 
causes him to run into the problem of subjective certainty that Deleuze and 
Guattari have described.  Descartes, for Deleuze and Guattari, is an embodiment 
of the “Idiot”: 
Although Descartes’ cogito is created as a concept, it has presuppositions.  This is not in the way 
that one concept presupposes others (for example, ‘man’ presupposes ‘animal’ and ‘rational’); 
the presuppositions here are implicit, subjective, and preconceptual, forming an image of 
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need philosophy to tell us how to think 
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thought: everyone knows what thinking means.  Everyone can think; everyone wants the truth.  
Are these the only two elements – the concept and the plane of immanence or image of thought 
that will be occupied by concepts of the same group (the cogito and other concepts that can be 
connected to it)?  Is there something else, in Descartes’ case, other than the created cogito and 
the presupposed image of thought?  Actually there is something else, somewhat mysterious, that 
appears from time to time or that shows through and seems to have a hazy existence halfway 
between concept and preconceptual plane, passing from one to the other.  In the present case it 
is the Idiot: it is the Idiot who says ‘I’ and sets up the cogito but who also has the subjective 
presuppositions or lays out the plane.  The idiot is the private thinker, in contrast to the public 
teacher (the schoolman): the teacher refers constantly to taught concepts (man – rational 
animal), whereas the private thinker forms a concept with innate forces that everyone possesses 
on their own account by right (‘I think’).  Here is a very strange type of persona who wants to 
think, and who thinks for himself, by the ‘natural light’.  The Idiot is a conceptual persona.  The 
question ‘Are there precursors of the cogito?’ can be made more precise.  Where does the 
persona of the idiot come from, and how does it appear?  Is it in a Christian atmosphere, but in 
reaction against the ‘scholastic’ organisation of Christianity and the authoritarian organisation of 
the church? …  In any case, the history of philosophy must go through these personae, through 
their changes according to planes and through their variety according to concepts.  Philosophy 
constantly brings conceptual personae to life; it gives life to them.
36
 
So, as well as being connected to other concepts and to an image of thought (a 
notion of what it means to think that seems undeniable to that thinker), the 
concept is also connected to a “persona”.  “Conceptual personae carry out the 
movements that describe the author’s plane of immanence, and they play a part 
in the very creation of the author’s concepts.”37  In other words, “conceptual 
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persona” is a term that describes the image of thought when it is put into action 
in concept creation.  In the case of Descartes, his image of thought may be 
difficult to describe, but we get a good sense of what it is like when we see what 
activity it drives him to as an “Idiot”.  We saw above that Descartes’ image of 
thought was one according to which certainty must be subjective, so that any 
quest for certainty must connect the objective to subjective certainty, and we 
see what this means in the Idiot: the Idiot is the one who must start out from 
subjective certainty, the one who must test everything according to his own 
reason, and so on.  In this conceptual persona we get a vivid illustration of what 
Descartes’ image of thought is by seeing how it works.  And there are other 
conceptual personae too, Deleuze and Guattari tell us: 
The idiot will reappear in another age, in a different context that is still Christian, but Russian 
now.  In becoming a Slav, the idiot is still the singular individual or private thinker, but with a 
different singularity.  It is Shestov who finds in Dostoyevsky the power of a new oppositions 
between private thinker and public teacher.  The old idiot wanted indubitable truths at which he 
could arrive by himself: in the meantime he would doubt everything, even that 3 + 2 = 5…  The 
new idiot has no wish for indubitable truths; he will never be ‘resigned’ to the fact that 3 + 2 = 5 
and wills the absurd – this is not the same image of thought.  The old idiot wanted truth, but the 
new idiot wanted to turn the absurd into the highest power of thought – in other words, to 
create.
38
  The old idiot wanted to be accountable only to reason, but the new idiot, closer to Job 
than to Socrates, wants account to be taken of ‘every victim of History’ – these are not the same 
concepts.  The new idiot will never accept the truths of History.  The old idiot wanted, by himself, 
to account for what was or was not comprehensible, what was or was not rational, what was lost 
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or saved; but the new idiot wants the lost, the incomprehensible, and the absurd to be restored 
to him.  This is most certainly not the same persona; a mutation has taken place.  And yet a 
slender thread links the two idiots, as if the first had to lose reason so that the second 
rediscovers what the other, in winning it, had lost in advance: Descartes goes mad in Russia?
39
 
We can see that there is a similarity between these two Idiots: they both refuse 
to accept anything that they cannot be certain of.  And yet they are radically 
different personae in that, philosophically speaking, they do radically different 
things: the cogito could not be a first concept for the later version of the idiot as 
it is for the earlier, Cartesian one, because the later Idiot refuses to be certain of 
anything and so could not accept that one’s own doubt proves one’s own 
existence.  The “Russian” version of the Idiot sees everything as uncertain and so, 
if she wills anything, she must “will the absurd”, since it is absurd to take any 
position.40  The later Idiot recognises that subjective certainty is required if we 
are to be certain of anything, but also believes that such subjective certainty is 
impossible.  An example of the latter sort of Idiot is the Russian philosopher 
Shestov, who Deleuze also mentions in Difference and Repetition: 
Ah Shestov, with the questions he poses, the ill will he manifests, the powerlessness to think he 
puts into thought and the double dimension he develops in these demanding questions 
concerning at once both the most radical beginning and the most stubborn repetition.
41
 
The difference between Descartes and Shestov is that the former believes that 
he can in fact find a philosophical answer to the doubts that he has about 
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thought, while the latter believes that to be truly philosophical is to admit that 
there is no answer.  As Shestov himself writes: 
We know nothing of the ultimate realities of our existence, nor shall we ever know anything.  Let 
that be agreed.  But it does not follow that therefore we must accept some or other dogmatic 
theory as a modus vivendi, no, not even positivism, which has such a sceptical face on it.  It only 
follows that man is free to change his conception of the universe as often as he changes his boots 
or his gloves, and that constancy of principle belongs only to one’s relationships with other 
people, in order that they may know where and to what extent they may depend on us.  
Therefore, on principle man should respect order in the external world and complete chaos in the 
inner.  And for those who find it difficult to bear such a duality, some internal order might also be 
provided.  Only, they should not pride themselves on it, but always remember that it is a sign of 
their weakness, pettiness, dullness.
42
 
In other words: for Shestov, we can indeed declare something certain, but it is 
the non-philosophical desire for stability that makes us take up such a position, 
rather than a triumph of reason over uncertainty, as it is for Descartes.  And this 
Shestovian Idiot can mutate even further, for Deleuze and Guattari: 
No list of the features of conceptual personae can be exhaustive, since they are constantly arising 
and vary with planes of immanence.  On a given plane, different kinds of features are mixed 
together to make up a persona.  We assume there are pathic features: the Idiot, the one who 
wants to think for himself and is a persona who can change and take on another meaning.  But 
also a Madman, a kind of madman, a cataleptic thinker or ‘mummy’ who discovers in thought an 
inability to think; or a great maniac, someone frenzied, who is in search of that which precedes 
thought, an Already-there, but at the very heart of thought itself.  Philosophy and schizophrenia 
have often been associated with each other.  But in one case the schizophrenic is a conceptual 
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persona who lives intensely within the thinker and forces him to think, whereas in the other the 
schizophrenic is a psychosocial type who represses the living being and robs him of his thought.  
Sometimes the two are combined, clasped together as if an event that is too intense corresponds 
to a lived condition that is too hard to bear.
43
 
The “Madman” mentioned here is, I think, another name for the second type of 
Idiot described above: the Madman is Shestovian in that he “discovers in thought 
an inability to think” so that every truth that we settle upon turns out to be 
absurd (see the “powerlessness to think” that Shestov is said to describe in the 
quotation from Difference and Repetition above).  The “maniac” described here 
is yet another mutation of the Idiot; the Maniac, like the Madman, believes that 
certainty is something that one cannot find in thinking, but who nevertheless 
continues to search because she believes that there is something ineffable “at 
the very heart of thought” that would make sense of thinking: in this way the 
maniac resembles the Cartesian Idiot in that, like Descartes, the maniac thinks 
that something can be found that would allow us to find the truth (though, 
unlike Descartes, the maniac has not found this yet, and perhaps cannot).  Finally 
we have the schizophrenic, who for Deleuze and Guattari is yet another persona 
(more accurately, the schizophrenic is a sort of maniac, but I want to suggest – as 
we will see below – that the schizophrenic is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a further 
mutation from the maniac): we will shortly see what this persona means for 
Deleuze and Guattari.  Note that Deleuze and Guattari tell us here that the 
schizophrenic lives “within” the thinker: the persona of the schizophrenic is not 
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the persona of a thinker.  The schizophrenic forces the thinker to think because 
of the difficulty that the former has with thinking; the thinker thinks in order to 
overcome the difficulties with thinking that the schizophrenic points to, which 
threaten to “rob” the capacity for thinking from the thinker.44 
Deleuze and Guattari do not tell us much about the schizophrenic here, but we 
can look to their Anti-Oedipus to discover more about what “schizophrenic” 
means for them, and the value it has as a conceptual persona: 
A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch.  A 
breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world.  Lenz’s stroll, for example, as 
reconstructed by Büchner.  This walk outdoors is different from the moments when Lenz finds 
himself closeted with his pastor, who forces him to situate himself socially, in relationship to the 
God of established religion, in relationship to his father, to his mother.  While taking a stroll 
outdoors, on the other hand, he is in the mountains, amid falling snowflakes, with other gods or 
without any gods at all, without a family, without a father or a mother, with nature.
45
 
So far, it does not look as though the schizophrenic has a problem at all: on the 
contrary, the schizophrenic is free from being socially situated and can enjoy the 
fresh air of the mountains.  Indeed, the schizophrenic Lenz seems to have 
extraordinary power because he “has projected himself back to a time before 
the man-nature dichotomy, before all the co-ordinates based on this 
fundamental dichotomy have been laid down” and so can commune freely with 
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nature.46  But in Büchner’s Lenz we can see evidence for why his relationship 
with nature leads him into problems: 
A surge swept through his breast at first when the rock seemed to leap away, the grey wood 
shuddered beneath him, and the mist devoured the shape of things then half revealed their giant 
limbs; the surge swept through him, he sought for something, as though for lost dreams, but he 
found nothing.  Everything was so small to him, so near, so wet, he would have liked to tuck the 
earth behind the stove, he couldn’t understand that he needed so much time to clamber down a 
slope to reach a distant point; he thought he should be able to measure out everything with a 
few strides.
47
 
Because he exists on a plane “before the man-nature dichotomy”, he cannot 
understand why he is unable to follow freely the natural shapes and distances in 
front of him, and why he must take time for his body to make the movements 
required to carry him across the landscape: that is to say, the distant objects 
seem to him “near” and “small” because he does not understand the relationship 
between his body and the natural landscape in front of him.  The earth seems to 
him something that he can pick up and tuck behind the stove because of the 
image of thought that he has: it is an image of thought according to which there 
is no man-nature dichotomy and so nature should not offer the sort of resistance 
to us that it does.  This absence of a man-nature dichotomy is connected to the 
non-Oedipalised nature of the schizophrenic: 
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It is often thought that Oedipus is an easy subject to deal with, something perfectly obvious, a 
‘given’ that is there from the very beginning.  But that is not so at all: Oedipus presupposes a 
fantastic repression of desiring-machines.
48
 
That is to say, the schizophrenic seems so difficult to understand because we 
unconsciously accept a metaphysics that takes the man-nature dichotomy for 
granted.  Lenz notices when his desires are resisted: he feels a “surge” when he 
finds he cannot instantly traverse the forest, but Oedipalised subjects do not 
notice such things: we repress our desires and take the man-nature dichotomy for 
granted.49  For Deleuze and Guattari, this means that schizophrenic experience is 
in a sense more sensitive than “ordinary” (Oedipalised) experience, since the 
schizophrenic is able to experience the resistance that nature offers us as 
something unnatural and not at all “obvious”: 
What the schizophrenic experiences, both as an individual and as a member of the human 
species, is not at all any one specific aspect of nature, but nature as a process of production.
50
 
Though above I have described Lenz as confused, the schizophrenic experience is 
not simply confused, if by “confused” we mean that it is unaware of what is 
“really” the case.  Rather, we should say that the schizophrenic has an image of 
thought in which she finds problems that the non-schizophrenic is unaware of.  
The image of thought of the schizophrenic is one that treats nature as a process 
of production, and this image of thought causes the schizophrenic to run into her 
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own unique set of problems, not encountered by non-schizophrenics.  By 
treating nature as a process of production, the schizophrenic challenges the 
normal assumption that production is something that is carried out upon nature 
by man: 
What do we mean here by process?  It is probable that at a certain level nature and industry are 
two separate and distinct things: from one point of view, industry is the opposite of nature; from 
another industry extracts its raw materials from nature; from yet another, it returns its refuse to 
nature; and so on.  Even within society, this characteristic man-nature, industry-nature, society-
nature relationship is responsible for the distinction of relatively autonomous spheres that are 
called production, distribution, consumption.
51
 
So, on this “ordinary” account of production, nature is opposed to industry, to 
the forces of production.  According to the ordinary view, nature is the material 
for production, it can be altered by production, but it is always at the end of the 
process of production, so to speak: as material to be produced, as altered result, 
as waste, and so on.  And we are not just talking about industrial production 
here, but also about social production: according to this conventional view, the 
way that we relate to nature is something learned, produced by society, a 
product of education, but nature itself is unchanging; also, social relations can be 
produced, but our fundamental nature cannot be altered.  To return to the 
example of Lenz: ordinarily we grasp the fact that nature is something 
unchanging, and that what must be produced if we are to pass across the 
landscape is movement in our own bodies, so that we can resist the matter we 
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find in nature.  We must go to the mountain, and we cannot make the mountain 
come to us.  But for the schizophrenic: 
The real truth of the matter – the glaring sober truth that resides in delirium – is that there is no 
such thing as relatively independent spheres or circuits…  Hence everything is production: 
production of productions, of actions and of passions; productions of recording processes, of 
distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; productions of consumptions, 
of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pain.  Everything is production, since the recording 
processes are immediately consumed, immediately consummated, and these consumptions 
directly reproduced.
52
 
So nature is also a process of production, and so there is no simple matter or 
material for production, but all matter is also a process of production, and the 
process of production must itself be produced, and so on.53  And neither are our 
own natures, those aspects of us that we ordinarily take to be unchanging, in fact 
distinct from the changeable social aspects of our being, since our natures are 
also processes of production.  Deleuze and Guattari are schizophrenic in their 
method in this sense:  
We make no distinction between man and nature: the human essence of nature and the natural 
essence of man become one within nature in the form of production or industry, just as they do 
within the life of man as a species.  Industry is then no longer considered from the extrinsic point 
of view of utility, but rather from the point of view of its fundamental identity with nature as 
production of man and by man.  Not man as the king of creation, but rather as the being who is in 
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intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of being, who is responsible for 
even the stars and animal life.
54
 
For the schizophrenic – as we saw with Lenz – nature seems infinitely malleable, 
which is why Lenz is confused that he cannot cross the forest in a couple of 
strides.  Deleuze and Guattari identify with the schizophrenic in that they agree 
that there is no logical necessity to separate man and nature, and so there is 
something rational about Lenz’s identification of himself with his natural 
surroundings.  Thus they write: 
This is the second meaning of process as we use the term: man and nature are not like two 
opposite terms confronting each other… rather, they are one and the same essential reality, the 
producer-product.  Production as process overtakes all idealistic categories and constitutes a 
cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an immanent principle.  That is why desiring-
production is the principal concern of a materialist psychiatry.
55
 
So, we have seen that the problem that the schizophrenic faces is as follows: 
because she has not been Oedipalised, she has no reason to distinguish between 
man-made production and the production of nature.  The “materialist 
psychiatry” that Deleuze and Guattari favour is thus against psychoanalysis in 
that they, like the schizophrenic, see processes everywhere, since without the 
Oedipus story – which explains desire in terms of familial relationships – they 
have no reason to limit this process of production to the family and society.  The 
production of desire also becomes something problematic, since it is not only 
produced in human society but is something seemingly unlimited: why should we 
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say that desire is found only in human subjects and not everywhere in nature?   
Though “conceptual persona” is not a term that Deleuze and Guattari use in Anti-
Oedipus, we can see that the schizophrenic already serves as a persona in this 
work.  We saw above that the Idiot, the Madman and the Maniac each had their 
own set of problems that called for new concepts; the schizophrenic too has a 
set of problems in that she cannot buy into the Oedipal story and so has a 
disorganised view of the world as a chaotic process of desiring-production.  As a 
result of this, the schizophrenic does not have the neurotic desire of the 
Cartesian Idiot to find absolute certainty in her own thinking, but we might say 
she has nearly the opposite problem: the schizophrenic cannot ignore the 
disorganisation that one finds in all things, and wants to challenge the (as the 
schizophrenic sees it) arbitrary organisation that exists in normal thinking and 
everyday life, by showing that everything has a life of its own which causes it to 
break free of the organisation that we impose upon it.  We have seen how this 
problem of disorganisation56 is a difficulty for Lenz (he cannot understand his 
own body’s relationship to the natural landscape: this relationship seems 
arbitrary to him, and he sees no reason why he should not be able to traverse 
these distances in a single step), but we must also note how it causes him to be 
critical of what he sees as a false “idealism” that would deny the real life of 
reality: 
Those writers, he argued, of whom it was said that they reflected reality in fact knew nothing 
whatever about it, but even they were a good deal more bearable than those who sought to 
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transfigure reality.  The dear Lord, he said, has surely made the world as it is meant to be, and I 
doubt if we can cobble up anything better, our one aspiration should be to create as much as he 
did.  What I demand in all things is – life, full of scope for existence, nothing else really matters, 
we then have no need to ask whether something is ugly or beautiful, both are overridden by the 
conviction that ‘Everything created possesses life’, which is the sole criterion in matters of art.
57
 
In attacking idealism, Lenz is defending what he calls “life”.  Life is never merely 
beautiful nor ugly, since these terms are arbitrary constructions that falsify life by 
placing restrictions upon it.  For Lenz, the life that things have is more important 
than the false notions of beauty that we use to “transfigure” life.  In Anti-
Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari mention the moment when Lenz receives a letter 
from his father and becomes angry, and we can see that this illustrates what 
Lenz means by “life”,58 and it is worth quoting a little more from this part of Lenz 
than Deleuze and Guattari do: 
After the meal Kaufmann took him to one side.  He had received letters from Lenz’s father, Lenz 
was to go home and give him assistance.  Kaufmann told him how he was squandering his life 
here, uselessly wasting it, he should set himself a goal – and so on and so on.  “Leave!” Lenz 
retorted angrily. “leave this place?  Go home?  Go mad there?  You know I can’t bear it anywhere 
but here, in this countryside; if I couldn’t get out on to a mountain occasionally and see the 
landscape all around, then come back home and walk through the garden and look inside 
through the window – I’d go mad!  mad!  Leave me in peace, for God’s sake!  A little bit of peace, 
that’s all, now that I’m starting to feel a bit happier.  Leave this place?  Three words, that’s all, 
and the world is ruined, I don’t understand it.  We all need something, what could be better than 
having peace!  Climbing ever higher and battling onward, forever spurning what the moment 
offers, always fasting in order to feast in the future, choosing to go thirsty while bright streams 
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sparkle right before you.  Life is bearable now, and I want to stay here.  Why?  why?  Because I 
feel happy, that’s why.  What does my father want?  Can he give me more?  Impossible!  Leave 
me in peace.”
59
 
Lenz opposes planning for the future to the more preferable option of living for 
“what the moment offers”, and in this way he rejects organisation.  Lenz just 
wants to be left alone.  Real life for Lenz is not something merely organised but is 
this happiness that is impossible to describe (“Why? Because I feel happy, that’s 
why,” Lenz says, and cannot say more), so that Lenz feels that he can only live 
when he is left alone and no demands are made upon him by others.60  This 
happiness is impossible to describe because it arises from the life that things 
have, from the variation that springs from things that we tend to stifle with the 
ordinary organisation of our lives and our thought.  Lenz is trying to escape 
organisation so that he can find happiness in the life that things have.  As Miguel 
de Beistegui writes: 
The problem of the schizophrenic is precisely one of disorganisation.  It is a matter of knowing 
how to become a body without organs, cross the thresholds of organisation and become reunited 
with the field of virtual intensities.
61
 
What is interesting here is that taking the schizophrenic to have a problem of 
disorganisation is opposed to a more conventional intuition about what is 
problematic about schizophrenia.  As we saw above, Lenz has to struggle to 
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create a separation between himself and nature, while the non-schizophrenic 
takes such a separation for granted.  The schizophrenic thus finds it difficult to 
live in our Oedipalised world and from a non-schizophrenic perspective it looks 
as though the schizophrenic has a problem of organisation, since what is wrong 
with Lenz, for example, is that he cannot grasp his relationship to the physical 
world nor the importance of his relationship to his father (we might say he is 
childish for failing to see that he has a duty to his father).  We might in that case 
suggest that, since he has such difficulty in working out what his place is in the 
world and cannot simply accept it, Lenz should be treated like an “idiot” and 
learn to be more Cartesian and try to find certainties that he can stick to so that 
he can live a normal, healthy life.  But Deleuze and Guattari propose that we take 
the schizophrenic to be a conceptual persona (to which an image of thought 
belongs) and that we do this by taking Lenz to have his own problem which is 
different to that of the Idiot (a mutation of this problem: see above).  They 
propose that we take this problem seriously and that this problem is a problem 
of disorganisation: we take it that Lenz has identified a real problem with the 
world by recognising that it is too organised or, more precisely, that it is 
organised in false ways; by noticing that people would prefer certainty to being 
truthful to the real chaos of life, that they would prefer to transfigure life rather 
than admit  the fact that what is alive has infinite variety; and by arguing that 
true creativity does not consist in working out and setting down what is beautiful 
and what is not and trying to stick to these conventions, but in allowing ourselves 
to be the sort of creators who seek more and more varied and various creations. 
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By “becoming schizophrenic” in our thinking, Deleuze and Guattari believe that 
we can learn to think in such a way that we take the ultimate disorganisation of 
life and thought into account62 and not take any particular organisation (for 
example, the man-nature distinction) for granted.  For example, we may assume 
that there is a man-nature distinction, but we must also see that this distinction 
is constructed, and that therefore this construction could be destroyed and 
replaced with another construction.  Indeed, we have to assume that there is a 
man-nature distinction for much of the time, for example if we do not want to 
become confused when we walk around in the world, but when we let go of this 
certainty, and eliminate the man-nature distinction, we should not see the 
confusion that arises as simply false; instead we should see that there is a certain 
truth in this confusion, that the elimination of the man-nature dichotomy gives 
us a certain insight into the disorganisation that grounds our thinking.63  It is this 
insight into the ultimate disorganisation of things that allows us to be creative.  
(We saw how this comes into concept creation above: concepts are made up of 
components that have lives of their own and that through their own variations 
will call for new combinations, that is to say, new creations of concepts and 
connections between concepts.)  Deleuze and Guattari propose that we follow 
Lenz to the extent that we become more sensitive to the importance of the 
infinite variety that life entails beyond the variations found in any given set of 
concepts. 
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So, we must note that it is not, for Deleuze and Guattari, a sort of blindness or 
lack of perception64 that makes the schizophrenic think in this way: the 
schizophrenic of Deleuze and Guattari belongs to an image of thought, according 
to which thought is utterly disorganised.  For the schizophrenic, any organisation 
of thought is something constructed, and constructed amidst the chaos that will 
inevitably give rise to more and new variations that destabilise the organisation 
that we have created in our thought.65  For Deleuze and Guattari, Lenz is a 
schizophrenic because of his refusal to accept anything but his own sense of 
peace as a guiding principle and the fact that this peace consists, for example, in 
the activity of aimlessly wandering about and peering through his window (see 
above): any organisation of his day (going out for a walk in the mountains) is 
aimed not at preparations for the future but at keeping alive the variation that is 
essential to his sense of “peace” and “happiness”.  Lenz’s “peace” consists in 
freedom from any form of arbitrary organisation, freedom even from his duties 
to his family.  Deleuze and Guattari are not advocating that philosophers spend 
all their time in the way Lenz does, or even that this sense of peace is the highest 
aim of human endeavour, but what they are telling us is that the schizophrenic is 
right to believe that thought has no underlying organisation, and that reality 
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consists in infinite variation (we’ll see in what sense it consists in “infinite 
variation” below). 
We saw above that, for Deleuze and Guattari, the schizophrenic is a mutation of 
the “maniac”.  Like the maniac, the schizophrenic is always looking for something 
other than the constructions she finds in thought.  However, the schizophrenic 
differs from the maniac in that the disorganisation that the schizophrenic seeks is 
not something mysterious that lies beyond thinking and experience and which 
cannot be found: disorganisation is immanent to organisation, for the 
schizophrenic.  For the schizophrenic, it is not that we should clear away all 
forms of organisation in order to get to the disorganisation that lies beyond 
organised thinking, but instead we should recognise the variation that belongs to 
every object and organisation of thought.  As we saw above, Lenz does not 
suggest that we should reject all forms of thinking; rather, he insists that we 
should create as much as we can (more than God, he says: see above) in order 
that we do not falsify the infinite variation in nature.  And as with the second 
idiot (the “Madman”: see above), the schizophrenic wants us to will the absurd 
and thereby create something new, rather than settle for what God has given us. 
As we saw above, all thought and experience and everything about the world is 
production for the schizophrenic (it was this that meant that there could be no 
man-nature dichotomy for the schizophrenic: see above). It is disorganised 
production: the various elements of thought and experience work against one 
another and produce something, rather than each element in itself expressing a 
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deeper, essential and prior unity that all elements share.  For Deleuze and 
Guattari, this means that the schizophrenic thinks of the world as consisting of 
nothing but “machines”, where “a machine may be defined as a system of 
interruptions or breaks”.66  “Breaks”, for Deleuze and Guattari, are opposed to 
“flows”: a flow occurs when one thing logically leads to another; when one thing 
implies another; when the thing that follows finds its cause in another; and so 
on.  That is to say, if everything were organised, if there were an underlying unity 
to everything, then the system would be one of “flows” and nothing more, since 
each thing would logically give rise to the next: what follows from something 
would be implicit in that thing, that is, it would follow from the nature of that 
thing. However, since everything is disorganised for the schizophrenic, the 
schizophrenic system is one according to which each thing “interrupts” other 
things, so that the effects that are produced in nature and thought do not follow 
from prior causes and so cannot be said to be implicit in what has gone before – 
for the schizophrenic, what happens next is always unexpected since it never 
flows from the thing that preceded it (we saw an example of this in Lenz when he 
was unable to grasp how he should move himself around in nature).  It is for this 
reason that the schizophrenic differs from the Cartesian “Idiot” too: for the 
schizophrenic, finding a certainty with which to begin philosophy would not help, 
since nothing would follow from this certainty and so it would not serve as a 
foundation upon which to build our philosophical thinking. 
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Now, Deleuze and Guattari are not suggesting that we follow the schizophrenic 
by denying all connection between events so that we are surprised at everything 
that occurs (even Lenz only experiences such surprise some of the time).  But 
what they are suggesting is that we should learn from the schizophrenic by 
becoming aware of the fact that any connection between objects in our thinking 
is not a result of the essential nature of the components themselves; instead, we 
should see that it is we, as thinkers, who create these connections. (As we saw 
above: for Deleuze and Guattari, though thoughts have life and so call for new 
connections, it requires a thinker occupied by a particular image of thought to 
create a specific set of connections.  For example, Descartes’ cogito was not 
created by simply thinking and following the essential nature of the concept of 
“thinking” or “being”; rather, Descartes created connections between thinking, 
being and doubting in order to solve his own particular set of problems.  To say 
that a thought has a life of its own is not to say that it has a pre-determined 
essence, but to say that it is indeterminate, that it is not determined to connect 
in any particular way until connected by a thinker.  Thoughts have no essence of 
their own prior to becoming component of a concept, for Deleuze and Guattari.)  
We learn from the machinic thinking of the schizophrenic that no connection in 
our thinking can be justified by claiming that it expresses an underlying unity: 
concepts are not connected in the way they are because we have discovered 
something essential about them from which our system of concepts flows.  As 
Beistegui writes: 
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Ultimately, Deleuze and Guattari insist we do away with the idealist category of expression, and 
propose instead that we understand desire in terms of units of production, that is, as a piece of a 
larger machine, or a factory.  Why talk of machines and factories?  To emphasise the fact that 
desire does not represent anything, and especially not something that it lacks, does not express 
anything in the linguistic-semantic sense, but does or produces something.
67
 
As we saw above, a concept connects components that have lives of their own: in 
this way a concept is a machine because it interrupts the flows of thought in 
order to make new connections.  (For example, it interrupts the flow of being in 
order to limit it in the cogito to finite thinking being.  In the cogito, the 
connection between thinking and being interrupts “being”.)  That is to say, there 
is no essence implicit in a component that constitutes that component’s “life” 
and from which connections follow; rather, there are infinite potential 
connections in a component – this is what it means for something to be alive for 
the schizophrenic  – and so the destiny of our thinking is in no way 
predetermined but is in fact chaotic (and as we will see, the chaos from which 
connections emerge means that talking of “potentiality” is perhaps misleading: 
we should instead talk of “virtuality”).  For Deleuze and Guattari, “every machine 
is a machine of a machine”68, and we saw how this applies to conceptual thinking 
in section 1 above: a concept is a “fragmentary totality”, because any truth that 
it happens to express is less important, for Deleuze and Guattari, than the fact 
that it is an organisation of components that have a life of their own: that is to 
say, the concept is an organisation of components that can vary in infinite ways 
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beyond those that follow from the concept.  For Deleuze and Guattari, the 
criterion of a good concept is not its truth but its productivity, that is, the new 
variations of components that it creates, that resonate with other variations of 
these components (and, as we saw above in section 1, can lead to bridges to new 
concepts, or adaptations of existing concepts, and so on). 
3: Virtuality 
 
As we have seen, the image of thought that a philosopher has determines the 
philosophical problems that that philosopher will face.  The image of thought of 
Deleuze and Guattari is a schizophrenic image of thought, and this means, as we 
have seen, that their problem is the problem of how to think in the face of the 
irreducible life that our thought has, which will take our thinking in infinite 
directions and make any concept that we construct unstable (“unstable” in the 
sense that the concept can cease to be relevant to our image of thought: it 
ceases to be “interesting”69).  In this section I will say a little more about what 
the schizophrenic conception of life as infinite variation means by looking at 
what “life” means for Deleuze.  We will see that, given this conception of “life”, 
historical events only occur as a result of discontinuity, so that any account of an 
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event – for example, a philosophical event, such as the appearance of Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason – that tries to explain that event by tracing a continuity, 
development or progression through history fails to account for the real causes 
of that event.   
We can turn to Deleuze’s essay “Immanence: A Life” in order to see what “life” 
means for Deleuze.  For Deleuze, life cannot consist in continuity because it does 
not have a fixed nature but is “pure immanence”, where “pure immanence” is 
“not immanent to life, but the immanence that is in nothing else is itself a life.  A 
life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence”.70  Since a life does 
not have a fixed nature, nothing follows from it: we cannot predict what will be 
caused by a life.  Deleuze distinguishes between a subjective life and this pure, 
pre-subjective life that he takes to be more fundamental: 
What is immanence?  A life…  No one has described what a life is better than Charles Dickens, 
when he takes the indefinite article as an index of the transcendental.  A scoundrel, a bad apple, 
held in contempt by everyone, is found on the point of death, and suddenly those charged with 
his care display an urgency, respect, and even love for the dying man’s least sign of life.  Everyone 
makes it his business to save him.  As a result, the wicked man himself, in the depths of his coma, 
feels something soft and sweet penetrate his soul.  But as he progresses back toward life, his 
benefactors turn cold, and he himself rediscovers his old vulgarity and meanness.  Between his 
life and death, there is a moment where a life is merely playing with death.  The life of the 
individual has given way to an impersonal and yet singular life, which foregrounds a pure event 
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that has been liberated from the accidents of internal and external life, from the subjectivity and 
the objectivity of what comes to pass.
71
 
So, in order to see the radical discontinuity at the heart of things we must take a 
life not as individuated but as singular, so that we see a life not as having an 
individual nature that determines what will follow from it (for example, the man 
who has led a bad life and so will be likely to commit more crimes) but as a 
singular nature for which “all things are possible” (to use Shestov’s phrase).  That 
is to say, when we reduce life to its “singularity” we “liberate” it from the 
“accidents” that have befallen it and which have shaped its character, and so 
there is no quality that the singular life has that would determine what is 
possible for it and what it not.  This unlimited possibility of a life is its “virtuality”.  
However, this is not to say that it is actually the case that all things are possible 
for a life: the process of actualisation that a life undergoes and which 
individuates that life is not simply a realisation of the possibility contained within 
that life.  As Deleuze writes: 
A life contains only virtuals.  It is composed of virtualities, events, singularities.  What I am calling 
virtual is not something that lacks reality.  Rather, the virtual becomes engaged in a process of 
actualisation as it follows the plane which gives it its proper reality.  The immanent event is 
actualised in a state of things and in a state of lived experience, and these states bring the event 
about.
72
 
So, the singular life does not lack reality but it is really something that is not an 
individual subject, and so does not have any qualities from which certain actions 
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flow.  All things are possible for the singular life, since the singular life is not 
limited by any states of affairs, and this unlimited possibility is the reality of the 
singular life.  But the process of actualisation is not a realisation of possibility but 
is rather an “engagement” with the virtual by “states” of “things” and “lived 
experience”: we saw this above with the creation of concepts, when we saw that 
concepts are not deduced from a plane of immanence, or image of thought, but 
instead connect up elements of the plane (existing concepts and thoughts, 
“being” and “thinking”, for example) while leaving them their own “lives” (their 
own potential for infinite variation) that will eventually lead any concept to 
become unstable.  For Deleuze, actualisation is the engagement of the plane of 
immanence (the image of thought that a philosopher has) with specific acts of 
creation that emerge contingently from the infinite variation of life. 
To be clear, I should emphasise that “virtuality” is not synonymous with 
“possibility”, for Deleuze.  As Deleuze writes in Difference and Repetition:  
The only danger in all this is that the virtual could be confused with the possible.  The possible is 
opposed to the real: the process undergone by the possible is therefore a ‘realisation’.  By 
contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself.  The process it 
undergoes is that of actualisation.
73
 
On my reading, virtuality is unlimited possibility, but the very fact that this 
possibility is unlimited means that virtuality is not the same as possibility: it is 
meaningless to talk of unlimited possibility if we are trying to decide what is 
possible and what is not.  In other words, Deleuze’s concept of the virtual is 
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intended to shift the focus away from trying to find the “conditions of possibility” 
of an event to finding instead the “real conditions” of an event.74  For Deleuze, 
the real conditions of an event are not contained implicitly within any existing 
state of affairs, but consist in an “encounter” of ordered states of affairs with the 
infinite possibility of the virtual.75   This means that any event will be aleatory, or 
chaotic: a given state of affairs will not make this or that outcome inevitable, 
given the need for a state of affairs to engage with the infinite variation and life 
of the virtual. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, this means that we should oppose thinkers who 
promote the “cult of necessity”.  The cult of necessity is the philosophical 
practice of assuming that new events arise out of the possibilities provided by 
the current, actual state of affairs.  Deleuze and Guattari call this the “cult of 
necessity” because it ignores the “irreducibility of contingency”: that is to say, 
the cult of necessity ignores the aleatory nature of events.  The cult of necessity 
claims that we can look at history in order to trace a development of events (for 
example, a development of concepts) by seeing how each actual event (for 
example, each actual concept) logically led to the next.  For Deleuze and 
Guattari, such an approach does not take into account other factors, such as 
“geographical” factors: 
Geography is not confined to providing historical form with a substance and variable places.  It is 
not merely physical and human but mental, like the landscape.  Geography wrests history from 
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the cult of necessity in order to stress the irreducibility of contingency.  It wrests it from the cult 
of origins in order to affirm the power of a ‘milieu’…  Finally, it wrests history from itself in order 
to discover becomings that do not belong to history even if they fall back into it…  ‘Becoming’ 
does not belong to history.  History today still designates only the set of conditions, however 
recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become, that is to say, in order to 
create something new…  Philosophy cannot be reduced to its own history, because it continually 
wrests itself from this history in order to create new concepts that fall back into history but do 
not come from it.  How could something come from history?  Without history, becoming would 
remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical.  Psychosocial types 
belong to history, but conceptual personae belong to becoming.  The event itself needs becoming 
as an unhistorical element.
76
 
Though historians do, of course, take geography into account (they distinguish 
between British and Chinese history, for example), Deleuze and Guattari are 
suggesting here that nevertheless historians fail to account for those factors that 
that “interrupt” the historical development that they are trying to trace.  That is 
to say (to use the “machinic” terms set out in section 2 above), historians and 
historicist philosophers take development to occur as a “flow” from one event to 
another, and do not take into account the many factors that must interrupt any 
flow and create new events.  For example:  
The birth of philosophy required an encounter between the Greek milieu and the plane of 
immanence of thought…  In short, philosophy does have a principle, but it is a synthetic and 
contingent principle – an encounter, a conjunction.  It is not insufficient by itself but contingent in 
itself.  Even in the concept, the principle depends upon a connection of components that could 
have been different, with different neighbourhoods.  The principle of reason such as it appears in 
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philosophy is a principle of contingent reason and is put like this: there is no good reason but 
contingent reason; there is no universal history except of contingency.
77
 
So, while philosophy did indeed emerge from past events, by responding to 
actual problems that existed in Greek society and Greek thinking (Deleuze and 
Guattari tell us that Greek philosophy emerged out of a desire to find a system 
for determining which of the many voices in the Greek democracy should be 
heard78), nevertheless these factors (this “milieu”) had to encounter the “plane 
of immanence”: 
This plane of immanence is not exactly philosophical, but prephilosophical.  It is affected by what 
populates and reacts on it, in such a way that it becomes philosophical only through the effect of 
the concept.  Although the plane is presupposed by philosophy, it is nonetheless instituted by it 
and it unfolds in a philosophical relationship with the nonphilosophical.
79
 
 As we saw above, the “plane of immanence” is the “image of thought” that a 
philosopher has, and this image of thought is an “event”: that is, it “unfolds” in 
the aleatory way described above, as it relates to the “milieu”, or the infinite 
possibility of the virtual.  As we saw above, the image of thought determines the 
problems that occupy a thinker; now we see that the image of thought and its 
problems depend for their existence upon the virtual.  To say that the image of 
thought depends for existence upon the virtual is to say that it comes from 
nothing, from chaos, from the infinite variation of nature or from the pure 
immanence of the life of the thinker.  As Beistegui writes: 
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The real itself is not produced or moved as a result of some intrinsic negativity, some self-
opposing or contradictory logic.  There is, however, such a thing as non-being, Deleuze claims: it 
is the being of what he calls the problematical, the being of the problem, or of the question.  He 
also calls it the virtual.
80
 
The virtual is thus the non-being upon which an image of thought rests.  That is 
to say, there is nothing that underlies an image of thought: the image of thought 
is what gets us thinking since it provides us with problems that we are driven to 
solve by creating concepts.  The image of thought is the plane of immanence (see 
above), but it is not immanent “to” anything81 and so cannot be explained by 
anything deeper than it.  An image of thought cannot be entirely explained by 
the historical conditions that made it possible and so is something singular.  Nor 
can the concepts that belong to an image of thought be explained by the milieu 
in which they were created, since they were not contained implicitly in this 
milieu.  The image of thought and its concepts meet the milieu, but are not 
implicit within it, so that the image of thought does not follow from the milieu 
(nor vice versa): 
To the extent that the possible is open to ‘realisation’, it is understood as an image of the real, 
while the real is supposed to resemble the possible.  That is why it is difficult to understand what 
existence adds to the concept when all it does is double like with like.  Such is the defect of the 
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 What is Philosophy? p.45: “Immanence can be said to be the burning issue of all philosophy 
because it takes on all the dangers that philosophy must confront, all the condemnations, 
persecutions, and repudiations that it undergoes.  This at least persuades us that the problem of 
immanence is not abstract or merely theoretical.  It is not immediately clear why immanence is 
so dangerous, but it is.  It engulfs sages and gods.  What singles out the philosopher is the part 
played by immanence or fire.  Immanence is immanent only to itself and consequently captures 
everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be immanent.  In any 
case, whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to Something, we can be sure that this 
Something reintroduces the transcendent.” 
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possible: a defect which serves to condemn it as produced after the fact, as retroactively 
fabricated in the image of what resembles it.  The actualisation of the virtual, on the contrary, 
always takes place by difference, divergence or differenciation.  Actualisation breaks with 
resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle.  Actual terms never 
resemble the singularities they incarnate.
82
 
So, we do not look for anything deeper than an image of thought: the task of the 
philosopher is to follow the vicissitudes of her image of thought as it responds to 
the contingencies of the milieu.  To say that the image of thought depends upon 
the virtual (upon the milieu, upon contingencies) for its existence is not to say 
that it actualises the possibility of the virtual (or of the milieu), but that it 
emerges from a chaos that defies explanation and that any further changes to 
the image of thought will likewise arise for reasons that cannot be fully 
explained.  There will always be a little chaos involved when we are setting up 
images of thought and creating concepts, for Deleuze and Guattari.  We saw 
above that Deleuze and Guattari themselves take up an image of thought and 
explore it, rather than trying to find a first principle from which we could 
determine which plane of immanence might be the “best” one: they cannot 
prove that their schizophrenic image of thought is an accurate image of thought, 
but they can take this image as far as they can in order to show that it is 
“productive”, that is, that it creates concepts that we can make use of and that 
are “interesting”.83  As we saw in section 1 above, for Deleuze and Guattari we 
think in response to problems, and the problems we have depend upon our 
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“point of view”.  Deleuze wants to show that the plurality of points of view that 
we have is something irreducible, since there is a real chaos in life that can only 
be accounted for through a plurality of planes of immanence, and that the point 
of view that we take is not determined by the actual, but emerges out of chaos 
(out of the “milieu”84).  Thus contingency is “irreducible” for Deleuze and Guttari. 
Nevertheless there is something paradoxical about this Deleuzian view, since 
they are trying to explain the plurality of planes of immanence through their own 
schizophrenic plane of immanence, and therefore they seem to imply that the 
schizophrenic image of thought is the best one.  In What is Philosophy? Deleuze 
and Guttari write: 
We will say that THE plane of immanence is… that which can be thought and that which cannot 
be thought.  It is the nonthought within thought.  It is the base of all planes, immanent to every 
thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it…  Perhaps this is the most supreme act of 
philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought 
in every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not-external 
outside and the not-internal inside – that which cannot be thought and yet must be thought, 
which was thought once, as Christ was incarnated once, in order to show, that one time, the 
possibility  of the impossible.
85
 
On my reading, what Deleuze and Guattari call “THE plane of immanence” is 
what Deleuze calls “the virtual”: it is the infinite possibility (which, being infinite, 
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 The milieu differs from a historical state of affairs because there is nothing we can say about it 
prior to its engagement with a plane of immanence or image of thought.  The milieu is not 
something actual whose outcome we can predict but a collection of contingencies.  In the 
thought of Deleuze and Guattari, a milieu functions as a random element that impacts upon the 
image of thought and shocks it into taking action, though the milieu does not determine what 
direction the image of thought takes. 
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is no possibility at all: see above) that cannot be thought but which must be 
engaged with if events are to come into being, the infinite possibility that 
ensures that events are not predictable but must have an element of chaos in 
them.  As we saw above, the schizophrenic does not try to think this 
“nonthought within thought” as the “maniac” does (see above for definition of 
the conceptual persona of the maniac), but tries to create endlessly in order to 
keep thought alive in this chaos.  The fact that THE plane of immanence is 
unthinkable means that the “cult of necessity” has got it wrong: there is a 
multiplicity of planes that affect the outcome of any event and so we cannot 
trace the causes of historical events just by looking at actual events and the 
possibilities that arose from them; we must look also to the infinite variation of 
life, or to the virtual. 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have seen that, for Deleuze and Guattari the “supreme act” of 
philosophy is to show that there is a chaotic element in our thinking that cannot 
be thought.  This chaotic element is the virtuality of our thinking: we cannot fully 
conceptualise the “image of thought” that we have; nor can we explain why it is 
that we have the image of thought that we do.  As we saw, the cult of necessity 
tries to explain the way that we think and the concepts we have by looking only 
at the way actual events have developed, and it therefore leaves out of 
consideration the aleatory element of the event that is essential for its creation.  
For the cult of necessity, there is no such thing as a “milieu”, but only “states of 
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affairs” that contain possibilities implicit within them.  For Deleuze and Guattari, 
Hegel is one of the philosophers who tries to explain our current philosophical 
situation in such a way: 
Hegel and Heidegger remain historicists inasmuch as they posit history as a form of interiority in 
which the concept necessarily develops or unveils its destiny.  The necessity rests on the 
abstraction of the historical element rendered circular.  The unforeseeable creation of concepts is 
thus poorly understood.
86
 
So, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that Hegel and Heidegger take philosophical 
thinking to have a “destiny”, which they deduce by looking back over past events 
and (as we saw above) “retroactively” trying to discover what it was about the 
past events that led logically to the events that followed them.  As we saw 
above, the problem with this is that the role that the “unforeseeable” virtual 
plays in the creation of concepts is ignored.  In this thesis I want to show that we 
can read Hegel’s story of the development of concepts in such a way that the 
“irreducible contingency” of events – the fact that they must always emerge 
from the virtual and never simply develop from the actual – is taken into 
account.  As we will see, asking that Hegel deal with this Deleuzian problem in 
this way will be a difficult task, since Hegel is usually read in such a way that he 
tries to overcome contingency to show that there is a deeper necessity at work 
in our thinking.  For example, Stephen Houlgate writes: 
In Hegel’s view… certain shifts in cultural perspectives have resulted not merely from a change in 
human self-understanding, but rather from a deepening of human self-understanding.  Such 
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shifts constitute, for him, a progressive development towards the truth.  They represent 
humanity’s increasing awareness of the essential nature of our own character, activity and 
thought – a growing self-awareness that brings with it a more adequate understanding of the 
world around us.
87
 
As we will see, I will be defending this sort of view of Hegel in my thesis: Hegel 
does indeed see the history of ideas as progressive, and believes that we can 
look back at the history of philosophy and see how new and better perspectives 
have emerged out of older concepts (new and better concepts make “explicit” 
what is “implicit” within the earlier concepts).  But I will be also arguing that 
Hegel gets to this point – where he can make claims about the necessity in the 
world – only by proceeding in a way that is immanent, so that the irreducibility of 
contingency is recognised, even as necessity is determined in the world.  I want 
to show that I agree with John Burbidge when he writes of events as follows: 
Here is no purposive development, organising events to produce an order that matches what 
reason tells us ought to be.  Reason works with universals, not simply the abstract universals of 
moral laws, but also the concrete universals where many components are fitted into a coherent 
whole.
88
 
Consequently “there is no way of knowing what will happen once we introduce 
these radically new events into the turbulent cauldron of human affairs.”89  This 
may seem to contradict the description of Hegel given above, according to which 
history for Hegel proceeds through a development to new and better ideas, but 
what I want to emphasise in this thesis is that there is really no contradiction 
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here: Hegel sees history as a progressive development when we look back upon 
it, but sees the event as emerging out of a chaotic jumble of affairs at the time in 
which the event is coming into being.  I will argue therefore that Hegel would 
accept the Deleuzian distinction between the aleatory moment when a concept 
is created and the “retroactive” explanation of that concept and yet considers 
the latter activity to be a valid mode of explanation for concepts.  For Hegel, it is 
essential that we retroactively explain the development of events and of our 
concepts – and therefore “conceal” the moments of contingency and chance 
where it could have been otherwise – if we are to make sense of ourselves as 
subjects, and as political agents.90  It is on this point that I think we find the most 
significant difference between Hegel, on the one hand, and Deleuze and 
Guattari, on the other: for Deleuze and Guattari, we have a false sense of our 
existence as political agents if we retroactively eliminate the virtual from our 
account of the event.  Hegel’s retroactive logic is a “betrayal” of philosophy for 
Deleuze and Guattari precisely because it tries to explain all change in terms of 
necessity and so denies the contingency that in fact creates any event.  As 
Beistegui writes: 
 
Hegel’s dialectic is movement, and even infinite movement.  As such, it gives the impression of 
being produced immanently.  But it produces movement and immanence with words and 
representations only.
91
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“Words and representations only” because, in the final analysis, Hegelian 
dialectic leaves contingency out of consideration and so fabricates logical 
reasons for events.  From a Deleuzian perspective, this means it leaves 
immanence out of the account, since it does not take the life that brings events 
into being into account.  My aim in this thesis is to show that Hegel at least 
intends to take such life into account when he considers the subjective “resolve” 
of reflective thinking, even if on Deleuze and Guattari’s reading he ultimately 
“betrays” life and philosophy by turning this resolve into something necessary (as 
we will see in chapters 6 and 7 below, there is no necessity without an 
irreducible contingency, for Hegel, even if this contingency is “concealed”92).  In 
this way we will see what Hegelian necessity consists in, and see that it is a 
necessity that is necessarily bound up with contingency. 
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Chapter 2: Preface to chapters 3 to 7 
 
In the previous chapter I explained why contingency must be “irreducible” if we 
take immanence seriously in philosophy.  I suggested that this is the case for 
Hegel as well as for Deleuze and Guattari (even if, as far as Deleuze and Guattari 
are concerned, Hegel fails to stick to the principle that contingency is irreducible 
and reduces contingency to necessity, nevertheless I will argue that Hegel does 
not intend to reduce contingency to necessity, and that he takes the immanent 
approach to mean that contingency must be irreducible).     
 
In chapter 3 we will see how Hegelian logic emerges from an initial contingent 
“resolve”.  We will see how the development of the Logic leads to an 
examination of “reflection”, which is a way of thinking that belongs in the 
modern age, and so is historically contingent. 
 
In chapter 4 we will see how the logic of being, found in the “Doctrine of Being” 
in the Logic – the logic of reflection’s thinking about traditional metaphysical 
concepts – is transformed into a logic of essence, or a logic of reflection.  We can 
call it a “logic of reflection” because in the logic of essence we are looking at 
concepts that are explicitly reflective, so that reflection is explicitly examining 
itself: after showing how reflection brings into question the various concepts of 
being, in his account of the concepts of essence he tries to give a positive 
account of reflection.  The concepts of being were the concepts of being in itself, 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 62 of 365 
 
being as simply what it is, that were shown to be inadequate (since reflection 
shows them to be what they are not).  The concepts of essence are the concepts 
of reflection: they are the concepts of being as what it is not, as always already 
altered by reflection.  According to essentialist – or reflective – thinking, 
reflection must distort being if we are going to have any conception of being at 
all.  The logic of reflection is a logic of domination, because being must be 
thought according to the rules of reflection and can have no meaning in itself.  
This positive account of reflection shows how, by basing our thinking on 
reflection, we might try to avoid the inadequacy of the concepts of traditional 
philosophy. 
 
In chapter 5 we will see how the logic of essence is transformed into the logic of 
the Concept.  Reflection turns on itself: reflection is incoherent, since reflection 
itself turns out to have no meaning in itself.  We cannot explain what reflection 
means and so cannot give a meaningful account of being: in order to offer any 
sort of coherent account we fall back on a conception of being as essentially 
unfathomable.  What is essential is repeatedly shown to be necessarily 
mysterious.  The problem, however, is that positing this mysterious element 
does not allow us to give a satisfactory account of being either, and we end up 
with a conception of being as what is actual, or as what simply is.  Despite the 
mediation of reflection, we can say no more of this mysterious actuality than 
that it is.  Thus the attempt to give a positive account of philosophy, to show how 
we can defend philosophy by learning lessons from reflective thinking and 
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rejecting the inadequate concepts of traditional philosophy seems to fail, since 
reflective thinking itself cannot stand up to its own criteria and thus comes 
seriously into question. 
 
In chapter 6 we will see in what sense the Concept is necessary: from the 
contingent “resolve” to think about a contingent way of thinking (reflection), a 
“retroactive” necessity develops: Hegel calls this speculative thinking.  
Speculative thinking does not aim at a fixed and complete definition of being, but 
sees thinking as a process of developing our conception of what we are studying 
(in this case, being) by tracing the development of concepts as they are applied 
to the object of study.  In this way, any object of study is found to consist 
logically of varying conceptual levels, from the most abstract to the most 
concrete.  Whatever our object of study is, there will always remain an 
unfathomable element: speculative thinking allows us to remedy our lack of 
certainty by allowing us to form the fullest picture possible of the object of study. 
 
In chapter 7 we will see how this method concretely applies to the study of the 
free will and ethical life: for Hegel, speculative thinking teaches us that, however 
we concretely grasp the free will, we must always account for the abstract 
character of free will if we are to avoid a dogmatic conception of what it means 
to be free.  Though it may seem strange to portray Hegel, who argued that the 
world is rational and intelligible, as a thinker who argued that an aspect of reality 
must remain unfathomable, I hope we will see in what follows how these two 
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aspects of Hegel’s thinking fit together: we can have a rational grasp of the world 
only once we realise that “Absolute Knowing” does not mean knowing all that 
there is about the world, but instead means thinking our concepts together 
systematically, so that we can grasp the role that the unfathomable, 
indeterminate and contingent plays in our rational and determinate thinking. 
 
Overall, my aim is to show that Hegel’s method is properly immanent, in that it 
recognises the irreducibility of contingency, even if it does this in a way very 
different to that advocated by Deleuze and Guattari. 
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Chapter 3: Hegel’s logic of being 
 
1: Beginning 
 
I am going to argue in this chapter that Hegel examines what it means to simply 
think, and does this by demonstrating how our modern way of thinking disrupts 
the act of pure thinking.  In the Logic, Hegel seems in places to lament that the 
spirit of metaphysics – meaning “the spirit which contemplates its own pure 
essence”93 – seems to have more or less died in his own time.  Metaphysics was 
a discipline that sought knowledge of things in themselves: the spirit 
contemplates its own essence not for some external purpose, but because self-
knowledge was seen to be an end in itself.  Metaphysics is self-sufficient, 
meaning that it is an end in itself: thus Hegel describes metaphysics as “the 
colourless communion of the spirit with itself.”94  The metaphysics that Hegel 
mourns for was a form of thinking that was not subservient to practical ends but 
was an end in itself.  In sum, metaphysics was the science of unfolding “the 
reason which is immanent in things themselves”, and as such metaphysical 
speculation did not presuppose a purpose for the things which were studied, but 
expected the things studied to offer their own reasons for being which could 
serve as a guide for living not merely for our benefit but so that we could be 
blessed with the knowledge that we were living in accordance with reason.95 
 
                                                          
93
 Logic p.25 
94
 Logic p.26 
95
 Althaus 2000 p.127 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 66 of 365 
 
For Hegel, metaphysics has been replaced by the “critical spirit” of “reflection”.  
Reflection is a form of thinking that takes nothing to be simply what it is: there is 
another side to every story and we cannot acquire a complete knowledge of 
things as they are in themselves.  For reflection, all knowledge of things is 
mediated – by our senses, by our mode of thinking, and so on – and so we can 
never get to things as they are in themselves, since knowledge is always distorted 
by these mediating factors.  Reflection represents the spirit of the age, for Hegel: 
all apparent knowledge – and as a result of this all political authority, tradition 
and even our own self-certainty – are brought into question by critical thinking.  
This means that the self-knowledge acquired through metaphysics is brought 
into question too.  Now, Hegel does not advocate a return to “pre-critical” 
metaphysics: for Hegel, the spirit of reflection is correct to reject the faulty 
metaphysical proofs of the ancient and medieval philosophers.  Instead (and 
perhaps surprisingly, given his lament for metaphysics), Hegel wants to suggest 
that the critical, reflective spirit of the age has not gone far enough.96  Thus he 
writes that “it seems that the period of fermentation with which a new creative 
idea begins is past”, meaning that the new spirit of reflection has been 
established and nothing new remains left to be discovered about what it means 
to be a critical, reflective thinker, and yet he tells us that “the higher demand is 
that it should become systematised knowledge”, meaning that although enough 
has been written about what the critical spirit is so that we have all the 
information available, we have yet to put this information into an order such that 
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we can fully grasp its implications.  If we do this, Hegel believes, something new 
will emerge: we will become aware of the possibility of a post-reflective spirit, a 
spirit of “speculative thinking”. 
 
I suggested just now that we might find it surprising that Hegel wants us to go 
further with reflection, rather than to dismiss it as incorrect, given that he 
laments the passing of metaphysics.  However, once we grasp what “speculative 
thinking” is we will no longer consider it strange that Hegel wants to push 
reflection to its logical conclusion.  As we saw above, metaphysics is the 
knowledge of things as they are in themselves, while reflection denies that such 
knowledge is possible, given the fact that knowledge is necessarily mediated.  
However, Hegel believes that, if we systematise the claims of reflection so that 
we can grasp their implications, we will discover a convincing case for 
“mistrusting the mistrust” of reflection.97  That is to say, reflection turns upon 
itself and turns out to be inconsistent (it is “unstable”, to use a Hegelian term 
that will be revisited throughout this chapter).  This does not mean, however, 
that this gives us cause to dismiss reflection: for Hegel, the claims of reflection 
are true and we cannot go back to the flawed arguments of traditional 
metaphysics.  However, the instability of the logic of reflection does, as we will 
see, give us cause to rethink some of the conclusions of critical thinking.  For 
Hegel, the logical result of reflection is not, as it has been thought to be, the 
denial that we can know things in themselves, but is instead the 
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acknowledgement that all knowledge of things in themselves requires a 
knowledge of “spirit”.  This is what Hegel calls “speculative knowledge”, which is 
described as knowledge of things “in and for themselves”.98 
 
For Hegel, reflection shows us that a naïve conception of the “self-sufficiency” of 
traditional metaphysics is problematic.  In this way, reflection is indispensible: 
although thinkers of reflection are wrong to suggest that we can never have 
knowledge of things as they are in themselves, they rightly point out what is 
wrong with having too simple a conception of what knowledge of things in 
themselves would involve.  As we will see in this chapter, we have a 
demonstration of this in the first part of Hegel’s Logic (the “logic of being”).  We 
learn in this part of the Logic that things cannot simply be what they are: things 
are more complicated than this, and so if we want to talk of self-sufficiency, then 
we will need to work fairly hard to explain what this means.  From a Hegelian 
point of view, this is what is wrong with much traditional metaphysics: the 
question of identity, of what it is for a thing to be itself, was not questioned 
enough (for Aristotle, for example, we do not really need to question the 
principle of identity: to be uncertain about such questions regarding the nature 
of being demonstrates a lack of education, for Aristotle99). 
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 See e.g. Enc Logic §81 (Add. 1).  As we will see in chapter 6 below (“conclusion” section), 
speculative knowledge is knowledge of “spirit” because it is a form of knowing that allows us to 
know ourselves as thinkers: with speculative knowing we come to know the way that thought 
develops as it comes to terms with what is actual and thus come to know thought itself. 
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 Aristotle 1984 p.1588 (Metaphysics 1006a2-9).  We should note that Hegel’s relationship to 
Aristotle was not as simple as this example might suggest: Aristotle was not simply a traditional 
metaphysician but exhibited moments of truly speculative thinking.  This will be returned to in 
later chapters. 
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For Hegel, it is this that we learn from reflection: that our thinking spirit has an 
impact on the nature of what is thought by us.  Things cannot simply be what 
they are, and this is due to this mediating role played by thought.  Traditional 
metaphysics got it wrong because it did not account for this impact of spirit on 
our thinking and assumed a naïve relationship between our thoughts and the 
objects of thought: it assumed that when we think we have access to the things 
as they simply are.  Reflection gets it wrong because it assumes that this impact 
must distort the object of thought in such a way that there is no hope of having 
knowledge of things as they are in themselves: it does not take into account that 
to talk of what things are in themselves is not to talk of things simply being what 
they are, but is to talk of things being what they are despite the mediation of 
reflection.  For Hegel, “speculative knowledge” is what results from our having 
learned lessons from the failures of both these approaches: we learn that if we 
are to have knowledge of things in as they are themselves, then we must acquire 
the capacity to have knowledge of things as they are “in and for themselves”.  To 
be “in and for itself” is to remain what it is, to be preserved, even as it is 
mediated.  For Hegel, this is the definition of freedom: not the absence of 
constraint, but the capacity to remain what one is even in the presence of 
constraint.100 
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 This will be returned to in chapter 6 below, where we discuss the preservation of the actual in 
the development of the Concept.  In this chapter, and in chapters 4 to 6 below, I hope to explain 
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Hegel’s Logic, but also how speculative knowledge is shown to be possible through the 
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So, for Hegel, traditional metaphysics was characterised by its self-sufficiency.  
For Hegel, traditional metaphysics found its own beginning and provided its own 
justifications, rather than relying on claims about its “usefulness” to other areas 
of life for its justification.  Hegel’s Logic will also provide its own beginning and 
aim to be self-sufficient.  Though this might seem strange in an age of reflection 
(and we are still in this age, from a Hegelian point of view), where things are 
never self-sufficient but always mediated by another, Hegel must nevertheless 
do this for two reasons: firstly, Hegel does not want to presuppose the death of 
traditional metaphysics but wants to show how, by thinking in the naïve way of 
philosophers of traditional metaphysics, we are necessarily led to recognise the 
failure of traditional metaphysics and the truth of reflection.  Secondly, Hegel 
believes that there is some good in the activity of metaphysics, that “the 
colourless communion of the spirit with itself” is something that is important and 
should be allowed to continue, and so he wants to begin in a metaphysical spirit, 
as it were, so that he can see what in fact remains of metaphysics once it has 
undergone the critical onslaught of reflection.  In other words, Hegel wants to 
show how metaphysics fares in an age of reflection.  He will thus begin by 
                                                                                                                                                               
how the naïve dream of traditional metaphysics, that things can simply be known as they are in 
themselves, can be realised by allowing that things can be preserved as what they are even when 
mediated by reflection.  In the present chapter we will see how reflection destroys the naïve 
conception of being in itself presented by traditional metaphysics; in chapters 4 and 5 we will see 
how reflection defeats itself; in chapter 6 we will see how the concept of freedom allows us 
knowledge of things as they are in themselves.  We will see that, though reflection takes into 
account the role that spirit plays when we think, it wrongly assumes that spirit must distort things 
as they are in themselves.  The merely reflective (and so not properly speculative) spirit cannot 
be free, because it cannot see that the truth of things can be preserved even as we think about 
them. 
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examining the apparent self-sufficiency of philosophy and will thus have to tackle 
the problem of beginning (that is, the question of how philosophy, since it is self-
sufficient, can find its own beginning), so that he can make his Logic the 
metaphysical investigation it needs to be.101  The naïve conception of self-
sufficiency will be shown to be inadequate in Hegel’s “logic of being”, which is 
the part of the Logic that will be discussed in the present chapter.  In later 
chapters we will see why we must nevertheless, due to the instability of the 
concept of reflection, return to a conception of philosophy as the study of “the 
reason which is immanent in things themselves”.  We will return to Hegel’s 
treatment of the question of beginning shortly, once we have briefly reviewed in 
a little more detail what Hegel means by “reflection”. 
 
2: Reflection 
 
Reflection is a form of thinking: more than this, it is what is, for Hegel, essential 
to modern thinking.  That is to say, minimally, for Hegel, thought takes the form 
of reflection in the modern age.  However, thought can also be much more than 
this.  It is Hegel’s view that we are capable of thinking in a way that goes beyond 
reflection, but that most modern thinking is merely reflection.  It is Hegel’s task 
                                                          
101
 See Brooks 2007 pp.1-12 for a good argument for why Hegel’s philosophy, even his political 
philosophy, should be taken to be “metaphysical”.  Thom Brooks reminds us that even so-called 
“non-metaphysical” readers of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right do not deny that this work contains a 
metaphysics: the argument is not whether Hegel has a metaphysics (since all agree that Hegel 
offers an account of things “that exist, but not in a physical form” and so of “metaphysical 
existence”), but the extent to which it is useful to use this metaphysics to explain the Philosophy 
of Right (that is, whether it is useful to use works such as the Logic to explain what is happening 
in the Philosophy of Right). 
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to explain the nature of reflection, before showing how we can become 
sophisticated enough in our reflection to move beyond mere reflection.  It is only 
then that we will be capable of “speculative thinking”. 
 
For Hegel, the way in which we think is historically determined.  That is to say, 
we think by using certain concepts, and the form that these concepts take 
depends upon the age in which we live.102  What it means to “think” changes 
over time.  As we have seen, Hegel suggests that it is characteristic of the 
modern age that “thinking” is assumed to mean “reflection”.  Reflection is a 
sophisticated way of thinking because it is thinking about thinking.  As Hegel puts 
it, reflection recognises the “contradiction” that lies within thinking: that is to 
say, reflection recognises that thought can always be turned against itself and 
bring itself into question.103  Reflection is essential to modern thinking because, 
since Hegel’s time, pre-reflective thinking has generally been seen to be 
inadequate.104  That is to say, in modern times it is not generally seen to be 
enough to think about things: we must also “reflect”, and consider the way that 
we think about things.  As I have stated above, what I want to suggest in this 
chapter is that the first part of Hegel’s Logic, the part entitled “The Doctrine of 
Being”, serves as an illustration of why traditional metaphysics is insufficient in 
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 Houlgate 2005 pp.4ff. 
103
 See Enc. Logic §26 for description of pre-reflective thought as “unconscious of the antithesis of 
thinking within and against itself”, and compare this to, for example §41 Add. 1, where Hegel 
discusses “critical philosophy” and explains that critical forms of thinking must “investigate 
themselves” (unlike “naïve thinking” which “let its determinations count as something given in 
advance”). 
104
 For this reason, speculative thinking is often misjudged to be naïve, since it does not seem to 
be critical enough (since its opposition to the scepticism of reflection makes it appear to be naïve 
and pre-reflective).  The modern standard is to be reflective and critical. 
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the age of reflection.  We will see that, since reflection is a form of thinking that 
recognises the contradictions that must belong to thinking, its task is seemingly 
endless: reflection will repeatedly come to a point where its contradictions 
cannot be resolved and it has to start again.  It is for this reason, Hegel tells us, 
that reflection always leads to “sublation” (this term will be explained below). 
 
In this chapter we will be looking at the first part of the Logic, the logic of 
“being”.  I aim to demonstrate that, for Hegel, the logic of being is the logic of 
pre-reflective thinking.  The logic of being is, for Hegel, the logic of “immediacy” 
and “one-sidedness”: in the logic of being, immediacy and one-sidedness will be 
shown to be inadequate and the truth of reflection – that we must think about 
thinking and discover new aspects of every immediate determination – will be 
shown at each step. 
 
In this chapter, we will only be looking at a small part of the logic of being: we 
will be looking at the first few steps of the development of this logic.  However, I 
hope that the analysis of this small part of the Logic will explain why Hegel 
believes that reflection – the process of thinking about thinking – must prevail 
when we consider the concepts of “being”, which are the concepts of what is 
one-sided and immediate.  The concepts that belong to the logic of being are the 
concepts of a “naïve” mode of thinking: in this chapter we will see that naivety in 
thinking leads to concepts that are “unstable”.  For Hegel, “stability” and 
“instability” refer to the ease with which concepts are altered by reflection.  For 
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example: as we will see, “pure being” is a very unstable concept because even 
defining it leads us to posit it as its opposite, “nothing”.  All the concepts of being 
that we will examine in this chapter are unstable, but none so much as this 
concept of pure being. 
 
We will see why, in modern times, thinking without reflection can justly be said 
to not be thinking at all.  The reason for this is that the naïve concepts of being 
demand reflection if they are to be thought properly.  We will see an example of 
this shortly: though we could perhaps, in some sense, say that we are thinking 
when we simply think “being” in its purity, the implications of this thought 
escape us if we do not move beyond this thought and reflect upon the process 
by which this thought is kept in mind.  For Hegel, true thinking is all about 
reaching the implications of that about which we think, and so reflection is 
essential to true thinking. 
 
3: Simply beginning 
 
Hegel wants to bring all of our concepts, as well as all the logical rules that we 
might follow when we think, into question.105  This notion of bringing things “into 
question” has the sense described above: something is in question if it is not 
taken to be determinate and sufficient in itself, but subject to alteration given 
the changing nature of the circumstances in which it finds itself.  In the case of 
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 Houlgate 2005 p.28: thus Hegel is proceeding according to the “modern demand that rational 
thought should subject all human assumptions and presuppositions to critical scrutiny”. 
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the concepts and rules of philosophy, not one of the concepts and rules for 
thinking with which we are familiar is assumed to be fixed and sufficient as it is in 
itself, and all concepts and rules are in principle subject to alteration through 
reflection being brought to bear upon them.  When Hegel begins his 
philosophical investigation in the Logic, no concept is assumed to be “stable”: 
though we seek a stable concept (see below for definition of “stable”), we will 
see that all the concepts of being (that is, all the concepts dealt with in the “logic 
of being”, which is the first of the three parts of the Logic) are in fact “unstable”, 
that is, they are all subject to alteration when they are reflected upon.  That is, 
the self-sufficiency – the inner coherence – of each concept turns out to be 
insufficient and “unstable” in the sense that the concept cannot meet the 
demands of reflection. 
 
Bringing all of our concepts and logical rules into question may seem to be an 
impossible task: after all, don’t we need to presuppose rules to follow in order 
that we can begin thinking at all?  Hegel will question this assumption, and in fact 
will suggest that beginning to think, before we even begin to follow rules, 
involves a moment of simply beginning, and it is this moment that he will explore 
at the beginning of his Logic.106  However, we should also note that Hegel is not 
going to try to prove right away that simply beginning in this way is possible or 
necessary: instead, he is going to show us how a logic starting from a simple 
beginning might work and ask us to suspend judgement and see what arises from 
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it.  Hegel aims to show that even the act of simply beginning to think implies a 
complex system of concepts.  By examining the act of simply beginning we will 
begin to investigate what it means for something to simply be itself and will be 
able to begin the investigation of what is wrong with the naïve conception of 
being in itself. 
 
We can call this moment of beginning a moment of “simply beginning” because 
all we do is begin.  We cannot have any assumptions in mind when we begin.  For 
example: we cannot presuppose the logical law of contradiction (that something 
“cannot be both what it is and what it is not”) since this law, like every other law 
that we apply when we think, is to be brought into question.107  But how can we 
simply begin?  Can the phrase “simply begin” really mean anything?  Are we 
talking about something that it is logically possible to do?  Again, we should bear 
in mind that Hegel is not going to try to prove that it is possible at this stage, but 
is simply going to suggest a process whereby we might carry out this act of 
simply beginning.  His suggested approach is that we think the concept of “pure 
being”. 
 
Hegel points out that many people, when asked to think abstract concepts such 
as “pure being”, say that they simply do not know what it is that they are 
supposed to think.108  In order to think pure being, he tells us, we must learn to 
think in a way that is non-representational: that is, we must stop “picture-
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 Houlgate 2005 p.28 
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 See e.g. Enc Logic §88 (Note) 
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thinking” (thinking with images) and engage in pure thinking.109  “Pure thinking” 
may seem a difficult concept to grasp, but Hegel assures us that such thinking 
(thinking without images) is possible.  Hegel can, to begin with, only offer us – if 
we are indeed uninitiated in pure thinking and are committed to picture-thinking 
– an assurance that pure thinking is possible110: he can only offer an assurance 
because pure thinking is not something that can be conceived through picture-
thinking.  That is to say, we cannot form a picture in our minds of what “pure 
thinking” might mean, and so if we only think via images we will not be able to 
grasp what Hegel means by “pure thinking”, and will have to learn to do pure 
thinking before we can grasp what pure thinking is.  Hegel compares this to 
learning to swim: we do not learn how to swim before getting into the water, 
just as we do not learn how pure thinking works before we go ahead and start 
doing it.111  Thus Hegel does not intend at the outset of the Logic to demonstrate 
that pure thinking is possible: instead we will learn what pure thinking means as 
we proceed.  Pure thinking was the aim of traditional metaphysics: we simply 
think and allow pure thought to show to us the nature of things.112  Hegel wants 
to show how the concepts that emerge from traditional metaphysics fare in the 
age of reflection, where the pure act of thinking itself comes into question. 
                                                          
109
 Enc Logic §88 (Note 3) 
110
 It should be noted that we will move from this assurance to something more convincing, 
something that we might call a “proof”.  See Phenomenology §76: “One bare assurance is worth 
just as much as any other”; however, once Hegel’s one assurance has led to the unfolding of a 
coherent logic, Hegel believes that his position will be shown to be more convincing than the 
view that pure thinking is impossible, since it will serve as a tool for thinking that will allow us to 
solve otherwise unsolvable problems. 
111
 Enc Logic §10 (Note) 
112
 Enc Logic §28: traditional metaphysics acted with the assumption that “the cognition of things 
as they are in-themselves results from the thinking of what is” (italics as in text). 
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What I want to suggest is that, for Hegel, the concept of “pure being” is so 
indeterminate that it should not properly be called a “concept” at all (though we 
call it that for want of a better term113), and so by beginning by thinking it we are 
able to begin by examining the nature of thought without presupposing a 
concept: that is to say, the concept of pure being allows us to examine the 
subjective “resolve” to begin thinking (by seeing what results from such resolve), 
without basing this resolve on a supposedly firm, objective foundation (we do 
not claim to begin with a concept of this resolve).  The concept of pure being is, 
for Hegel, the concept of “pure indeterminateness and emptiness”.114  What this 
means is that it has no objective content at all: when we think pure being we are 
not thinking of any particular thing, but are just thinking of indeterminateness as 
such.  It is by thinking of indeterminateness as such – by thinking of “pure being” 
– that we begin to do pure thinking: we simply think.  Again, it should be noted 
that, as the first step on the path of pure thinking, Hegel cannot offer a proof 
that pure being has such and such a nature at this stage but simply invites us to 
think as he suggests and see what results.115 
 
                                                          
113
 “Thought” is a possibility, but this might cause confusion: though I will occasionally call the 
concept of pure being the thought of pure being, I have tried to limit this use of the word 
“thought”, since I mainly use the term “thought” to refer to thought in general, i.e. the process of 
thinking. 
114
 Logic p.82 
115
 And, as we will see, pure thinking turns into concrete thinking.  The very notion of pure 
thinking is “unstable”, which means that it is transformed into concrete thinking: that is to say, by 
carrying out pure thinking we end up thinking concretely. 
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Indeed, when we look at what Hegel writes about pure being, we see that pure 
being does not have any determinate nature at all.  Hegel tells us that the 
beginning – pure being – is “subjective in the sense of being a particular, 
inessential way of introducing the discourse”.116  It is important to emphasise 
this subjective character of beginning: for Hegel, our thinking must be guided by 
what is subjective because thinking should be “free and for itself”.117  That is to 
say, we think freely when we think for ourselves: we think freely when we 
determine for ourselves the way in which we think.  It follows from this that 
thinking cannot begin from anything objective if we are to think freely, since this 
would mean that it was not we, but the objective thing, that determined our 
thinking.  The concept of pure being is the beginning of the logic in a “subjective” 
sense and not an “objective” one.  An objective beginning would be a first 
principle of which we could be certain and on which we could base our 
investigation of further concepts.118  A subjective beginning, on the other hand, 
is an “abstract beginning” or “pure beginning”: rather than claiming that the 
concept with which we begin is the concept of something fundamental, the 
concept is taken to be the first because it is utterly indeterminate and thus 
cannot form a foundation for thinking.  Instead of examining the determination 
of the concept, then, we see how the concept of indeterminateness is determined 
by our thinking, and thus learn about the nature of our subjective mode of 
thinking.  So we see with the concept of pure being that it is utterly 
                                                          
116
 Logic p.67 
117
 Logic p.68: “The beginning is logical in that it is to be made in the element of thought that is 
free and for itself, in pure knowing.” 
118
 Logic p.67 
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indeterminate and that there is nothing objectively true about it upon which we 
could base any claims about the nature of reality: all that is determinate about 
beginning with pure being is the subjective and arbitrary fact that we decide (or 
“resolve”) to take it up in the first place.119 
 
What I am suggesting, then, is that, for Hegel, we start with what is objectively 
indeterminate so that what determines our thinking is the subjective nature of 
our thought itself.  By examining the concept of what is utterly indeterminate, 
we gain insight into how our subjectivity is determined.  For Hegel, as we have 
seen, the way in which we think is determined historically: that is to say, the 
categories with which we think are not eternal, but have been shaped by the 
contingent factors that have led to the historical situation in which we find 
ourselves.  (It is important to note that though these factors are indeed 
contingent, they are also necessary, in that though Hegel does not deny the 
contingent nature of each historical event, he also claims that we can detect a 
logical “development” in them: this will be returned to in chapter 6 below.120)  
That is to say: we focus on the thought of sheer indeterminateness and see 
where our thought takes us from this point.  We will thus see that the Logic 
develops from this first moment of utter indeterminateness: we simply begin 
thinking – that is, begin thinking without any presupposed objective content – 
and see what results from this.  Hegel’s Logic demonstrates how thinking must 
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 Logic p.70; Houlgate 2005 p.49 
120
 See also introduction to chapter 1 above: in the logic of the Concept we see “retroactive” 
necessity emerge. 
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work if it does not presuppose any foundations for thinking: the way of thinking 
described in the Logic is a way of thinking that is utterly free and for itself 
because it is not determined by any objective facts external to it.  (That is, 
although thought is determined by historical, social factors, which are of course 
“objective” in a sense, it is nevertheless governed by nothing objective except for 
these minimal objective conditions without which there would be no such thing as 
subjectivity at all.  Also, no objective facts are presupposed regarding historical, 
social conditions: we only assume that there are such facts and that it is these 
that makes our thinking subjective, in the sense that our thinking belongs to a 
particular group of thinking beings.)  We will see in the discussion below that the 
concept of pure being gives rise to new concepts, so that the entire course of the 
Logic can be said to emerge from this first moment of thinking about pure 
indeterminateness.  Now, one might object that such “foundation-less” thinking 
is impossible.  However, it is important to remember that Hegel is not trying to 
prove that such thinking is possible, at least not right at the beginning.  He is 
instead inviting us to try thinking in this way in the hope that the proof will be 
found in the fact that such thinking functions in a coherent way: that is to say, 
rather than show at the beginning that this is the only way to begin philosophical 
thinking, Hegel would instead hope to show to readers that his system as a 
whole allows us to solve a great deal of the conceptual problems faced by less 
adequate methods of philosophical thinking.121  From a Hegelian perspective, it 
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 As Thom Brooks puts it, for Hegel “the proof is in the pudding” (Brooks 2007 p.12).  Also see 
Logic, for example p.75, where Hegel writes: “If impatience with the consideration of the abstract 
beginning should provoke anyone to say that the beginning should be made not with the 
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would be irrational at this stage – before more of the logical system has been 
revealed – to have a conviction either for or against this approach: all Hegel is 
asking us to do is to try this approach and see what emerges.  It is for this reason 
that the Hegelian approach can be described as being “without presuppositions”: 
Hegel is not asking us to presuppose that this method will be successful, but 
simply to try it. 
 
What I have just suggested might seem strange: doesn’t Hegel ask us to take a 
“scientific” approach to philosophy?  To proceed on the basis of “proofs” rather 
than on the basis of hunches and intuition?122  This is true, but it is evident from 
his discussion of “pure being” that he does not consider a proof to be possible at 
this stage.123  “Pure being” is simply the concept of the first concept, of the 
concept with which we will begin: we accept that thinking can have no certain 
foundation, and so we begin with an utterly indeterminate concept.  In my view, 
it is in fact this characteristic of Hegel’s thought that means that it deserves to be 
called “scientific”: it begins with an experiment in thought – thinking “pure 
being” – and proofs will only be reached through a methodical approach to the 
results of this experiment.  That is, we are resolving to think and no more.  This 
resolve is arbitrary, since it is not justified by anything.  What is important is that 
we resolve to think and do no more than this, which is why what we begin with 
                                                                                                                                                               
beginning, but straightaway with the subject matter itself, well then, this subject matter is 
nothing else but the said empty being; for what the subject matter is, that will be explicated only 
in the development of the science and cannot be presupposed by it as known beforehand.” (my 
italics) 
122
 Enc. Logic, “Preface to the First Edition” p.1 
123
 Again, see Logic e.g. p.75 
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must be indeterminate (since we merely think, and do not think in a way that is 
determined by presuppositions). 
 
It may seem contradictory to say that thinking can have no certain foundation 
and yet that it must begin with an utterly indeterminate concept.  However, this 
contradiction disappears once we bear in mind Hegel’s distinction between an 
“objective” and a “subjective” beginning, which I mentioned above.124  For Hegel, 
there can be no objective beginning: that is, there can be no first principle on 
which thinking can be based with certainty.  However, there must be a 
beginning: that is, if we are going to do philosophy then it must be the case that 
we begin.  Hegel is pointing to an unavoidable paradox when it comes to thinking 
about thinking: we must begin and yet cannot know where to begin, so we begin 
with the most abstract act of thinking imaginable: that is, we begin with the 
subjective act of thinking a concept with no prior criteria for thinking.  To put it 
another way: we cannot know beforehand where to begin, and yet we must 
begin, and so we must abandon certainty and simply begin. 
 
Given that the first concept has no determinate content, the way that we think 
this concept will depend upon our subjective inclinations.  Hegel is well aware 
that we are not obliged to think pure indeterminateness in the way that he 
prescribes: in fact, many thinkers treat the paradox of beginning in very different 
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ways to Hegel.125  Hegel can only suggest that we can think pure 
indeterminateness in a certain way (a way that presupposes nothing) and assure 
us that if we do so a coherent logic will emerge, which will serve as a proof for 
the validity of the beginning.  For this reason, we will see in this chapter that 
Hegel makes certain claims that may seem vague or uncertain: if we are to get 
anything out of Hegel, we must at first give him the benefit of the doubt and see 
what emerges from the claims that he makes. 
4: Pure being 
 
In the previous section we saw that Hegel wants to bring all of our concepts into 
question, and believes that he can do this by “simply beginning”.  In this section 
we will see what happens after this simple beginning: the nature of our thinking 
is revealed since we see that we must move from pure, indeterminate thinking 
to “reflection” upon pure thinking, which leads to determinate thinking. 
 
I have suggested that, for Hegel, we must begin the examination of thinking by 
simply beginning, and that this means beginning with what is utterly 
indeterminate.  The thought of sheer indeterminateness is the concept of “pure 
being”.  The first question that we ask when examining the nature of thought is: 
                                                          
125
 In the Logic pp.93-103, Hegel goes over some of these different ways of responding to the 
paradox of the beginning.  For example, he discusses Jacobi’s scepticism over whether we can 
make a beginning at all, since the beginning must be indeterminate.  Though Hegel thinks that 
Jacobi is wrong, my point is that Hegel accepts that it is possible to think about the indeterminate 
beginning in such a way that we do not reach Hegel’s conclusions: we will fail to grasp the truth 
of Hegel’s position if we remain sceptical and thereby do not allow ourselves to carry out the 
procedure that Hegel has set out. 
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“What is pure being?”  This is a difficult and perhaps paradoxical question: after 
all, pure being, as pure indeterminateness, is not a thing that has properties 
(since it is utterly indeterminate) such that we can ask what it is and expect a 
simple answer.  Nevertheless, this question – “What is pure being?” – is 
essential, if we are to reflect upon the concept of pure being.  Remember that, at 
the beginning of the Logic, all we have is pure indeterminateness and the 
subjective resolve “to consider thought as such”.126  This subjective resolve is 
what will determine the Logic, since this first concept is utterly indeterminate.  
This resolve manifests itself as the question “What is pure being?”, and by asking 
“What is pure being?” we will be led to consider what is necessarily associated in 
our thinking with the concept of indeterminateness.  We resolve to formulate 
and express the concept of pure being and in this way we are led to discover 
what is necessarily associated with indeterminateness: in this way we act in 
accordance with the demand of reflective thinking that we try to explain what 
we are thinking about.  We thus learn how thinking operates when divorced 
from any objective content.  By asking “What is pure being?” we are causing 
ourselves to question what it is that we have done by “simply beginning”.  I 
suggested above that, for Hegel, to begin with what is utterly indeterminate is to 
merely think, that is, to think in a way that is not guided by presuppositions.  
However, despite thinking without presuppositions, we nevertheless do think in 
a certain way: that is, we think indeterminately, which means that we actively 
avoid thinking with any determination.  This way of thinking is “unstable”: that is 
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to say, it is contradictory, because thinking has to be determined in such a way 
that it is not determined.  In what follows we will see how Hegel argues this 
point: we will see that logical development, for Hegel, consists in making explicit 
the determinations that are implicit in what is indeterminate.  We will also see 
that making these determinations explicit leads to “sublation”: we end up with a 
number of contradictory statements and so have to begin again, by both 
“preserving” and “cancelling” the position that led to these contradictions.  We 
will also see that these moments of sublation recur throughout Hegel’s Logic. 
 
I want to suggest that, by beginning with pure being, Hegel begins with a 
tautology or absolute statement: “being is being”.127  By talking of “pure being”, 
Hegel is talking of being that is itself and nothing more.  It is very important to 
note the connection between indeterminateness and tautology, for Hegel: we 
can explain what Hegel means by “indeterminateness” through the concept of 
tautology.  If we want to understand how “indeterminateness” is explained 
through “tautology”, then we must think about what it means to be 
“determinate”.  As Gillian Rose points out, the determination of something is 
discovered, for Hegel, through a gradual process (of having “contradictory 
experiences”) and not by simply defining something (that is, by defining a subject 
through a predicate).128  What is indeterminate is what is no more than merely 
defined, while what is determinate has had its meaning concretely realised by a 
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 Logic p.81: “This reflectionless being is being as it is immediately in its own self alone.” 
128
 Rose 2009 pp.51ff. 
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process of providing definitions.129  Rose gives an example: when Hegel writes 
“In general religion and the foundation of the state is one and the same thing; 
they are identical in and for themselves”, religion is not defined as “the state”; 
rather, Hegel is saying that its meaning is only grasped through experience of the 
way that religion and the state meet (and experience of our encounters with 
both of them).  As Rose reminds us, the statement that religion and state are 
identical is not “an uninformative tautology”, but tells us instead that we can 
grasp the meaning of both through a process of thinking them together.  That is 
to say, we do not carry out a process of thinking in which the end result is the 
stable identity of religion and state (remember that what is stable is a tautology), 
but instead recognise this identity as unstable, but productive of its own 
determinations (a small amount of reflection will tell us that religion and state 
are not identical, and it is by this process of reflection that the non-identity in the 
proposition in revealed: it is the play of identity and non-identity that make the 
proposition productive).  The concept of pure being is indeterminate because it 
simply is: that is to say, being is simply being, and we have not yet gone through 
a process of providing definitions (since we have only provided one answer to 
the question “What is being?”) as a result of which process we could be said to 
have a concrete, determinate concept.  At this stage it may be unclear to the 
reader what such a process of definition must consist in, but I hope that this will 
be explained as we proceed.  I have suggested that, for Hegel, offering a simple 
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 As we will see, a definition is not enough for Hegel, since any definition turns out to be a 
tautology: the meaning of something is only really brought out by a concrete process of coming 
to terms with the object that is being examined. 
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definition for a concept is only the beginning of making a concept determinate, 
and that tautology means indeterminateness, for Hegel.  In what follows, we will 
look in more detail at why tautological and indeterminate concepts can be said, 
for Hegel, to be unstable: it is this instability of what is tautological that leads us 
from the concept of indeterminateness with which we begin (the concept of 
pure being) to more determinate concepts. 
 
It might seem that the investigation must end with the phrase “being is being”: 
being, in its purity, is being, and that is all that can be said.  However, the very 
fact that, by explaining this tautology – explaining what the concept of pure 
being means – we end up with more than this tautology, tells us something of 
the nature of thought (of the “subjective resolve” mentioned above).  It is the 
purpose of the Logic to explore the nature of thought, and we begin to do this by 
seeing what is necessarily associated with the tautology “being is being” when 
we try to explain it.  Far from seeing the truth of pure being as “being is being” 
and nothing more, we see that such an apparently simple answer is no answer at 
all (since it is no explanation), and that the answer to the question “What is pure 
being?” is an immensely complex one.  What I mean is that, for Hegel, the 
concept of pure being, as the tautology (or absolute statement) “being is being”, 
or “being and no more than this”, is, through its sheer indeterminacy, unstable.  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “stable” means “not likely to give 
way or overturn; firmly fixed”130, and I want to suggest that Hegel takes this term 
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in the same sense, so that “unstable” means “likely to give way or overturn; not 
firmly fixed”.  In this case, the concept of “pure being” is unstable because 
minimal reflection will show that this concept is contradictory (since it can only 
be explained if we take it to be other than it is, that is, as more than simply 
indeterminate), so that our concept of being will have to alter and be 
overturned: that is to say, pure being is likely to alter because the smallest 
amount of reflection will show that it is contradictory and so it is a very unstable 
concept.  When we begin to explain “pure being”, it shows itself to be unstable 
and alters.  We will see how that happens shortly: pure being becomes 
“nothing”, then becomes “becoming”, then becomes “determinate being”.  The 
absolute statement, “being is being”, thus needs to be qualified, since as it 
stands it is contradictory. 
 
It is by discovering the necessary associations or connections between thoughts 
that we can be said to derive new concepts from this initial concept of pure 
being.  This process of derivation is called the “self-development of the Concept”.  
For now, we need not worry too much about why it is called this: let us simply 
bear in mind that Hegel sees the Logic as, in some sense, describing a single 
process of development, as concepts are derived through their necessary 
connection to this initial concept of pure being.  By establishing the way in which 
thoughts are necessarily connected we discover the nature of thought in general: 
we will see that Hegel is giving us a conception of thought such that thinking 
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means looking for explanation, which means looking for the determinations that 
lie behind, or are implicit within, what is indeterminate.131 
 
We have begun with the concept of pure being, then, and we must explain what 
this means.  Yes, pure being is utterly indeterminate, but we can nevertheless 
attempt to explain what we mean by “utterly indeterminate”.  By explaining 
what “pure being” means, we will see that the tautology “being is being” implies 
a process of thinking by virtue of which “pure being” is determined in such a way 
that it is indeterminate.  “Pure being”, or the tautology (or absolute statement) 
“being is being”, thus implies a contradiction that is overcome by a process of 
thinking that “holds together” the thought of pure being.  Though “pure being” is 
the concept of simple being, the thought of pure being is complex, since it 
implies a process of holding together contradictory elements.   
 
The concept of pure being is described at the beginning of the chapter entitled 
“Being” in the Logic.132  In a single paragraph Hegel will try to encapsulate what 
we mean when we try to express the concept of pure being.  Among other 
things, we are told that we should think pure being as not having “diversity 
within itself or any reference outwards” and that “it would not be held fast in its 
purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished 
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 Here we can already see the connection between reflection and essence: for the latter, what 
lies behind determinations is important, since this is what is implicit within that determination 
(that is, it is what must be grasped if we are to grasp the determination itself). 
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in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other.”133  I hope to show in 
this section how phrases such as this express the concepts that are necessarily 
connected to the concept of indeterminateness, or pure being.  That is to say: we 
will see in this section what concepts are required, for Hegel, for thinking the 
concept of pure being, in order to illustrate the thought processes that are 
implied by the thought that “being is being”. 
 
Pure being is said to be “without any further determination”.  This works as a 
definition of pure being (as pure indeterminateness).  In order to express what is 
meant by “pure being”, Hegel thus uses the term “determination”: however, 
Hegel uses this term only to negate it, since he says that pure being is “without” 
it.134  Hegel is telling us that we do not need the term “determination” to 
understand pure being at all and he does so through the use of the term 
“without”, by saying that pure being is “without determination”.  The term 
“without”, we will see, will be central to an understanding of the concept of pure 
being.  We next come across the term “indeterminate”, which is another way of 
saying “without determination”, but we now see this term linked to the term 
“immediacy”.  “Indeterminate immediacy” seems to follow from “without 
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134
 See Houlgate 2006 p.79: “Without” is, for Houlgate, one of the expressions that Dieter Henrich 
has in mind when he mentions those expressions that “have an unmistakenly negative character 
and clearly just have the task of keeping every further determination away from the purity of 
being.” (this is a translation by Houlgate of Henrich)  Similarly to Houlgate (and Henrich), I will 
argue in what follows that, of all the determinations that come up when we try to think pure 
being, only some (such as “without”) are essential and tell us what “pure being” essentially is.  
For example, I want to suggest, with Henrich, that the phrase “without determination” tells us 
what pure being is via the essential term “without”: “without” is a key term for explaining “pure 
being”. 
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determination”.  Immediacy, then, is a term that contains the “without” that we 
saw in the last sentence.  “Immediacy” means “without mediation”.135  By being 
without mediation, we see, pure being “is equal only to itself”.  So we now have 
the term “equal”.  But we are told that pure being “is equal only to itself”, which 
is to say that it is not equal to anything else.  The term “only” can be seen as 
another term, like “without”, that has a negative, and limiting, quality.  Again, 
equality is put to one side by the negative term (the former is “cancelled” by the 
latter), while the latter is supposed to reflect what does in fact belong to pure 
being.136  We might say, if we were to stretch ordinary English usage slightly, that 
“only” is what is essential to pure being so that pure being is, in some sense, 
“only” (that it has what we might call “only-ness” about it): that is, pure being is 
the thought of being that is only itself and nothing else (which is why we said 
above that it is the tautology, or absolute statement, “being is being”).  The term 
“equal”, then, has been negated and we are left with “only”, which tells us the 
same thing of pure being as “without” does.  So far, then, what we might call the 
“positive” terms have been put to one side by the “negative” terms, which 
remain as definitions of pure being. 
 
We now have the term “unequal”.  This might look like a negative term, but it in 
fact has a positive quality, since it translates into “greater than” or “less than”.  It 
                                                          
135
 See Houlgate 2006 p.81: “By naming the object of thought ‘indeterminate immediacy,’ Hegel 
employs ordinary, reflexive words in such a way that the reflexive connotations of those words 
are cancelled leaving his readers focused on pure being alone.” 
136
 See Houlgate 2006 p.81: “By speaking of being’s equality only with itself… Hegel makes it clear 
that the normal connotation of equality is being negated here…  Hegel describes pure being as 
equal only to itself… in order to direct the attention of the reader to the sheer simplicity of pure 
being.” 
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must be remembered that we are not interested in the form of the words alone, 
but in the nature of the thoughts that they bring to us.  We are told that pure 
being is “not unequal relatively to another” (my italics).  Hegel is doing the same 
thing here as has been described above and that he will continue to do 
throughout the rest of this paragraph; that is, he is showing us that we must 
understand pure being negatively if we are to understand it as purely as is 
possible.  Ideally, we would think pure being through itself alone, since this 
would be what an understanding of pure being should mean.  However, since 
these other terms must be brought in if we are to formulate and explain our 
thought of pure being (and we must formulate and explain a thought if we are to 
think it137), we must “cancel” these terms and thereby understand pure being in 
the most minimal way possible: that is, using the fewest categories (to get the 
purest conception of pure being that we can).  The process of cancellation 
throughout this paragraph in the Logic shows us that we must understand pure 
being minimally as this negation of all other terms.  Pure being turns out to be 
“nothing”, then, since “nothing” is a term that we might use to describe the sum 
total of these negations (of these withouts and onlys: pure being is shown to be 
nothing since it has negated all of the terms that would make it something.) 
 
Before we go any further, I should defend this claim from a possible objection.  
By opposing “nothing” to “something”, it might be objected, I am not following 
Hegel, who makes it clear that the term “nothing”, or “Nichts”, should not at this 
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See Houlgate 2006 p.75: “thoughts cannot be pictured or felt but need to be named and 
explained of they are to become something definite.” 
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stage be opposed to “something”.138  However, I believe that my reading helps to 
justify this claim by Hegel and is a Hegelian reading.  What Hegel is trying to 
claim when he says that nothing is not opposed to something is that we should 
not think of nothing as being the absence of something, such as we might mean 
if we were to say, when asked to retrieve something from a bag and finding the 
bag to be empty, “there is nothing there”.139  But I am not setting up nothing as 
opposed to something in this sense; rather, what I am arguing is that “nothing” 
used at this point in the Logic is used in opposition to something in the sense 
that Hegel himself opposes the two concepts when he says that nothing is not 
opposed to something.  That is to say, pure nothing is understood to be not 
something in the profound sense of not being either something or even the 
absence of something.  In a sense then, I am not opposing something and 
nothing at all, since they are not opposites but radically different categories (we 
will return to Hegel’s sense of the term “opposition” in chapter 5 below). 
 
Another objection might be made concerning the fact that I have used the 
category of “negation” in order to describe pure nothing.  “Negation” is a 
category that arises later on in the Logic (and will be discussed below, as will the 
concept of “something”) and so we should not derive the concept of nothing 
from it.  This is true, but we can see from my reading that it is in fact negation 
that will be derived from the concept of nothing.  This will be discussed in more 
detail below, but the essence of the argument is that nothing, by being the sum 
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total of all negations, is indeterminate, and so is not properly negation at all.140  
The concept of negation that is opposed to the concept of “reality” below will be 
a negation that is essential to determinate being since by negating in a particular 
way it allows a particular determination (and in this way will lead to a concept of 
something); negation could be described as a superior concept to nothing (it is 
certainly a more complex one), since to negate properly is to negate 
determinately, while to call something “nothing” is simply to discard it entirely 
(or, even, to deny that there is an “it” to discard: to say that something is nothing 
would be to deny that we even need to discard it in order to render it null and 
void.  See below: this is why the concept of “nothing” is inadequate and must 
give way to negation – it is incoherent when it is applied determinately in that it 
discards what it is applied to but must logically deny that this act of discarding is 
taking place.  Or, to put it in a way more consistent with the way in which I have 
presented Hegel so far: the concept of nothing is both determinate and 
indeterminate and so is “unstable”, since it will not stand up to the scrutiny of 
reflection.  Thus when the concept of becoming gives way to the concept of 
determinate being, the concept of nothing must give way to the more complex, 
and more adequate, concept of negation).141 
 
                                                          
140
 See e.g. Logic p.111: “Negation taken as mere deficiency would be equivalent to nothing”. 
141
 See the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit §79: Hegel writes of “the scepticism 
which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this 
nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results.” (my italics)  The concept 
of pure nothingness, then, would be a nothingness that is not the nothingness of that from which 
it results. 
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To return to the main line of argument: the concept of “nothing” thus necessarily 
arises from the concept of pure being.  The necessity of the thought of nothing 
has been demonstrated through the formulation of the thought of pure being, 
since it shows that the thought of nothing must arise when we think pure being.  
That is, there seems to be no way to think pure being without keeping in mind the 
thought of nothing, whereas each of the other thoughts that can arise when we 
think of pure being (determinacy, equality, and so on) are not necessarily 
thought in order for us to think pure being, since what is essential to each of 
them is that they bring to mind the concept of “nothing”, and bring to light the 
nothingness of pure being.  The concept of nothing thus finds its genesis in the 
concept of pure being: that is to say, thinking about pure being generates the 
concept of nothing in our minds.  It is not enough to say that the term “nothing” 
is useful for describing what we think pure being to be: other terms, we saw, 
were useful too, such as “indeterminate immediacy”.  We have now seen, 
however, that all these terms used to describe pure being find their meaning 
through the concept of pure nothing, and that we can strip them down so that 
what is useful about them for describing pure being is always the kernel of 
nothingness (the “without”) that they contain.  The term “indeterminate 
immediacy” is useful for describing pure being only insofar as this term negates 
itself, as we saw above.142  It turns out that we must think pure being as nothing, 
otherwise we will not be able to think being in the empty way that we require if 
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 Terms such as “‘indeterminate immediacy’… are intended by Hegel to explicate and help us 
focus on precisely what is meant by pure, rather than determinate, being.” (Houlgate 2006 pp.79-
80) 
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we are to think it as pure.  We thus have the concept of the thought of nothing, 
since we have the thought of nothing as necessary, as generated by the concept 
of pure being.143 
 
It will be noted that I consider the “necessity” of the connection between two 
concepts (in this case between pure being and nothing) to have been 
demonstrated, for Hegel, when there seems to be no way to express the one 
concept without recourse to the other concept.  Perhaps this will not seem 
rigorous enough, but Hegel does not claim to go any further than this.  It is for 
this reason that Hegel tells us that his “proof” that pure being and nothing are 
connected in this way could be rejected if we could come up with a way of 
thinking pure being that did not depend on the concept of “nothing” in this way, 
but that until this way of thinking is adequately described we should accept the 
necessity of the connection between being and nothing.144  This is the nature of 
Hegelian “necessity”: something is necessarily a certain way if we cannot think it 
in a different way and so are compelled to think it in this way.145 
 
                                                          
143
 Note the technical use of the term “generated”: a concept is generated by another concept 
where it is shown to be necessary for explaining that concept.  Thus “nothing” is generated by 
“pure being”: or, “nothing” finds its genesis in “pure being”. 
144
Enc Logic §87 (Note 1): “We are bound, as we think it over, to start searching for a stable 
determination for being by which it would be distinguished from nothing… But none of these 
additional and more concrete determinations of this kind leave us with being as pure being”.  
That is to say, the only way to think pure being is as identical with nothing, try as we might to 
think it otherwise. 
145
 See Burbidge 2007 for an account of the way that Hegelian necessity never entirely excludes 
contingency.  For example, p.98: “We can never be sure that we have already mastered 
everything there is to know about pure thought.” 
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We have seen that the concept of nothing owes its genesis to the concept of 
being: that is to say, it is shown to be an essential concept because it is essential 
for thinking the indeterminateness that constitutes the beginning of thinking 
about thinking.  The formulation of the thought of pure being is the formulation 
of the thought of pure nothing.  Pure being and nothing are necessarily 
connected, but furthermore Hegel asserts that they are “identical”.  Why should 
we go so far as to say they are “identical”, rather than just “necessarily 
connected”?  Hegel has something quite specific in mind when he uses the term 
“identical”146: identity is a concept that is central to Hegel’s philosophical 
thought, and grasping what it means here will help a great deal for grasping what 
it means in Hegel’s philosophical thought as a whole.  Pure being and nothing are 
identical for the reason pointed out above, that pure being is not merely 
explained through the concept of nothingness (the concept of the without): this 
“without” has to be thought as what pure being essentially is if we are going to 
explain the meaning of “pure being”.  “Pure being” and “nothing” are both 
formulated in the same way and so are identical: both are formulated as what 
we might call “without-ness”.147  At the same time, we must bear in mind that 
pure being and nothing are distinct: when we say that being is nothing (or the 
“without”) we are not merely uttering a tautology.  To say that pure being is 
nothing is an explanation of the meaning of “pure being”, and not a mere 
tautology, because these are distinct concepts.  That is to say, “being is nothing” 
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 As we will see in more detail in chapter 5 below 
147
 See above: each attempt to explain the meaning of pure being ends up with this description of 
absence, of without-ness. 
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is not logically equivalent to “being is being” or “nothing is nothing”: the first has 
a real explanatory force, while the last two are mere tautologies, lacking the 
“concrete meaning” of the first. 
 
Before we continue, these concepts of “explanation” and “concrete meaning” 
must be explained: for Hegel, I want to suggest, explanation must have a certain 
force, a force that is not provided by mere tautology (this is a demand of 
reflection: see above).  Now, Hegel does not use the terms “force” and “mere 
tautology” to explain this aspect of his work: Hegel writes instead of the “drive” 
(Trieb) that is inherent to the act of “reflection” (or “thinking things over”: 
Nachdenken), to go beyond “empty abstractions” (leere Abstraktionen): “the 
drive to find in being or in both [being and nothing] a stable meaning is this very 
necessity, which leads being and nothing further along and endows them with a 
true, i.e., concrete meaning.”148  Note the use of “necessity” here: as I have 
suggested above, we say that a concept is necessary, for Hegel, if we have a 
certain degree of compulsion to think it.149  So, the concept of “nothing” arises 
from the necessity of finding a “concrete meaning” for “being”, the necessity of 
providing an adequate explanation: thinking is compelled (we might even say 
“(reflective) thinking is the compulsion”) to look for concrete meaning.  Finding 
the concrete meaning of concepts is finding their “deeper determinations” 
(tiefere Bestimmungen) which is the act of “logical thinking” (logisches Denken), 
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 Enc Logic §87 (Note) (italics and square brackets as found in text) 
149
 See above: I suggested that this compulsion can arise from our not being able to come up with 
an alternative. 
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and it is this logical thinking that Hegel calls “reflection”.150  Thus the concept of 
“nothing” arises from “pure being” due to the demands of reflection: our 
thinking will not allow us to settle for “being is being” as an explanation of “pure 
being”, since we must go beyond this tautology, or “empty abstraction”. 
 
Now, such an account of what is going on may seem to contradict the demands 
of a logic that is supposed to proceed without presuppositions, since it seems 
that we must have a certain idea of what it means to think before we can see 
that being and nothing are necessarily connected.  However, Hegel is not 
suggesting that we must presuppose this conception of thinking if we are to see 
that being and nothing are identical: instead, as we saw, he is suggesting that, 
even if we do not yet think about the nature of thinking we will still find ourselves 
compelled to agree that being and nothing are identical, given the lack of 
alternatives to this claim.  That is to say, the necessity of the connection between 
being and nothing does not arise from a preconceived view of the nature of 
thinking, but from the persuasive nature of the argument taken on its own 
terms.  We may want to resist calling this an “argument” at all, and this is fine, as 
we have seen: Hegel is not providing a “proof” here, but merely asking us to 
continue with this naturally compelling thought in order to see where it leads us.  
In sum, while it may be useful to consider Hegel’s view of the nature of thinking 
(as we have) in order to make his argument a little more persuasive, in fact it is 
                                                          
150
 Enc Logic §87 (Note): the translation I am using translates “Nachdenken” as  “thinking… over”, 
but “reflection” would also be a suitable translation.  See chapter 4 section 1 below for discussion 
of the relationship between Nachdenken and Reflexion, two German terms that can be translated 
as “reflection”. 
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unnecessary, since Hegel does not want to persuade us at this point to do any 
more than simply follow his way of thinking in order to see that, later on, proofs 
will in fact emerge.151 
 
In this section we have seen an example of the paradoxical nature of Hegelian 
identity: to say that two things are identical is not to exclude the possibility that 
they are different.  In fact we should go further than this: to talk meaningfully of 
identity is never to talk of an identity that excludes difference (where to talk 
“meaningfully” means to talk in a way that gives an explanation that is satisfying 
to thought, and not a mere tautology).  This may sound quite strange, but we 
should hopefully be able to see that this can make sense from the example of 
pure being and nothing discussed above: pure being must be identical to the 
nothingness that it is, and yet the concept of “nothing” can only serve as an 
explanation because it gives us more than we get from the concept of “pure 
being” alone. We have seen in this section that, for Hegel, what is indeterminate 
is tautological (it is merely defined).152  What is tautological is unstable, which 
means that it is unsatisfactory to reflection because it does not explain enough.  
However, by explaining what is simple, we arrive at a contradiction: what is 
explained is said to be other than it is, because it is simple and yet explained in 
such a way that it is said to be complex.  Thus we say that pure being is nothing: 
pure being turns out to be precisely what it is not, when we try to explain it.  We 
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 Albeit “retroactive” proofs: see introduction to chapter 1 above 
152
 As we have seen, to merely define a concept is, for Hegel, to make a tautological statement. 
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will see below that this leads us to one of the impasses to thought described 
above, which in turn will lead thought to “sublate itself”. 
 
5: Becoming 
 
In the previous section I have shown that, for Hegel, the process of (reflective) 
thinking means that the concept of pure being must not be taken to be simply 
self-identical (“being is being”), but must be taken to be identical with nothing.  
However, it is also distinct from nothing, which is why “pure being is nothing” is 
an expression that has explanatory force, or gives “depth” to the concept of 
being.  That is to say, the tautological phrase “being is being”, by being one-
sided, concealed a depth to the thought of being: the phrase “being is being” is 
only one side of the deeper thought that “pure being is nothing”. 
 
As we saw, we now have the concept of nothing, which explains what we mean 
by “pure being”.  Pure being is nothing, but now we ask “in what sense 
‘nothing’?”  This is how we reflect on this new concept: remember that 
reflection, at the most minimal level, is this relentless questioning of thought.  It 
is not enough to say that being is nothing, we also have to enquire whether we 
can find a better explanation of what “nothing” means. 
 
The concept of nothing is the concept of pure indeterminateness, and so is 
identical to the concept of pure being.  Hegel writes another paragraph, after the 
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one on pure being, in which he tries to encapsulate what he means by “nothing”.  
Nothing is “simple equality with itself”, “absence of all determination and 
content” and “undifferentiatedness in itself” and yet it “is (exists) in our intuiting 
or thinking”.  Nothing is, for Hegel, “altogether the same as, pure being.”153   
 
As we saw above, nothing and being must be distinct from each other if “being is 
nothing” is to serve as an explanation of pure being.  If being and nothing were 
simply identical, then “being is nothing” would be a worthless tautology: if the 
answer to “What is being?” is “being is nothing”, but the answer to “What is 
nothing?” can be no more than “nothing is being”, then our explanation is 
circular and “being is nothing” is a tautology, of no more value than “being is 
being”.154 
 
Being and nothing must therefore, despite their identity, be distinct in some 
sense if “being is nothing” is to serve as an explanation of being.  But in what 
sense are they distinct?  “Being” and “nothing” do not seem to be simply the 
same: we seem to mean something different by “being” than we do by 
“nothing”.  Thus Hegel tells us that we “imagine” being and nothing to be 
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 See Hutchings 1964: I am using “tautology” in a loose sense, as used by Hutchings when he 
describes Wisdom’s view that “‘God exists’ is a tautology, or that the proposition is at least like a 
tautology, in that it is not assailable on the grounds of anything that happens or does not happen 
in our experience”.  Tautology and “unassailability” come together in my account too, even 
though experience doesn’t really play a role at this abstract level.  A tautology is supposed to be 
“stable”, since it is self-contained, but for reflection such self-sufficiency is unacceptable and 
turns into instability. 
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distinct, despite our being unable to discover what is distinct about them.155  
Being and nothing are identical and yet distinct, and we claim this because 
“being is nothing” seems to tell us more about being than “being is being” does. 
 
Since pure being is identical with nothing and yet (we imagine) distinct from it, 
Hegel describes the relationship between being and nothing as one of 
“transition”.156  It is called a transition in order to highlight the transformation 
that the concept of pure being must undergo when it is described as “nothing”: 
when we say that being is nothing, we are not talking simply of its identity with 
itself, but of its identity with something other than it.  As we saw, “pure being is 
nothing” must not be a mere tautology, but a new way of thinking pure being: it 
is an explanation.  When we had the concept of pure being in mind to begin with, 
all we had was sheer indeterminacy (“being is being”), but once we think it over 
we necessarily create the deeper concept of pure being that is nothing (“being is 
nothing”).  Pure being thus becomes nothing and so there is a transition between 
these concepts. 
 
It is by thinking this transition – the identity and difference between being and 
nothing – that we arrive at what Hegel calls the “first concept” of the Logic: the 
concept of “becoming”.157  It can be called the first concept because it is the first 
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 Logic p.105: Hegel writes of the “initially imagined self-subsistence” of being and nothing (my 
italics). 
156
 Logic p.93 
157
 Enc Logic §88 Add.: “Becoming is the first concrete thought and hence the first concept, 
whereas being and nothing, in contrast, are empty abstractions.” 
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concept that is not a concept of sheer indeterminateness: as I noted above, we 
only call pure being and nothing “concepts” for want of a better term.158  Hegel 
suggests that the logic of pure being tells us “that neither being nor nothing truly 
is, but that their truth is only becoming”.159  That is to say, since the concept of 
pure being is utterly indeterminate, any explanation of pure being, as we saw, 
must transform pure being into nothing, and so give us the concept of becoming, 
which is the concept of the movement from “being” to “nothing”.  Since it is only 
with explanation that we truly begin to think (see the previous section: 
explanation is what I am calling the process by which determinations are made 
explicit; explanation is essential to reflection), and as soon as we explain pure 
being it becomes nothing, becoming is the first true concept: that is, becoming is 
the first concept to emerge from the activity of logical thinking.  With the concept 
of becoming we recognise that “pure being” cannot be thought in its purity 
unless it is also thought as “becoming”, as a transition between being and 
nothing.  It is at this point that we realise that it makes little sense to call pure 
being “pure” at all, since it is already more than simply “being”. 
 
However, it is not just the case that being becomes nothing: nothing also 
becomes being.  There is not simply a transition from being to nothing, but also a 
transition away from nothing and back to being again, since although being and 
nothing are (imagined to be) distinct, when we think nothing we think it as no 
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more than being.  As we saw above, “being is nothing” is a tautology and so 
cannot serve as an adequate explanation of “being”: that is to say, “being is 
nothing” taken by itself is a tautology.  If being could be meaningfully described 
as simply “nothing” – if “nothing” gave us a full explanation of what is meant by 
“pure being” – then this concept would be static and fixed in its determination, 
since we would need to go no further to define it.  However, the fact that 
“nothing” means no more than “pure being” means that this explanation is 
unsatisfactory, since “being is nothing” turns out to be a tautology: if being is 
nothing, but nothing is no more than being, then “being is nothing” is as 
tautological as “being is being”.  The concept of becoming is required because 
“being is nothing” is insufficient as an explanation.  There is a movement 
between these two concepts as we struggle to present “being is nothing” and 
“nothing is being” as meaningful explanations rather than as meaningless 
tautologies, by presenting them as concepts that are both identical and distinct.  
That is to say, the concept of becoming is the concept of the movement in 
thought as we attempt to make more of the identity of being and nothing than is 
explicitly there: we imagine that being and nothing are not simply identified with 
each other, and so they are repeatedly separated from each other to emphasise 
the imagined difference between them which seems to serve as an explanation 
for what “being” and “nothing” mean.  The concept of becoming is the concept 
of what thought requires if it is to explain being and nothing, even if this 
explanation is imaginary and (as we will see) ultimately unstable.  The concept of 
becoming arises from a certain creativity on the part of thought: thought does 
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not settle for the simple, tautological and absolute truth that being is nothing, 
but attempts to make more of this truth than is explicitly contained within it. 
 
We imagine, then, that being and nothing are two “self-subsistent” concepts 
despite their identity: they must be separate concepts if their identity is to 
provide the depth of an explanation.160  By this stage in the development of the 
Logic, we have not discovered anything that we could call knowledge: we have 
tried to say what “pure being” must mean, and thus we try to claim that we have 
some knowledge of pure being, but we still have no more than a tautology.  Or 
rather, we have this tautology and the continued will – or “resolve” – to acquire 
more than mere tautology: it is from the latter that the movement of becoming 
arises.  That is to say, becoming is generated in our thinking out of the concepts 
of being and nothing because this restless movement in thought whereby being 
and nothing are repeatedly shown to be alike and yet not alike, is what would be 
required for us to explain being and nothing; that is, we would need, if we were 
to explain being and nothing, to take them to be identical and distinct. 
 
We have seen that, though there is a transition from being to nothing, this is not 
the end of the journey, as it were: nothing is also transformed into pure being.  It 
is the complex nature of the transition between being and nothing that leads 
Hegel to use the term “becoming” in the way that he does: becoming is, for 
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Hegel, the “speculative determination” of pure being.161  A speculative 
determination is one of the “deeper determinations” described above: rather 
than offering a mere tautology, a speculative determination explains a concept.  
That is to say, a tautology lacks determinateness, it describes what is 
indeterminate (and does so insufficiently, since it does not amount to an 
explanation), while the speculative determination describes the determinations 
required to explain this concept.  Becoming is the concept of what is required if 
we are to acquire explanation and knowledge: being cannot simply be nothing if 
nothing is simply being; we need more than this and becoming is the movement 
that thought makes as it imagines being and nothing to be two distinct concepts 
that explain each other.  Even as they are described as identical, thought pulls 
them apart so that they can be said to explain each other. 
 
A speculative determination explains a concept by standing for every aspect of 
the concept that it explains: in this case, the speculative determination of pure 
being and nothing would have to explain both the identity and difference of 
these two concepts.  As Hegel writes: 
 
It remains to be noted… that the expression: “Being and nothing is the same,” or “the unity of 
being and nothing” – like all other unities of this kind (the unity of subject and object, etc.) – can 
fairly be objected to, because it is misleading and incorrect insofar as it makes the unity stand 
out; and although diversity is contained in it (because it is, for instance, being and nothing whose 
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unity is posited), this diversity is not expressed and recognised along with the unity.  So we seem 
only to have abstracted quite improperly from this diversity, and to have given no thought to it.  
The fact is that no speculative determination can be expressed correctly in the form of such a 
proposition.
162
 
 
Since becoming is the speculative determination of pure being and nothing, it is 
easy to see how it is generated by these concepts: becoming is precisely the 
concept of the identity and difference of the concepts of pure being and nothing 
that, as we have shown, is necessary for thinking these concepts as explaining 
each other.  There is no way to think pure being and nothing adequately except 
as identical and distinct, and so the concept of becoming (the concept of the 
identity and difference of pure being and nothing) necessarily arises from, or is 
generated by, the concepts of pure being and nothing.  The concept of becoming 
arises from the act of the imagination required for us to think the concepts of 
being and nothing. 
 
We must remember that the concept of becoming arises from a creative, 
imaginative act of thinking: it describes the movement of thinking required if we 
are to explain the concept of pure being.  Becoming explains what being must be, 
by explaining the restlessness of thought that must occur as we try to explain it.  
The concept of becoming is the concept of a certain vagueness and lack of 
determination that is implied by the concept of pure being: we learn that we 
cannot quite put our finger on what “pure being” might mean, and so thought 
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moves restlessly, rather than fixing on a clear definition.  Pure being must be 
determinate (it must be a self-subsistent concept that is different from the 
concept of nothing), and yet can seemingly only be defined as an utter lack of 
determination (and so utterly identical to nothing).  In the next section we will 
see that the concept of becoming implies the concept of sublation: the imaginary 
and vague status of becoming (the fact that we cannot put our finger on exactly 
how the concept of becoming explains the concept of being) means that the 
concept of becoming is unstable, and this imaginary becoming leads us to the 
more concrete and stable concept of determinate being.  This is how dialectic 
unfolds: we move from an unstable concept (pure being), to the unmet – and 
seemingly impossible – demands of thinking (pure being must be identical to and 
distinct from nothing) to a fresh attempt at thinking that allows the demands of 
thinking to be met.163  As I suggested above, “sublation” occurs when thought 
reaches an impasse: thought has reached an impasse because it seems that 
being must be both what it is and what it is not (it must both simply be and be 
other than it is).  The concept of pure being, we might say, is not “self-sufficient”: 
when we explain it we find that it is not simply what it is.  The concept of pure 
being is unstable and must change: that is, when we explain what “being” 
means, we find that we have explained that it is not being, since we define 
“being” as “nothing”. 
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6: Determinate being 
 
In the last section we saw that, for Hegel, the concept of becoming is the concept 
of the identity and difference of being and nothing: though “being is nothing” is 
true, it must also be true that being and nothing are distinct from each other.  
Thus we can say “being is becoming”, since being is nothing while it is also, in 
some as yet indeterminate sense, other than nothing.  Hegel describes this 
moment of identifying being and becoming in this way as the “vanishing” of 
becoming: it is the vanishing of the movement between “being is being” (being is 
self-subsistent and distinct from nothing) and “being is nothing” (being is no 
more than nothing).  This is why we have a movement of becoming: it is because 
“being is nothing” is true but different and opposed to the equally true claim that 
“being is simply being” (that being is self-subsistent).  “Being is being” means 
that being is being and nothing more: “being is nothing”, we imagine, goes 
beyond this tautology and is opposed to the claim that being is self-subsistent.  
As long as we see these two claims as incompatible, to assert both of them to be 
true gives us a movement: they are both alternately true (since they cannot be 
true at the same time) as one becomes the other.  However, Hegel tells us that 
to assert that both claims are true (whether we alternate between them in this 
way or not) means that the movement is “cancelled”: since they are both true 
they must be compatible claims.  Thus becoming resolves into its own vanishing, 
and the claim that being is becoming is not to say that being is the movement of 
becoming but that it is the “result” of this movement.  That is to say: “being is 
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becoming” means “being is being and nothing”, which means that “being is 
being” and “being is nothing” are true, which means that these two propositions 
are compatible, and so there is no movement (since they are true at the same 
time). 
 
When becoming vanishes, we have a concept that Hegel calls “determinate 
being”.  The concept of determinate being is the concept of being as becoming: 
that is to say, it is the concept of being as being and nothing at the same time 
(and so not a movement between being as being and being as nothing).  It is 
simply true that being is both being and nothing: we have a tautology, since to 
have being is to have nothing, and vice versa (that is, “nothing” is contained in 
“being”, and vice versa). 
 
In sum: we know that we need more than “being is nothing” if we are to explain 
being, since “being is nothing” is tautological and thus uninformative.  The 
movement of becoming arises out of the knowledge that we need something 
further if we are to have an explanation: being and nothing are held to be 
distinct even while they are identical, in some indeterminate way, so that they 
can be seen to explain each other.  This movement is unstable, however, since 
we cannot specify what it is that makes being and nothing distinct.  Becoming 
thus “collapses” and we are left with the tautology “being is nothing”.  This 
tautology as the result of the collapse of becoming – that is, as the result of the 
recognition that being and nothing cannot be taken to be distinct – is the 
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concept of determinate being.  Determinate being is being that is inseparable 
from nothing. 
 
This collapsing of movement into a simple, tautological truth is what Hegel calls 
“sublation”.  The movement of becoming was supposed to allow us to escape 
from mere tautology, but when we look at what “becoming” means, we see that 
we have not in fact done this.  As I noted above, becoming is the concept of the 
imagined difference and identity between being and nothing, and with the 
collapse of becoming, the dream that we have a satisfactory explanation of 
“being” is shattered.  Being and nothing are simply identical.  However, sublation 
does not only mean the “cancellation” of a previous concept (the cancellation of 
the movement of becoming), but also the “preservation” of what was true about 
that concept.  Although becoming is cancelled because it was not an adequate 
solution to the problem of the meaning of “being”, what we have learned is 
preserved, since it is still the case that being and nothing must be different even 
though they are identical.  This, as we will shortly see, will lead to a fresh attempt 
to explain the tautology of being, though this time we are dealing with the 
tautological concept of determinate being (being that is simply identical to 
nothing) rather than the tautological concept of pure being (being that is simply 
identical to itself). 
 
Hegel tells us that, once we have the concept of determinate being we have the 
concept of “quality”.  “Quality” means “immediate determinacy or… determinacy 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 114 of 365 
 
that simply is”.164  Becoming was complex: it helped to explain “pure being” 
because it stood for the movement between the simplicity of pure being (“being 
is being”) and a concept that explained it (the concept of nothing).  Now we take 
the truth of becoming (that being is being and nothing) as a simple 
determination (so that the movement of becoming “vanishes”) and we are back 
to a simple truth: being is becoming (being is being and nothing) and no more. 
 
But this simple truth requires explanation and so we are in a position similar to 
that in which we found ourselves with the concept of pure being: just as being 
was simply being, so now being is simply being and nothing, and yet this simple 
truth requires explanation.  It requires explanation for the same reason that pure 
being required explanation: as simple being, determinate being claims to be 
indeterminate (it just is this way), and this indeterminateness is only part of the 
story (as we saw above, it is never the case, for Hegel, that something just is).  
We will see that simple, determinate being is explained through the concepts of 
“reality” and “negation”. 
 
In sum: the movement back and forth from being to nothing turns out not to be 
such after all, since to claim that both propositions are true, whether alternately 
or not, is to claim that they are compatible, and so they can be true at the same 
time.  The logic of becoming is such that becoming cancels itself.  That is to say: 
the movement that has arisen from the requirement for “depth” and 
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“explanation” (“being is nothing” as well as “being is being” is true) can also be 
described as a tautology (being is being and nothing at the same time).  Once the 
movement is transformed from a movement back and forth to an established 
result, we have determinate being.  Being and nothing are now simply one in 
their identity.  In a sense, we are back to where we started with pure being (or 
“being is being”): we have a tautology that needs to be explained.  However the 
tautology differs in that it is the result of the concepts prior to it.  We already 
know that “being is being” means “being is nothing” and “being is becoming”, 
and the task now is to explain these claims, which combine to give us no more 
than a tautology: “being is being and nothing”. 
 
So we now have the concept of determinate being.  But we should note that we 
do not yet have any particular sort of determinate being.  In order for being to be 
determinate we must have being and nothing (or “non-being”, as Hegel starts to 
call nothing from this point) as a unity, but this is not determinate enough to give 
us any particular determination.  The German word that A.V. Miller translates as 
“determinate being” is “Dasein”, which might more literally be translated as 
“being there”.  Miller rightly chooses not to translate it in this way, since, as 
Hegel makes clear, there is nothing spatial about the concept of Dasein taken, as 
it is here, in its pure form.165  In other words, the concept of Dasein does not, on 
its own, provide us with enough to answer any particular “where?” question, 
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asked of any determination in particular.  For Hegel, he has given a minimal 
definition of what it means to be determinate: to be determinate is to simply be 
in such a way that what is determinate also is not in some sense.   
 
We saw in this section that the logical outcome of becoming, its result, is that 
being is becoming.  But to recognise that being is becoming is to cancel the 
movement of becoming, since it is to recognise that “being is being” and “being 
is nothing” are true at the same time.  “Determinate being” is the name Hegel 
gives to the concept of being that is both being and nothing, but this concept 
demands explanation, since the simple truth that being is nothing and nothing is 
being does not explain enough.  In the next section we will see how Hegel’s 
logical explanation develops. 
 
7: Reality and negation 
 
We have seen above that determinate being is being that is non-being.  Unlike 
pure being, determinate being is inseparable from non-being in such a way that 
non-being can be said to belong to it: determinate being is being that simply is 
non-being.  However, we have here a tautology and so it will need to be 
explained it if it is to be satisfying to thought.  “Being is non-being”: as a 
tautology this is simple.  But there are “aspects”, or “depths”, to this tautology 
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that can be brought out by thinking.166  Determinate being is explained through 
the concepts of “reality” and “negation”: determinate being is real insofar as it is, 
and negation insofar as it is not.  In a sense, as being that is a unity of being and 
nothing, determinate being is being that contains nothing.  This makes it appear 
to be stable: it is not transformed from being into nothing and back again but 
remains both of these at the same time.  However, Hegel will show us why 
determinate being is unstable: we will see that the reality and negation of 
determinate being must be contained in one another while at the same time 
being separate. 
 
Let us sum up what has been said so far.  We sought a definition of the 
indeterminate concept of “pure being”, but could only define it as equivalent to 
the equally indeterminate concept of “nothing”.  Since both concepts are utterly 
indeterminate, “being is nothing” is an uninformative tautology.  However, 
“being” and “nothing” nonetheless seem to mean different things: we imagine 
that the fact that we call one “being” and the other “nothing” indicates a 
difference in their determination, though we cannot say what this difference 
precisely is.  “Becoming” is the concept of the movement between these 
indeterminate concepts as we try to separate them and imagine that they are 
different.  Becoming “vanishes”, however, once this imaginative separation of 
being and nothing is recognised to be precisely that: imaginary and thus 
uninformative.  We do not know being and nothing to be separate but only 
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imagine them to be so.  However, we do know something once the concept of 
becoming has vanished: we know that being and nothing are identical (that is, 
we know that there is a certain difficulty in separating being from nothing).  
Thus, while thinking begins with the concept of pure being, knowledge begins 
with determinate being, even if this is only negative knowledge: we know that 
we cannot separate pure being from nothing.  What remains to be known is what 
is implied by the fact that being and nothing are identical: until we can explain in 
what sense they are distinct, the claim that they are identical remains 
uninformative (since “being is nothing” is a tautology). 
 
Given this knowledge, we try to explain determinate being – we try to say more 
than “determinate being is being that is being and nothing” – by coming up with 
another way in which being and nothing (or “non-being”) might be distinct while 
nevertheless remaining inseparable.  Being and non-being are called “reality” 
and “negation” when they are considered to be “aspects” of the same 
determinate being (rather than as separate, self-subsistent concepts): 
determinate being is real insofar as it is and is negation insofar as it is not.  When 
we talk of “reality” we are not talking of something utterly separate from 
“negation”, but as a distinct aspect of what it means to be determinate.  To be 
determinate is to have certain real determinations, while not having others, and 
we can focus on the positive and negative aspects, even while accepting that we 
only have determination proper when both are taken into account. 
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For Hegel, then, we can talk about determinate being in different ways: we can 
put the “accent” on different aspects.167  The being and non-being that 
determinate being is composed of are now described as “reality” and “negation”, 
in order to highlight the new way in which these concepts relate to each other.  
Being and nothing, we saw, flowed into one another (there was movement of 
becoming, or transition, between the two concepts), since we had, at the 
moment we thought we had difference, identity of the two concepts.  With the 
new form that being and nothing take, as being and non-being, or reality and 
negation, we are shown that their difference and identity are not mutually 
exclusive.  A consequence of this is that we cannot talk of pure reality in the way 
that we could talk of pure being.  We cannot think reality except as impure, that 
is, as in a stable unity with negation.  What we have is a new sort of 
“unseparatedness” of being and nothing: a stable unity rather than an unstable 
one.  However, reality is a category that conceals negation for Hegel: 
 
“Both *reality and negation+ are determinate being, but in reality as quality with the accent on 
being, the fact is concealed that it contains determinateness and therefore also negation.”
168
 
 
Because we can describe determinateness in terms of the being that belongs to 
it (its reality: that is, the determination is such as it is because it is this way) or of 
the non-being that belongs to it (its negation: that is, the determination is such 
as it is because it is not that way), and both are determinate being, to describe 
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determinate being in either way is to conceal its other aspect.  Reality and 
negation are thus both categories that conceal an aspect of determinate being.  
But they also conceal an aspect of their own truth, since to talk of mere reality is 
to ignore the negation involved with it, while to talk of mere negation is to ignore 
the reality to which this negation belongs.  To utter the term “reality” is thus to 
utter only half of the truth of determinate being, and the same goes for the term 
“negation”.  We can see now why we said above that nothing, being the sum 
total of all negations, is indeterminate, and so is not properly negation at all: the 
concept of negation must be determinate and can only be so by having reality 
and thus having a limit to what it negates. 
 
It is for this reason that the concept of determinate being itself does not tell the 
whole story: since it is a concept that can be expressed by two terms that 
conceal the whole truth, it is clear that determinate being points to something 
beyond it.  This “something” is precisely the concept of something. 
 
8: Something 
 
We can now understand why Hegel says of the concepts of reality and negation 
that “although these distinctions are present in determinate being, they are no 
less equally void and sublated.”169  We distinguish between reality and negation 
in determinate being, but can only do so insofar as we see each distinct part as 
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involving the other.  If we say, with Spinoza, that “determination is negation” we 
conceal an element not only of determinate being but of negation itself, since we 
leave out mention of reality (Hegel agrees with Spinoza that determination is 
negation, but reminds us that this conceals the part that reality plays in its 
involvement with negation).170 
 
The fact that uttering “reality” and “negation” involves concealment causes 
these categories to be sublated.  They are sublated for the same reason that the 
transition between being and nothing was sublated: the difference between 
them is only imaginary and so thought has reached an impasse: we want to claim 
something to be true that we cannot properly explain.  We know that the 
difference is only imaginary, because in order to explain what “reality” is 
supposed to mean we must conceal the negation that is identical to it (that is, we 
must imagine reality as, per impossibile, not involving negation), and the same 
goes for “negation” (we imagine negation as not involving reality).  That is to say: 
when we talk of reality as separate from negation we must pretend that there is 
a difference and deny (or conceal) their identity.  Though there must be a 
difference between reality and negation if we are to explain what we mean by 
“determinate being”, we can only come up with an imagined difference by 
concealing what is in fact the case. 
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Hegel argues that we can think the reality and negation of determinate being 
more correctly with the concept of “being-within-self” or “something”.  This 
concept is the concept of the distinction between reality and negation as 
sublated and “this sublatedness of the distinction is determinate being’s own 
determinateness”.171  That is to say, reality and negation are identical and 
together belong to this form of being, this something: with the concept of 
something, or being-within-self, we now no longer talk of a distinction between 
reality and negation.  We should note that, for Hegel, if a distinction is sublated 
this means that the distinction is not reduced to “nothing”; that is, the distinction 
is not considered to be no distinction at all, but is recognised to exist as a part of 
a more adequate (that is, more coherent) whole (“the distinction cannot be 
omitted, for it is”).  Nevertheless, this distinction, since it could not be properly 
explained (we could never offer a complete explanation of what “reality” could 
mean as distinct from negation, and the same for “negation”), must be left to 
one side so that we can offer a more satisfactory explanation of what “being” 
might mean.172  We do this in the following way: instead of saying that being is 
reality, or that to be is to be real, we say that to be is to be something.  Hegel 
does not deny that to be is to be real; he simply says that to be real is not 
enough, and to be must also mean to be something, which means to be both real 
and negative, since reality and negation cannot be separated.  In this way he 
hopes to arrive at a more satisfactory explanation of “being”, where we do not 
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have to rely on concepts that are imaginary and unstable, but can instead move 
closer to a stable concept that meets the demand of reflection that our concepts 
be explained. 
 
Once again, then, with the concept of being-within-self as being that simply 
contains reality and negation, we are back in a position similar to the one in 
which we began: we have a tautology, since though reality is negation, negation 
is just reality, so that to say that reality is negation is not to say anything 
informative.  The concept of being-within-self is this concept of determinate 
being as this sort of absolute unity of reality and negation, so that determinate 
being is no longer seen as divided into reality and negation – a division that 
might have helped to explain it since we would able to point to different aspects 
of it – but is a simple unity of reality and negation.  Reality and negation are thus 
not so much aspects of determinate being that tell us different things about 
determinate being: with the concept of something, or being-within-self, reality 
and negation both equally “belong” to this determinate being, this “something”, 
so that the being is question is always at the same time “this and not that”. 
 
We need a new formulation of the difference between being and non-being if we 
are to explain what “something” means: as it stands, with the unity of reality and 
negation, we have merely another tautology.  Something is merely the reality 
and negation that belongs to it, but we cannot explain what “reality” and 
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“negation” mean, since they are simply the same, with no third term distinct 
from them which we could identify with them to explain them. 
 
The concept of “something” is the concept of reality and negation taken 
together: a thing is because it has some qualities and does not have others.  
Hegel writes that “something is rightly credited with reality”173: this is because, 
unlike with the reality of merely determinate being, we now have a true 
conception of reality as always involving this moment of negation.  But this still 
raises the question: what is negation?  If we cannot answer this question, then 
we have not explained what “reality” means, since all we know of reality is that it 
is inseparable from negation. 
 
Something is the arrival at “finitude”, since we have found that to be real, 
something must be limited by what it is not.  Reality and negation must always 
be involved when we express what “something” is: reality must belong to a thing 
that is not something else (and thus has negation as well as reality), while 
negation must belong to a thing that is what it is (and thus has reality as well as 
negation).  However, we still have to explain what it means not to be something 
else.  It is for this reason that we need to explain what it means to be “other” if 
we are to explain what it means to be “something”. 
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9: Something and other 
 
To sum up what we have seen so far: we defined pure being as equivalent to 
another indeterminate concept, which meant that our definition – “being is 
nothing” – was uninformative.  Being is becoming because, although pure being 
can be no more than nothing, thought must reflect on being in such a way that 
we imagine this definition to have more explanatory value than it in fact does: 
becoming arises due to the demand of reflection that we have an adequate 
explanation, even where such an explanation seems impossible.  Becoming 
collapses into determinate being because the movement of becoming amounts 
to the simple truth that being and nothing are identical: this simple truth must 
nevertheless be explained, and it is explained by distinguishing between reality 
and negation, the aspects of determinate being (and so determinate being marks 
the point where thought begins again after becoming has been sublated).  
However, this distinction – between reality and negation – also collapses, since it 
is impossible to say precisely how there can be a distinction between these 
concepts.  There is once again a simple identity between being and non-being, 
between reality and negation, and the concept of this simple unity is the concept 
of being-within-self or something.  The concept of something is the concept of a 
being that is “this and not that”, and so has reality at the same time as it has 
negation, and vice versa: with something, we accept that we have as yet found 
no clear distinction between the sense in which a being is “this” and the sense in 
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which it is “not that”, since the reality and negation of something are 
indistinguishable from each other. 
 
However, there must nevertheless be a distinction between the being and non-
being of something, and so we proceed to think about the concept of something, 
and the sense in which it is “this”, on the one hand, and “not that”, on the other.  
We have the concept of “something” when we have a simple unity of reality and 
negation: something, or “being-within-self” is simple being that is real in a 
determinate way, and so is negative at the same time that it is real.  But we have 
a similar problem to the one we had before: in what sense is being-within-self 
this and in what sense not that?  That is to say, with determinate being, “reality” 
and “negation” denoted the qualities that did (reality) and did not (negation) 
belong to the determinate being: reality and negation were taken to be separate.  
But if there is no way to distinguish meaningfully between reality and negation, 
then there is no way to distinguish between the qualities that the determinate 
being does and does not have: the determinate being (now called “being-within-
self” or “something”) simply has a bundle of positive and negative qualities 
(things that are true of the being, facts about what the being is and is not).  In 
what sense, then, can a something, in this Hegelian sense of the term, be said to 
not be this or that, if to not be is the same as to be? 
 
The answer is that, while there is no distinction between reality and negation 
within the being-within-self (it just is, even where it is not this or that), the being-
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within-self, the something, is distinct from what is external and other to it.  
Something is insofar as it is itself (and all the positive and negative qualities that 
belong to it), and is not insofar as we can point to something other than it, to 
something outside of it from which it is different. 
 
Something and its other “are… indifferent to one another.”174  Something and 
other must both be things, they must each be something.  Something and the 
other something, that we point to in order to highlight what the first something 
is not, are both these bundles of qualities that are in themselves neither positive 
or negative but simply are.  The negation between them is found in their relation 
to each other: we can say what the first something is not by pointing to what the 
other something is.  We thus have a distinction between the reality of something 
and the negation of this reality: this distinction is found once we compare 
something to its other. 
 
However, there is a question that can be asked here: how do we determine what 
is other than something?  As we have seen, what is other is not intrinsically 
other: an other is a something that is real in its own right, and just like any 
something, its reality is bound up with its negation, so that it cannot be said to 
be merely negative.  The other is the negation of something due to its relation to 
something.  But this relation works both ways, and the first something is the 
other of the other something, just as the second something is the other of the 
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first.  Just as something and other are both “somethings”, so to speak, so both 
are others.  The same being is thus both something and other.  The being is 
something insofar as it has reality and negation bound up as its quality.  The 
being is other insofar as it is related to another something.  To repeat the 
question just posed: how do we determine what is other than something?  It 
cannot be anything about the other something itself, since each something 
simply is: that is to say, a something is just this bundle of qualities, and does not 
contain its relation to other within it.  This must be the case: the whole reason 
that the question of an other came up was that there can be nothing distinct 
about the negation aspect of the something, of the being-within-self, since all 
negation is reality and all reality is negation.  Or to be more precise: it is 
impossible to explain what we might mean by saying that there is an aspect of 
something that is its negation, since we cannot distinguish this from the 
something’s reality.  The concept of an other came in because we needed 
something external to explain how the reality of something might be distinct 
from the negation of this reality. 
 
So we seem to run into a problem explaining the difference between something 
and its other.  Each something is simply that: a unity of reality and negation and 
nothing about it tells us what its other might be like, or in what sense it is itself 
an other.  Some external factor must come into play that determines what is 
other than something.  This external factor is otherness as such: we think not 
merely of a something and its internal qualities (its inseparable aspects of reality 
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and negation), but we think also of an abstract concept of an other, and use this 
concept to determine what it is about something that makes it an other.  That is 
to say, we have a concept of the other as such, and use this concept as a sort of 
template for determining, for a given something, which somethings qualify as an 
other to that something.  We therefore posit an other, and in this way ascribe “to 
the other a nature of its own”.175  That is to say, since there can be nothing about 
the something in itself that makes it other, we posit something called 
“otherness”, which allows us to take something as other.  Something is thus 
taken to be “external to itself”: it has the characteristic of otherness, even 
though this quality does not belong to it.176  That is to say, each something has 
the quality of otherness, even though otherness must be external to something 
(since otherness must be otherness in itself, and so must subsist separately from 
something, since if it did not, as we saw, the existence of otherness would rely 
on a distinction between reality and negation that we cannot explain).  
Something is thus always other than itself: despite being “being-within-itself”, 
being the simple unity of reality and negation, it is nevertheless always more 
than this for reflection.  For reflection, something is always more than it is. 
 
With this realisation, that something is always more than it is because it must, 
paradoxically, always have the property of otherness that does not belong to it, 
we have the concept of “alteration”.  To say that something is more than it is, 
being a paradoxical expression, lacks meaning: we instead say that something is 
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never what it is for more than a moment at a time.  Something is simply what it 
is, but must always already have transformed into something else.  This is what 
“alteration” means: something, by having the quality of otherness, is always 
other than itself, and the being of something is more than its simple reality and 
negation; something is its transformation beyond itself.  There is always a surplus 
of being, such that, whatever the something is, it is always already more than 
this. 
 
Conclusion 
 
With alteration, then, we are assured that whatever thing we grasp, when 
grasped fully, a surplus will nonetheless arise.  The thing that we have grasped, 
we will find, is always undergoing a process of alteration.  Something is always 
what it is not.  Alteration is thus “unstable” in the sense described above: it is 
unsatisfactory to reflection, since it means that what something is and what 
something is not (what is other than something) are always identical.  What the 
concept of alteration tells us is that, if we are to talk in such terms that we refer 
to this or that as “something” when describing the world, we will not be able to 
have a fixed conception of  what we are talking about.  Our view of the world will 
necessarily be made vague by the fact that any given something is never simply 
what it is.177 
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I should point out that Hegel’s examination of “being” does not end with his 
discussion of alteration.  Alteration is one aspect of “finitude”, which Hegel 
continues to talk about at some length, before discussing how finitude makes the 
concept of infinity necessary; Hegel then goes on to discuss “quantity” (up to this 
point he has only been discussing “quality”) before showing how quantity and 
quality are ultimately inseparable; he then shows how “measure”, as the unity of 
quality and quantity, reveals to us the need for a logic of “essence”, which goes 
beyond the logic of “being” that has been discussed so far.  I will try to explain in 
the next chapter how the need for a discussion of “essence” arises from Hegel’s 
reflections on the concepts of being: however, I will not give a detailed 
explanation in this thesis of how we get from the concept of alteration through 
quantity and measure to the concept of essence.  One thing I would like the 
reader to take from what has been discussed above is the following: for Hegel, 
there are certain concepts that, while being indispensible (we must, for example, 
talk of “reality” sometimes), are nevertheless vague and unstable.  They are 
essential to thought, despite their lack of clarity and certainty.  “Something” is 
such a concept: whatever “philosophy” is, for example, it is certainly 
“something”.  But, to stick with the philosophy example, it is also more than this.  
If we say that we are examining “something”, that we have “something” before 
us, we should not expect that we can get a full picture of what this something is 
                                                                                                                                                               
word “vagus”, which means “wandering”.  Our view of the world is vague because it is subject to 
alteration and so can never be fixed. (See translator’s notes in Deleuze’s Expressionism in 
Philosophy: Spinoza p.424) 
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as something.  Any something will always be part of a dynamic process of 
alteration.   
 
It is a simple, perhaps even trivial point to make, but Hegel’s analysis of 
“something” shows us that the answer to the question “What is philosophy?” 
must be a complex one, since we must account for the fact that philosophy will 
change over time.  Again, this is a trivial point that Hegel has gone to such 
lengths to demonstrate, but this is characteristic of his philosophical method: 
everything is brought into question.  The hope of reflective thinking is that 
bringing everything into question to arrive at trivial points is not a waste of time: 
by reflecting upon itself, thought is supposed to become stronger and clearer to 
itself.  This is what we saw happening with “sublation”: when concepts are 
sublated, we note the vagueness and instability of these concepts and accept 
that they have a place in a logical system even as we recognise that they are 
vague and unstable.  Thought becomes stronger, we might say, for having 
recognised which concepts, necessary to thinking, are nevertheless unstable and 
therefore limited in their value.178  We saw this above (when we discussed Rose’s 
reading of Hegel): a mere definition for a concept is not enough, and we must 
develop a system of concepts through a process of finding newer and better 
definitions, if thought is to be determinate.  That is to say, thought becomes 
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philosophical work for you.  Just as thought inevitably gives rise to contradictions, so it also 
inevitably reconciles them in a higher unity, as a human self that grows through self-conflict 
proves its growth by emerging from the conflict into a higher self-harmony.” 
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determinate not through finding the perfect, simple definition, but by creating 
layer upon layer of concepts so that thought becomes more determinate as it 
becomes more complex.  By examining the process of sublation, we have learned 
that we can either have simplicity or explanation: we cannot have both.  For 
example, we saw that the concept of pure being was simple, but that to explain it 
we had to use uncertain concepts and talk of imaginary “movement” in order to 
explain what we meant.  Thoughts that are simple and yet unexplained are 
useless, and yet when we explain them we discover that they are unstable.  For 
reflection, this must be the way it is, which is why the modern reflective spirit 
tends to be sceptical.  As I noted in the introductory comments above, Hegel 
wants to show that the modern reflective spirit is itself dependent on unstable 
concepts, and so we must “mistrust the mistrust” of reflection.  We will see how 
he shows this in the following chapters. 
 
In the following chapters we will see how this logic of alteration is a logic of 
freedom: we are free when we act and do not settle for tautology or sheer 
identity.  Hegel’s experimental mode of argumentation makes him stand out 
from lesser philosophers (and alongside thinkers like Deleuze and Nietzsche): 
that is to say, Hegel knows that, though we must meet the demand of reflection 
that all concepts come into question, it does not belong to the philosophical 
method to set out definitions of terms beforehand.  As I suggested above, 
reflection is a creative and imaginative way of thinking, since reflection involves 
repeatedly coming up with new ways of questioning the concept that is under 
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examination and allows us to come up with new ways that a particular concept 
might relate to other concepts.  I hope that I have shown in this chapter what it 
means to say that philosophy must be thought of as a “process”: our concepts 
gain their meaning from their use and so we define concepts by systematising 
them, and this gives meaning and life to the concepts we use.  Each concept is 
something, and as such it alters depending on its context.  As we will see in later 
chapters, the method of the Logic will become more determinate as it 
progresses: that is to say, the method will become more comprehensive, so that 
we will end up with a method that can inform our investigation of more concrete 
things, such as actual political institutions.   
 
Thus I have suggested in this chapter that Hegel makes the concept of “pure 
being” a concept of his very own, and via this concept he is able to come up with 
a sophisticated and convincing system for thinking about the concept of “being” 
in all of its various manifestations.  This system of thinking is sophisticated and 
convincing, I believe, because it meets the demands of reflection, which is to say 
that it responds to the various difficult questions that our thinking can put to it.  
Reflection makes everything appear unstable, and yet, by systematising our 
concepts, we can find a place for them in our thinking, despite their instability.  It 
is for this reason that the logic of alteration makes us free: by recognising that all 
concepts must alter, we can take control of them and allow them to work for us 
in their limited and finite way, without allowing an impossible desire to see all 
concepts fixed in their determinations to dominate our thinking and ultimately 
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ruin us.  We will see this as the Logic develops: we discover that, since concepts 
can have no fixed meaning in themselves, we can only learn to use concepts 
properly by tracing their development (that is, by working out how they are 
connected to each other).  The speculative method teaches us to use concepts, 
and so we gain control of our concepts. 
 
I have shown, I hope, that Hegel consistently resists going so far with his proofs 
that they give us fixity and certainty; Hegel argues instead for the necessity of 
leaving an argument in such a way that there is a possibility of its being 
disproved.  By bringing the necessary and the contingent together, Hegel brings 
into question the notion of necessity and does not argue that we should rest 
when we have a tautology.  Philosophy is something: this means that it is not 
simply abstract, but is to some extent concrete and so subject to change.179  In 
the next chapter we will begin to look more closely at the thought processes that 
determine the way in which philosophy must change, by looking at Hegel’s “logic 
of essence” which deals explicitly with the concept of “reflection.” 
  
                                                          
179
 Note that, though we are still in this part of the Logic dealing with what is very abstract, the 
concept of something is, for Hegel, more concrete than the concept of, say, pure being. 
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Chapter 4: Hegel on Essence (I: Reflection) 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last chapter I suggested that the first part of Hegel’s Logic – Hegel’s “logic 
of being” – was an examination of how traditional metaphysics fares in the age 
of reflection.  The concepts of traditional metaphysics are concepts of immediate 
being, that is, of being as simply what it is.  Over against these concepts was 
reflection, which is the mode of thought peculiar to modern thinking (though 
earlier thinkers, for example Aristotle, demonstrated reflective thought, such 
thinkers were never typical of their time, and it is only relatively recently in 
history that we have been able to say that thinking in general takes the form of 
reflective thinking).  Reflection, we saw, brings everything into question: for 
reflective thinking, it is not enough to say that something is what it is.  Reflection 
demands an explanation of everything, and the act of explaining always shows 
the thing in question to be what it is not.  Traditional metaphysics was shown to 
fare badly in the age of reflection, as its dependence on concepts of simple 
being, on a conception of being that simply is what it is, was shown to be unable 
to stand up to the demands of reflection. 
 
In the last chapter, reflection was characterised as a self-subsistent entity, 
distinct from the concepts of “being” (that is, the concepts of traditional 
metaphysics).  Reflection had a character of its own (though we only described 
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this character in a vague way: reflection is relentless questioning, always asking 
“What is…?” and so on): reflection, characterised in this way is something, it is 
what it is and is other than the concepts of being that it questions.  Now, if 
reflection is to be consistent, when it reflects on itself it will bring its own 
immediacy (its being simply what it is) into question.  The beginning of the 
“Doctrine of Essence” (the Doctrine of Essence being the second part of the 
Logic, after the “Doctrine of Being”) marks the beginning of this process of 
reflection questioning itself.  The task of the Doctrine of Essence is to see how 
reflection fares when it examines itself.  
 
Hegel writes that “essence issues from being”.180  The concept of essence arises 
from the concept of being because, as we have seen, the immediacy of each of 
the concepts of being leads us to consider in each case a deeper process of 
reflection that lies behind them, so that the concepts of being are not essentially 
what they are, but are essentially something other than what they are.  To put it 
another way: the concepts of being claim to be simply what they are in 
themselves, but this is shown to be untrue: we see that they must be more than 
this, since they must be dependent on a process of reflection.181  For example, 
we saw that “pure being” cannot simply be “pure being”, but must also be 
                                                          
180
 Logic p.393 
181
 It may sound strange to say that concepts “claim to be” this or that, in this case that they 
claim to be simply what they are in themselves.  However, what this means is that simplicity is 
essential to the concept, so that we cannot think pure being except as simple.  Thus if we use the 
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of pure being without talking of simplicity: to talk of simplicity is, we might say, the price that we 
must pay for uttering the phrase “pure being”.  Of course, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
implicit in the concepts of being is also in each case a certain complexity, which is what makes 
these concepts unstable. 
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“nothing”, and this in turn can only be true if we think of “pure being” as 
“becoming”, that is, as a process of transition between being and non-being.  
With the concepts of being, we looked at what being is in itself.  With the 
concepts of essence, we will look at the process of reflection that “lies behind” 
the concepts of being and is thus essential to them. 
 
The logic of being leaves us in a paradoxical position: after all, how can we accept 
that all things must be what they are not?  If this were the final conclusion of 
Hegel’s Logic then we would have to conclude that Hegel is a sceptical thinker, 
since the result of his philosophy would be wholly negative: “the only true 
wisdom is in knowing you know nothing”, is how we might summarise Hegel’s 
position, since he would have shown that, whatever it is that we know, we can 
also be sure that we do not know it, since whatever is known must alter and 
become something else.  In this chapter, however, I am going to show how this 
paradoxical and negative conclusion of the logic of being serves to illustrate a 
positive point about the nature of reflection.   I am going to show that, for Hegel, 
reflection must have three aspects: it must be absolute (“absolute reflection”), it 
must therefore contain within it what is external to it (it is “external reflection”) 
and therefore it must determine what is external to it (it is “determining 
reflection”).  The logic of essence that issues from the logic of being gives us an 
account of reflection, and by studying the logic of essence we can discover what 
it is about modern thinking that causes us to be sceptical about the all-too-
simple concepts of being, by studying the nature of the reflective processes 
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according to which we must think (and therefore alter) these simple concepts of 
being. 
 
It is the simplicity of the concepts of being that makes them problematic, for 
Hegel.  Hegel argues that the term “simple”, wherever it is applied, is always 
untrue.  For Hegel, “‘simple’ is… a determination which… is incapable of grasping 
what is true because it is itself untrue.”182  This is what we learned in the logic of 
being: not merely that there are no concepts to which the term “simple” applies, 
but that the concept of simplicity itself is flawed.  Simplicity, to reflective 
thinking, always means tautology, and tautology is always unstable for modern, 
reflective thinking.  Thus wherever there is simplicity there is always more to be 
said, and so there is always complexity where we find simplicity, which makes 
“simple” a contradictory term (since it refers to complexity as well as simplicity).  
Thus Hegel believes he has shown that there is a logical flaw in the very notion of 
a simple element of thought. 
 
Each concept that we looked at in the last chapter was shown to be 
contradictory: far from being simply what it is, each concept proved to be 
“unstable” and so more than it is.  Each concept became part of a process of 
transition, as it changed from being one concept to being another.  But more 
fundamental than this was the process of sublation, as it was shown that 
transition, implying as it does a movement from one self-subsistent concept to 
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another, did not quite get to the heart of what was happening: rather than 
merely transforming one concept into another, it is instead the case that 
reflective thinking collapses the distinction between the two concepts, so that, 
rather than saying that one concept becomes the other, we should say that each 
is the other at the same time as it is itself. 
 
What I want to suggest is that the repeated collapse of transition into sublation 
points to a movement from transition to “positing”, for Hegel.  Positing is 
another movement of thought, but one which does not refer to the 
transformation of one concept into another, but to the fact of a concept “always 
already” being other than it is.183  The truth of the sublation of transition is 
positing, we might say, since what we learn throughout the logic of being is that 
being could be said to always already be nothing, becoming, something, other 
and so on.  That is to say, we learned from the logic of being that to explain what 
we mean by “being” we must think it as nothing, becoming and so on, so that to 
think being properly (according to the demands of reflection) we must think it as 
always already nothing, becoming and so on. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, reflection – that is to say, reflective thought – 
is always questioning itself.  Reflection is supposed to provide its own criteria for 
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Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 141 of 365 
 
thinking, and accept no criterion as beyond question.184  No concept is simply as 
it is when it is given, since the movement of reflection will alter it.  For reflection, 
each concept is always already sublated, and this (as we will see) is the 
standpoint of thought that Hegel calls “positing”. 
 
Let us see how Hegel introduces the notion of positing.  In the Encyclopaedia 
Logic, we are told that “in the sphere of Being, relatedness is only implicit”.185  
The sphere of Being is what we looked at in the previous chapter: it is the first 
part of Hegel’s logical system devoted to examining the concepts of being.  We 
saw in the previous chapter how it is that we can say that relatedness is only 
implicit in the concepts of being: explicitly, the concepts of being are concepts 
that simply are what they are, and it is only due to the demands of reflection 
(that we explain the tautological truths of being) that we see that they must be 
related to other concepts (and that this circumstance, of being simply what it is 
and being necessarily related to an other makes the concept in question 
contradictory, in each case). 
 
“In Essence, on the contrary, relatedness is posited.”186  That is to say, in the 
logic of essence, which follows the logic of being, the concepts of being are taken 
to be always already related to other concepts.  This is the nature of reflection, as 
we will see: that is, for reflection, concepts are taken to be always already 
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related to other concepts.  We will see that this means that anything can be 
related to anything else, and this will cause the logic of reflection to break down.  
So, for example, reflection is, and so is always already nothing.  It is self-
sublating, or positing, making it absolute.  That it is positing makes it absolute 
because it can only transform into what it always already is (that, we must 
remember is what is meant by “positing”: it is always already sublated) and so 
there is nothing that reflection can become that it isn’t already.  This leads us 
from “absolute reflection” to “external reflection”: reflection is always already 
transformed, and so we must think of reflection as always already what is other 
than reflection.  From external reflection we come to the concept of 
“determining reflection”: because it is absolute and other than itself, it is 
reflection’s own nature that determines what is other than itself (since there is 
no other nature than reflection’s own nature).  In other words, reflection is all 
that there is (and that there can be) but must be “restless”, it must always be in a 
state of becoming what it is not.187  
 
Since, in the logic of essence, the concepts of being are taken to be always 
already related to other concepts, in the movement from the logic of being to 
the logic of essence we have a movement from transition to positing.  We get a 
movement from transition to positing because it is no longer the case that 
concepts are seen as simply what they are and then transformed into other 
concepts (these other concepts also being simply what they are, until they 
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 See Nancy 2002 p.6: this restlessness, as we will see in later chapters, will remain a 
characteristic of thought, since thought is defined by its movement. 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 143 of 365 
 
themselves are transformed): instead, each concept is known already to be other 
than itself, and so we have “positing” (that is, the movement of thought 
according to which concepts are taken to always already be other than 
themselves).  In other words, we move from a way of thinking according to which 
concepts are assumed to be simply what they are, and are then shown to be 
other than they are (transition), to a way of thinking according to which we 
assume that concepts are always already other than they are (positing).  This 
latter way of thinking, we might say, is justified by what we have seen of the 
logic of being: that is, that no concept of being is simply what it is.  With this 
latter, “essentialist”, or “reflective”, way of thinking, we are no longer 
considering how the naïve metaphysical view fares in an age of reflection: the 
naïve view is assumed to have failed, and we just examine the claim of modern 
reflective thought that things always alter and are always already other than 
they are.  The question that we ask of reflection is: how can we describe a way of 
thinking for which concepts are always already what they are not and so 
concepts are each related to all other concepts?  Whereas the logic of being was 
an examination of metaphysics in an age of reflection, the logic of essence is an 
examination of reflection itself, that is, of a way of thinking that assumes from 
the start that traditional metaphysics is impossible, and that thought will always 
get in the way of certain, stable and fixed truths about reality: with reflection, 
everything is always already transformed and transforming. 
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1: Nachdenken and Reflexion 
 
In the present chapter we will see how discussion of essence is, for Hegel, 
discussion of “reflection” (as a result, I will be using the terms “reflection” and 
“essence” more or less interchangeably).  The logic of essence begins with the 
concept of reflection: however, at the beginning of the “Doctrine of Essence” 
(the second “book” of the Logic, which deals with the concepts of essence) Hegel 
looks at the concepts of the “essential” and the “unessential” and “illusory 
being”, before getting to discussion of reflection proper.  The Doctrine of Essence 
thus deals not only with the logic of essence, but also with concepts that are 
technically prior to the concepts of essence, and could be said to belong to the 
logic of being.  The reason Hegel has presented these concepts in this way is that 
these concepts that come before reflection, and so before the logic of essence, 
are transitional concepts: that is to say, these concepts are the concepts of being 
that lead us into the logic of essence.  In sections 2 and 3 of this chapter we will 
discuss these transitional concepts. 
 
In the previous chapter we saw how important the concept of reflection was for 
grasping what was going on in the logic of being (even though, until reflection is 
examined properly, in the logic of essence, we can only have a vague notion of 
what the concept of reflection might be.  That is to say, we know it has to do 
with relentless questioning and refusing to settle for tautologies – the latter 
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being where things are taken to simply be what they are, unrelated to anything 
else that might explain them – but this is nevertheless an incomplete picture of 
what reflection means).  As we saw, reflection means “thinking over”, and is a 
translation of the German term “Nachdenken”.  Related to “Nachdenken” is the 
term “Reflexion”, and we find a discussion of the relationship between these two 
terms in an Addition to the Encyclopaedia Logic.  It is worth reproducing a large 
part of this Addition here: 
 
The standpoint of essence is in general the standpoint of reflection [Reflexion].  The term 
“reflection” is primarily used of light, when, propagated rectilinearly, it strikes a mirrored surface 
and is thrown back by it.  So we have here something twofold: first, something immediate, 
something that is, and second, the same as mediated or posited.  And this is just the case when 
we reflect on an ob-ject [über einen Gegenstand reflektieren+ or “think it over” *nachdenken] (as 
we also say very often).  For here we are not concerned with the ob-ject in its immediate form, 
but want to know it as mediated.  And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that 
it consists in the cognition of the essence of things.  By this we understand no more than that 
things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or 
grounded by something else.  The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind 
or curtain behind which the essence is concealed.
188
 
 
There are three important points to take from this passage: firstly, the “twofold” 
nature of both types of reflection (that is, both the reflection that occurs in 
nature and the reflection of thought); secondly, the priority of what we might call 
                                                          
188
 Enc Logic §112 (Add.) (German terms in square brackets added by me) 
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the “mediation” side of Nachdenken, or “thinking over”; and thirdly, the priority 
of essence over being.  We will deal with these points in order. 
 
Firstly, then, we can see that there are two aspects of reflection.  We saw this in 
the previous chapter: on the one hand we had, in each case, the immediate 
concept of being (whether it was pure being, determinate being or something), 
while on the other hand we had the reflective process of thinking, according to 
which what is immediate is subjected to scrutiny and so is mediated.  Where we 
have reflection, we must also have what is immediate, so that we have 
something “given”, which can be mediated by reflection (or “thought over”).  
Given that the logic of essence is an examination of the nature of reflection, we 
might assume that it will be an examination of only one aspect of this twofold 
process, that is, an examination of pure mediation with consideration of 
immediacy excluded.  However, as we will shortly see – the examination of the 
transitional concepts of the essential, the unessential and illusory being 
demonstrate this – such an examination of pure mediation would be 
contradictory and would not be an examination of reflection proper.  To talk of 
pure mediation would be to talk of mediation that is mediation and no more 
than this, which would be a tautology and an immediacy and so would set us 
back in the realm of Being, or the realm of immediacy.  Reflection, grasped 
properly, is always twofold: it is immediate on the one hand and has mediation 
on the other.  This will be returned to below. 
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Secondly, the second (mediation) side of reflection has priority: reflection always 
destroys what is merely immediate and shows it to be mediated.  We saw this 
illustrated in the previous chapter: reflection looks for explanation, and so is 
interested not in the concept as immediate, but as mediated in such a way that it 
is explained.  For example, to say “being is being” is not enough: we must explain 
this, and the explanation begins with the claim that “pure being is nothing”.  
Though reflection is “twofold”, it is nonetheless primarily concerned with 
mediation. 
 
Thirdly, this priority of reflection over immediate being amounts to a priority of 
essence over being, for Hegel.  When we come to examine the concept of 
reflection, we are looking at the logic of essence because we are looking at what 
lies behind and is essential to the seemingly immediate concepts of being.  The 
logic of reflection is thus the logic of essence.  The reflection (Nachdenken) that 
was described in the previous chapter is thus essential: this leads us to the first 
transitional concept of the Doctrine of Essence, the concept of the “essential”. 
 
2: The essential and the unessential 
 
In the logic of being, then, we saw being divided into two: on the one hand we 
have the immediate concepts of being, that is, what being is in itself, or being as 
simply what it is; on the other hand, we have the mediating process of reflection 
that is required if we are to think being as it is, or to explain what we mean by 
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“being” (and which, ultimately, leads us to conclude that being must always be 
what it is not).  The logic of essence, as we have seen, also wants to maintain 
what we might call a “twofoldedness”: any mediating process of reflection must 
be only one aspect of the story, and there must be an immediate element, or 
that which is given to be mediated.  However, the twofoldedness of essence 
must be different in kind to the two-sidedness of being: the new twofoldedness 
must reflect the fact that being is always what it is not, and so, despite its 
immediacy is mediated through and through (whereas, in the logic of being we 
had moments where being was thought as simply what it is).  This is what we 
might call the “hardest thought” of essence: though being is immediate, it is also 
thoroughly mediated.  In the logic of essence Hegel wants to describe what this 
difficult thought amounts to, and I will hopefully be able to explain this in the 
current chapter and the next. 
 
In this section we will look at the concepts of the “essential” and the 
“unessential”, introduced by Hegel at the beginning of the Doctrine of Essence.  
The essential and the unessential are terms used to distinguish between two 
aspects of being, that is, between the immediacy of being and the mediation of 
being (the reflection upon being) that we have seen is essential to it.  We will 
see, however, that this division of being into the essential and the unessential is 
problematic, and when we try to explain what these terms mean we will find 
that we need a new concept, the concept of illusory being, to explain what we 
mean.  When we ask the questions “What is the essential?” and “What is the 
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unessential?” we will find that they are what they are and no more than this, 
which is to say that they are immediate and tautological: that is to say, the 
unessential is the unessential and the essential is the essential.  As we know from 
the previous chapter, this must mean that they are unstable concepts and must 
give way to new concepts if we are to explain what they mean.  The unessential, 
we will see, is being that is merely immediate and so is non-being, while being 
that is more than this, and is mediated, is true, essential being.  We thus arrive at 
a concept deeper than the concepts of the essential and the unessential: this 
new concept is the concept of illusory being, which is being which, as merely 
immediate, is non-being, and so is illusory.  The concept of illusory being thus 
explains what the unessential must mean: unessential being is not merely 
unessential, but can also be described as being that is merely immediate, and so 
is non-being. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, throughout the logic of being we discover 
various ways to formulate the immediacy of being but all of these are found to 
be inadequate (that is to say, each of the concepts of being turns out to require 
further mediation if it is to be explained).  It is for this reason that we pass into 
discussion of essence.  The concept of essence is the concept of things that are in 
a relation of dependence, one dependent on the other.  Thus when Hegel writes 
“the truth of being is essence” he means that being has shown that being owes 
its immediacy to something else, since all attempts to present it as merely 
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immediate have failed.189  We saw an example of such a failure with pure being, 
where pure being was shown to require that we think it as nothing as well as 
being, and so as becoming; this failure, however, leads to another attempt to 
render being immediate, with the concept of becoming leading to the concept of 
determinate being.  However, by the end of the logic of being all attempts have 
failed and we must think of being as essence, that is, as depending for its 
immediacy on something essential, something without which we could not have 
being: being is dependent upon reflection, since we cannot think being properly 
without reflection.190 
 
When we begin the Doctrine of Essence, then, we begin with the thought that 
essence is superior to being, in the sense that being owes its being to essence 
(that is, to reflection).  Essence, as the truth of being, “is sublated being”.191  That 
is to say, we are re-thinking the concepts of being as always already sublated, 
and so as always already dependent upon a process of reflection, which 
determines what the concepts essentially are.  It is for this reason that essence is 
taken to be the truth of immediate being: essence, as the mediation that 
explains what immediate being means, is the truth of immediacy.  Thus Hegel 
writes of essence: 
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 Thus we see in Enc. Logic §111 that immediacy is always mediated and so we arrive at a 
conception of being as essence. 
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It is the negation of the sphere of being in general.  Essence thus has its immediacy confronting it 
as an immediacy from which it has become and which in this sublating has preserved and 
maintained itself.
192
 
 
That is to say, we do not reject the notion of the immediacy of being, but talk of 
this immediacy as dependent upon mediation, so that the truth of immediacy is 
revealed in the mediating process of reflection (or “essence”, as we also now call 
it, given that reflection is now recognised as essential for grasping the truth of 
being).  That is to say, we have essence because we are trying to think the 
immediacy of being properly, and not in an inadequate and merely immediate 
way.  We have immediate being on the one hand, and the mediating essence, 
that explains immediate being, on the other: the former depends upon the 
latter.  We saw this to some extent in the logic of being (see previous chapter): 
the concepts of being, on the one hand, and the process of reflection, on the 
other, were seen as two “self-subsistent entities”, in a certain relationship to 
each other.  It is this relationship of two entities that is explored as we look at 
the logic of the transitional concepts of the essential and the unessential. 
 
We have seen, then, that the thought that we are asked to think at the beginning 
of the Doctrine of Essence is the thought of being that is dependent on another, 
superior form of being, which Hegel calls “essence” (it is superior because 
immediate being depends upon it, while it does not depend upon immediate 
being).  Taken in this way, essence and being are referred to by Hegel as the 
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“essential” and the “unessential” respectively.  Their immediacy (the fact that 
they are two self-subsistent entities that are what they are) means that the 
essential and the unessential (or essence and being) “are indifferent to each 
other”: that is to say, they are simply what they are, so that the essential is not 
the unessential, and the unessential is not the essential.193  Since they are 
immediately what they are, essence and being, as the essential and the 
unessential, are not characterised by their relationship to each other: the 
essential is what it is by virtue of being essential, and the unessential is what it is 
by virtue of being unessential, we might say.194  This indifference, however, 
makes the thought unstable, since it is a contradiction to say that two things are 
indifferent to one another and in a relation of dependence.  That is to say, they 
are simply what they are, and yet are in a relationship to one another: though 
the essential is what it is, it is essentially not the unessential, and vice versa.  We 
are seeing here, once again, the problematic nature of the notion of immediacy 
as simplicity: if something simply is what it is, then we lack an explanation of 
what it is.  In this case, what we lack is an explanation of how the essential and 
the unessential relate to each other, and what it is that makes the essential 
essential, as it were. 
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 Cf. Plato Phaedo 100: “All beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful”: such a claim as this 
might seem strange, but such appeals to self-relation as Plato is making here are at the heart of 
essentialist ways of thinking, for Hegel. 
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As essential and unessential, essence and being are merely “other” to one 
another.195  Such a relation of simple otherness, saying that essence is other than 
being (and being, of course, is thus other than essence) and that there is no more 
that we can say of this relation, is a way of formulating the immediacy of each 
concept, but it does not give us the relation of dependence that the thought of 
the essential and the unessential demands.  The problem is that both essential 
and unessential are immediate being, and so there is nothing to distinguish them 
in a relation of dependence: they both simply are what they are (as we have 
seen, this is what it means to be being, as it were), and nothing about this 
tautological truth gives us any reason to think one as superior to the other, or 
indeed to distinguish them from each other in any way at all.   
 
The identity of being and non-being that was demonstrated in the logic of being 
gives us the solution to this problem.  If both are immediate being, and so are 
indifferent to each other, we can put these two in a relation of dependence by 
taking one to be non-being, while the other is genuine being.  But they remain 
immediate and indifferent to one another, and so it cannot be that we take one 
side to become non-being in recognition of the truth of the other side; that is, we 
cannot take unessential being to be non-being due to the fact that it is not the 
essential.  Rather, the thought of the essential and the unessential demands that 
being become “in and for itself a nullity”.196  That is to say, being does not 
become non-being on account of the fact that it is not the essential, but due to 
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its immediacy: as we have learned from the logic of being, whatever is merely 
immediate is non-being.  Insofar as they are merely immediate, then, the 
unessential and the essential are non-being: formulated in the inadequate way 
that has been described, as simply essential and unessential, both are non-being 
and so are unessential.  Whatever is truly essential (and this notion of “true” 
essence will become important shortly, as we will see) must be more than 
immediate.197   What is (truly) essential is not so by virtue of its simply being 
essential, but by virtue of its being more than simply what it is.  The essential and 
the unessential are flawed concepts, then, because when they are opposed in 
this way it seems that the essential is what it is and no more than this: this 
opposition must be overcome by saying that the unessential is unessential by 
virtue of its being merely immediate, and whatever is essential is not so simply 
because it is essential but because it has more than mere immediacy about it.  
The unessential is simply what it is and so is non-being, while the (true) essential 
is more than it is and so can truly be called essential being.  This notion of “true 
being” is very important: we now move from the concepts of the essential and 
the unessential to the concept of “illusory being”, and I will explain how illusory 
being (being that is non-being), for Hegel, brings in a contrast between illusory 
being and true being.198 
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 Logic p.395: “in so far as the distinction is made of an essential and unessential side in 
something [Dasein], this distinction is externally posited” (German term in square brackets and 
italics as in text of the Miller translation).  That is to say, without this external positing, the 
essential and the unessential are merely immediate and so are equivalent to each other. 
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The distinction between the essential and the unessential has been shown to be 
inadequate, since it must be supplemented by a distinction between the (true) 
being of essential being and the non-being of unessential being, and this being 
and non-being can in no way owe their status as being and non-being to their 
essential and unessential nature respectively.  That is to say, to talk of essential 
and unessential first of all is to get things the wrong way round: something can 
only be said to be essential or unessential by virtue of  its being or non-being.  
The distinction between the “essential” and the “unessential” has thus become 
redundant as a way of pointing to a real difference, since it is in the being and 
non-being of essential and unessential being, and not in the fact that they are 
essential and unessential, that the real difference is found.  We are now at the 
logic of “illusory being”, where unessential being is defined as illusory being, non-
being and “non-essence.”199  The concepts of the essential and the unessential 
are redundant because they do not say enough: nothing is simply essential or 
unessential, but is essential or unessential by virtue of whether it is being or non-
being. 
 
3: Illusory being 
 
With illusory being, then, what is unessential is what is non-being, while all true 
being (being that is not merely immediate, and which is therefore not non-being) 
is essential.  Being is essence, and whatever is not essence is not being, that is to 
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say, what is not essential has no being and is merely illusory being: that is, its 
having being is an illusion.  The distinction between the essential and the 
unessential is relatively worthless, because they do not tell us enough about 
what it means to be essential.  However, now we know what it means to be 
essential: to be essential is to be, and whatever is not, or is merely illusory, is 
unessential.  The former, the essential, is being that is essence, and so through 
mediation becomes what it is, while the latter, mere being, is the unessential, 
since it is being that is merely immediate, and so is mere non-being.  By the end 
of this section, however, we will see that even this distinction, between being 
and non-being, does not get to the heart of the matter: in fact we should say that 
all being is non-being, and is both immediate and mediated.  By the end of this 
section we will see that there is no “outside” of essence (what is essential – that 
is, reflection – is absolute), so that while it is true that, as with illusory being, all 
that is not essence is nothing, since non-being also has being, what is not is 
essential too.  We come to these conclusions as we come to realise that the logic 
of “sides” – of “two-sidedness” – is flawed, and with it the logic of “true” 
(essential) versus “false” (illusory) being.  Instead of two-sidedness we come to 
think in terms of two-foldedness, so that nothing belongs strictly to one “side” of 
a dualism, but is always already what it is not.  This is how Hegel’s logic of being 
becomes a logic of essence, and we will see how this happens in what follows. 
 
We have seen above that the requirements that being be taken as immediate 
and that essence be taken in a relationship of superiority to non-essential being 
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requires that non-essential being is thought of as an immediate nullity, and we 
know what this means: taken by itself (that is, immediately), it is taken to be 
non-being.  The problem with thinking in terms of the essential and the 
unessential was that each side had being, and we needed another criterion, a 
“third term”, in order to decide between these two “sides”: it wasn’t enough to 
simply say that one side was essential while the other was not, and we needed 
something that we could claim made the one side different from the other.200  
With illusory being, we still hold onto the notion of one “side” versus the other, 
but now the balance has shifted: the one side has being while the other does 
not.  The logic of illusory being, then, could be described as “one-sided”: there 
are two sides to this conception of essence, but only one of these sides is 
considered to be true, while the other is merely illusory and false.  The essential 
is essential because it is essence: that is to say, because it is not merely 
immediate being and so is true being. 
 
Illusory being might be seen as a last attempt to think of unessential being as 
dependent upon essence while thinking of these as independent and immediate 
forms of being (it may seem strange to consider both as forms of being, when 
the one side is characterised by its non-being, but we must remember that being 
and non-being are identical for Hegel, so that even nothingness is in some 
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 “In so far as the distinction is made of an essential and an unessential side in something, this 
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from another that does not affect 
the something itself, a division that has its origin in a third.” (Logic p.395) 
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sense).  In the logic of being we tried out various ways of thinking of being as 
independent and immediate (as simply what it is), and found these all to be 
inadequate.  In the logic of the “essential” and the “unessential” we found these 
terms to be inadequate too and we will soon see that the concept of illusory 
being, as being that is false and opposed to true being, is also inadequate.  
Illusory being is simply what it is, and what it is is illusion: this way of describing 
illusory being, as merely immediate, will be shown to be inadequate, and we will 
find that we have to think of all being, illusory or not, as what it is not, and so we 
think all being as reflection. 
 
As we have seen above, the logic of illusory being is the logic of two immediacies, 
one that is non-essential and is to be identified by its non-being, one that is 
essential and is to be identified by its being.  That is (and this is important to 
note), even though essential – or true – being is essential because it is mediated, 
it is nevertheless immediate, insofar as it constitutes just one side of a dualism: it 
simply is what it is.  The logic of illusory being that comes out of the logic of the 
essential and the unessential differs from the latter in that essential and non-
essential being are distinguishable in the logic of illusory being (through their 
being and non-being respectively); it is similar in that essential and non-essential 
being (being and non-being) are both immediately what they are and not 
mediated by each other and so the distinct character of each form of being does 
not determine the character of the other.  Illusory being is what it is 
immediately; the same goes for essence.  “Illusory being” is a translation of 
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“Schein”, and we might just as well translate this as “mere appearance”.  When 
we take something to be mere appearance, we do so because it has about it 
nothing of the essence of what it purports to be.  This is what Hegel is trying to 
get at here: illusory being is taken to be illusory and false precisely because it is 
immediately what it is and is not mediated by essence.  That is to say, all 
mediation is on the side of essence (remember that there are two sides to the 
logic of illusory being, though it is a one-sided logic in the sense that all 
mediation, and thus true being, is on one side).  By the end of the account of the 
logic of illusory being, Hegel will have shown that the concept of illusory being, of 
mere appearance, is inadequate, and that there is in fact always something of 
the essential in appearance.  What has to be shown next “is that the 
determinations which distinguish [merely immediate being] from essence are 
determinations of essence itself”.201  In this way, the very immediacy of illusory 
being (immediate non-being) will reveal itself to be mediated by essence. 
 
In so far as being is immediate, Hegel tells us, it is a nullity.  We saw this above: in 
order to take being as immediate and as dependent on essence, being must be 
taken to be non-being.  Thus “in essence, being is non-being”.202  However, 
essence, as we also saw above, is also immediate being.  That is to say, only one 
side is mediated and so has true being, but by being just one side, simply one 
side and no more, it is immediate (it simply is what it is): this means that its being 
is non-being. 
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Since essence is also immediate being, it is also indifferent non-being: if, with 
unessential being, immediate being is non-being not due to a relation to 
essential being (due to the fact that it is unessential being) but in and for itself 
(due to the fact that it is immediate being), then it follows that essential being, if 
it is immediate being, must also be non-being.  This is a difficult thought, and 
requires careful consideration.  Of course, on some level, it is due to the fact that 
we are trying to think immediate unessential being as unessential that we must 
think it as non-being: this was precisely the argument of the logic of the essential 
and the unessential presented above.  If this were the whole story, then the 
move presented here, of immediate essential being into immediate essential 
non-being, would be illegitimate, since it is the unessential nature of immediate 
unessential being that leads us to regard it as non-being.  However, if we think 
back to the logic of the essential and the unessential, we must remember that 
we saw that this logic was unstable.  It was unstable precisely because it cannot 
be the unessential nature of unessential being that distinguishes it from essential 
being; the distinction between unessential and essential being is thus shown to 
be an inadequate one, and has been replaced by the distinction between being 
and non-being; that is, the distinction between essential being and unessential 
being has been replaced by the distinction between essential being and illusory 
being.  Hegel is not denying that there is no distinction to be made between 
essential and unessential being, but is saying that in order to make this 
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distinction, we must rely on the more adequate distinction between being and 
non-being. 
 
It is because the distinction between “essential” and “unessential” is not enough 
to distinguish the two forms of being that we rely on the distinction between 
“being” and “non-being”, and, consequently, that the collapse of the distinction 
between being and non-being leads to a collapse of the distinction between 
essence and illusory being.  The distinction between being and non-being 
collapses due to the immediacy of essence.  Hegel writes: 
 
The negativity of essence is its equality with itself or its simple immediacy and indifference.  
Being has preserved itself in essence in so far as the latter in its infinite negativity has this 
equality with itself; it is through this that essence itself is being.  The immediacy of the 
determinateness in illusory being over against essence is consequently nothing other than 
essence’s own immediacy; but the immediacy is not simply affirmative, but is the purely 
mediated or reflected immediacy that is illusory being – being, not as being, but only as the 
determinateness of being as opposed to mediation; being as a moment.
203
 
 
The logic behind what Hegel is saying here has been explained above, and from 
this logic Hegel has arrived at the conclusion that the immediacy of illusory being 
is mediated.  Essence, as immediate, has “infinite negativity” and “equality with 
itself” (that is, it is what it is).  We should not be confused by the expression 
“infinite negativity”.  In the discussion of “quality” in the logic of being (a topic 
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we did not cover in the previous chapter), Hegel has told us that infinity, if it is to 
be “genuine” must consist in self-relation (that is, infinity is explicitly what 
finitude – including determinate being, something, and so on –  is only implicitly: 
it is self-relation, that is, it is what it is and nothing more).204  Infinite negativity is 
thus self-relating negativity: essence, as immediate being, must be non-being 
that is the negation of the non-being of illusory being, and must be self-relating.  
That is to say, essence must be negative, and so have non-being, because it is 
(paradoxically) not non-being.  To say that essence is “infinite negativity” is thus 
to say what we have already said: that essence is both immediate and in a 
relation to unessential being such that the latter must take itself to be non-being.  
In the thought of these two immediate forms of being, we must recognise that 
each is the negation of the other, even if we cannot logically say this of them 
insofar as they are merely immediate.  Hegel writes: 
 
Being has preserved itself in essence in so far as the latter in its infinite negativity has this 
equality with itself; it is through this that essence itself is being.
205
 
 
We have seen that essence and illusory being are both immediate but that 
illusory being must have a mediated side if it is to be dependent upon essence.  
In so far as illusory being is dependent upon essence it is mediated.  We know 
this because the ways in which we tried to distinguish essential and unessential 
being (or illusory being) while thinking of them as immediate have failed, and so 
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illusory being can only be taken to be dependent on essence if it is taken to be 
mediated by essence.  But essence is immediate, and does not depend upon 
illusory being for any determination of its character.  However, we cannot 
separate illusory being from essence, since essence is immediate as well as 
mediated, just as illusory being is mediated as well as immediate.  There is no 
way to distinguish illusory being from essence: 
 
The illusory being in essence is not the illusory being of an other, but is illusory being per se, the 
illusory being of essence itself.
206
 
 
This follows due to the immediacy of essence: the mediation of essence 
produces the immediate determination (or character) of illusory being, but 
essence is not mediated by another (it mediates: it is true being and is not 
determined by the false being that is other than it), and so it must be something 
that can be recognised in essence taken by itself, immediately, that produces this 
mediation.  Taken immediately, then, essence is mediation.  Therefore we now 
have a conception of essence as both immediacy and mediation.  This conception 
of essence is the conception of essence as reflection. 
 
To sum up what we have seen so far: Hegel shows that there is no coherent way 
to think of immediate being as separate from the reflection that mediates it.  
Immediacy and mediation are both aspects of essence, and so are both aspects 
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of reflection.  With reflection, immediacy and mediation come together, so that 
we do not have one on one side and one on the other (as we have seen, it is not 
logical to talk of mediation being one “side” if we want to keep immediacy and 
mediation apart, since this is to make mediation immediate), but have to think 
them together.  In the remainder of the current chapter, we will see what this 
means: reflection, as all that there is (it is not merely a self-subsistent “side” to a 
bigger picture but is a two-folded, absolute entity) must have a certain character.  
Reflection, we will see, must be absolute (or positing: any transformation it 
undergoes must have always already happened), external (it must contain what 
is other than it within it) and determining (what is other than it is determined by 
it: what is external to reflection always already belongs to reflection).  These 
terms will be explained in the next few sections. 
 
4: Absolute (positing) reflection   
 
Given the conclusion of the logic of illusory being described above, we can now 
make sense of what Hegel means when he describes reflection at first as 
“absolute reflection”.207  If something is “absolute”, then it is all that there is, in 
some sense.  Absolute reflection is thus a mediation that is not the mediation of 
an other; it is the mediation of itself.  The logic of illusory being has shown us 
that the distinction between essence and illusory being collapses, and so to make 
such a distinction is simply to point to the mediation by essence of itself. 
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In sum: we have now got to the point where we must think reflection as 
absolute, since we cannot coherently think reflection as merely one “side” of 
what is going on when we think.  Just as, following Hegel, we began thinking of 
being as pure being, as absolute, as being and no more than this, so now, at the 
beginning of the logic of essence, we are thinking of reflection as absolute 
reflection, as reflection and no more than this.  But the way that we think 
reflection as absolute, is informed by what we have learned so far (in the logic of 
being and the beginning of the Doctrine of Essence): the thought of absolute 
reflection is not simple (and so not pure).  Absolute reflection is complex because 
it must involve both mediation and immediacy (unlike pure being, which simply 
is, and so is sheer immediacy).208 
 
It is worth noting the circularity of the reasoning that has brought us to this 
point.  As we saw in the previous chapter, reflection tells us that nothing can be 
simply what it is, and we assume (as modern thinkers) that reflection is correct.  
If reflection is correct, then nothing can be simply what it is, and if nothing is 
simply what it is then reflection must be correct, and so we leave behind the 
logic of being – the logic of immediacy, or everything being simply what it is – 
and move onto the logic of essence and study reflection itself.  However, this is 
not problematic, as long as we take note of what Hegel is doing: Hegel is not 
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arguing that reflection is correct (we will see that, in an important sense, he does 
not believe this), but is unpacking the logic of reflection as he finds it.  For Hegel, 
the circular reasoning of reflection can be found in and is fundamental to 
modern thinking, and we need to explore the logic of such thinking if we are to 
learn more about ourselves. 
 
Thought more adequately, then, the immediacy that the mediation of essence 
presents us with is the immediacy of essence itself: essence, or reflection (since 
reflection is what is essential, these terms are more or less interchangeable) is 
always already what it is not, since it perpetually mediates itself (there is nothing 
about what it immediately is that is not mediated).  In this way, essence is 
through and through the act of “positing”.  “Positing” is a translation of the term 
“Setzen”.209  A more natural translation of this word would be a “placing”, or 
“setting”; however, its translation by Miller as “positing” gives it a more 
academic philosophical flavour, and thus allows us to tie in Hegel’s philosophy 
with that of other post-Kantian thinkers (such as Fichte, for example).  In what 
follows I would like to urge the reader to take the term “positing” to have both 
of these senses, as a placing as well as a positing, but perhaps to give more 
emphasis to the “placing” sense, since I think that it is easier in this way to make 
sense of the meaning of the concept of reflection for Hegel. 
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As we have seen above, reflection is through and through a positing: the process 
of positing is all that reflection is.  As such, all that we have with absolute 
reflection, or “positing reflection”, is the act of positing.  All reflection is, is 
positing, and, since reflection is all that there is, what it posited is therefore the 
process of positing itself.  By making what is posited the process of positing, we 
have thus left ourselves as the only logical option the task of examining what 
positing consists in, without reference to something “other” than reflection as 
what is posited. 
 
Absolute reflection is described by Hegel as “sublated negativity”.210  As 
mediation, essence is negativity, since it is the negation of the immediate non-
being of illusory being.  It is sublated negativity because, as the negation of the 
immediate non-being of illusory being, it is “the negating of its own self”.211  We 
do not have the thought of essence as simply the negation of illusory being any 
more; now that the distinction between illusory being and essence has broken 
down, we have the thought of essence as the negation of itself.  The problem of 
the logic of the essential and the unessential and the logic of illusory being has 
thus been made explicit.  With the essential and the unessential and the 
transition from this to illusory being, we saw that the problem was that whatever 
we said of the unessential side, we could not relate this to the essential side, and 
vice versa; and so we could not conceive of a relation between essential and 
unessential being.  This is made explicit in reflection, since essential being is now 
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considered as infinite self-relation.  “It is a positing in so far as it is immediacy as 
a returning movement”, writes Hegel: if we think of “positing” as having the 
sense of “setting down” we can make sense of this.212  Hegel is asking us to think 
of an act of “placing” or “setting” in the most minimal way possible, that is, such 
an act abstracted from what is set down.  We find that it is impossible to think of 
an act of placing without something immediate (and by “immediate” we mean 
“having its own existence”) being placed; such a thought would be merely the 
thought of a movement, not a placing.  So we must think of the act of placing as 
separate from what is placed, but not separately from placing something.  To use 
Kantian terminology, perhaps we could say that instead of thinking of a concrete 
something or other as what is placed, we think of placing as having a sort of 
“transcendental object” or “=x”: the act of placing must involve placing 
something though we can say nothing of what this something is, if we are to 
follow the logic immanently (and thus only be as concrete in our thinking as the 
concepts so far allow us to be).  But this would be an impossible thought unless 
we filled this “=x”, or “place holder” with some thought or other.  The only 
thought available to us at this stage in the logic is the thought of reflection, since 
we have logically arrived at the conclusion that reflection is all that there is.  And 
so what is placed is the placing itself. 
 
This is a difficult thought, but a necessary one.  Its difficulty comes in part from 
its inadequacy: of course no concrete act of placing is an act of merely placing a 
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placing, as it were.  This inadequacy leads us to the concept of “external 
reflection”, however, where we realise that the placing that is placed can also be 
described as something placed, as a “positedness”.213  We might call this a 
“having-been-placed”, which we could describe as a characteristic of any object 
that has been placed, and which perhaps it will be agreed is a (marginally) more 
concrete concept than the concept of “placing a placing”.  Once we arrive at this 
positedness, we have arrived at “external reflection”. 
 
5: External reflection 
 
“External reflection”, writes Hegel, “presupposes itself as sublated, as the 
negative of itself.”214  We have seen this above: the act of positing becomes 
positedness, which introduces a moment of difference into the act of reflection 
that allows us to conceive of a product of reflection as different from the activity 
of reflection itself, as a positedness and not merely a positing.  This is described 
as a “presupposing”, since if the movement of positing that essence (reflection) 
can be taken to be is a positedness, then it must follow that a positing is already 
a positedness, since what is posited can be nothing other than essence itself, and 
all essence is is positing.  “Presupposing” is a translation of “voraussetzen”, 
which might be translated as “to pre-posit”: the act of positing presupposes that 
there is something to be posited, and this presupposing is what must come 
before an act of positing, as, in some sense, the ground or condition for positing.  
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This gives what is posited the character of something external to reflection since, 
before the act of reflection has taken place there must be something, and so this 
something must be something other than reflection. 
 
External reflection has worried many philosophers, and the logic of external 
reflection presented here should explain why.  With positing reflection, what is 
essential is reflecting upon itself, and so reflection seems to be the way to get to 
the essence of things.  But now this reflection involves something prior to 
reflection: reflection cannot take place without a presupposition, and so 
reflection does not give us what is essential, but what is prior to essence, as an 
immediate presupposed other that is “found”.215  This problem is solved, 
however, as we move from external reflection to determining reflection: 
 
But a closer consideration of the action of external reflection shows it to be secondly, a positing 
of the immediate, which consequently becomes the negative or the determinate; but external 
reflection is immediately also the sublating of this its positing; for it presupposes the immediate; 
in negating, it is the negating of this its negating.  But in doing so it is immediately equally a 
positing, a sublating of the immediate negatively related to it, and this immediate from which it 
seemed to start as from something alien, is only in this its beginning.  In this way, the immediate 
is not only in itself – that means, for us, or in external reflection – identical with reflection, but 
this identicalness is posited.
216
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As a positing – an act of placing or setting down – reflection is the negative of 
what it presupposes.  We could put it as follows: no matter what reflection is 
presented with, its act of positing will always be what determines the nature of 
what is in front of it.  Any presupposition is thus sublated by reflection, since as 
an act of positing it always brings something to what is before it, and so 
determines its presupposition.  Positing is always what is essential, and so the 
truth is never found outside of essence: to think otherwise is to fail to think 
essence properly.  What external reflection is confronted with is never merely a 
starting point or “beginning”, but is a beginning that is posited by essence.  In 
other words, the “positedness” is posited by essence itself, and is nothing other 
than a positing, and so we see that the moment of (external) reflection as the 
activity of “finding” a “positedness” is precisely that: a moment of reflection 
alongside the moment of positing.  From external reflection we have learned 
that the positing of essence is a positedness, but now we learn that this 
positedness is nonetheless still a positing.  What is “external” about reflection is 
just as much internal to it: in fact the distinction between external and internal 
cannot properly be made yet.  Once we have learned this we have arrived at the 
concept of determining reflection. 
 
To summarise what we have learned about external reflection in this section: 
though reflection is only positing (it is absolute), it must also be a pre-positing, or 
presupposing (it is external).  That it is only positing and yet is also presupposing 
is not contradictory: it means that positing is always already presupposing.  
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Positing must always already be presupposing because of the absolute nature of 
reflection.  What is posited is not created anew, but must always already be a 
part of reflection (since reflection is absolute).  Through positing, reflection finds 
something that always already belonged to it, and this finding what is always 
already there is presupposing, and can be described as reflection being external 
to itself (because what is found is prior to, and thus external to, the process of 
positing that reflection is).  But since reflection is through and through positing 
(it is positing and absolute), the act of presupposing must be positing: what is 
presupposed is not merely found but is determined by reflection, since the act of 
finding must also be an act of positing (since all reflection is is positing). 
 
6: Determining reflection 
 
“Determining reflection is in general the unity of positing and external 
reflection,” writes Hegel.217  This is because the move from “positing” as what is 
posited to “positedness” is recognised as being only a partial movement: 
positedness, we realise, is still a positing, and so we have not escaped fully from 
the inadequacy (we might say “absurdity”, given the strangeness of the thought 
of placing a placing) of the logic of positing reflection.  The immediate other with 
which external reflection is confronted (the “something immediately given which 
is alien to it”218) is recognised as being a determination of reflection itself, since 
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positing determines what is presupposed.219  Reflection is thus two-folded, 
because what is external to it is not absolutely other than it, since what is 
external to reflection is determined by reflection.  Reflection is all that there is, 
while it is nevertheless not the case that it is simple and pure: reflection is a 
complex process, a dialectical play between positing and externality which we 
call the determination of reflection.  The “determinations of reflection” will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
 
It is worth noting here that the three modes of reflection demonstrate nicely the 
difference between “transition” (as the way that we move logically from one 
concept to the next in the logic of being) and “positing” (as the way that we 
proceed logically in the logic of essence).  With being, each category is 
immediately what it is, before it shows itself to be what it is not.  For example, 
the concept of something in itself is intelligible, even if we then realise that it is 
better thought as something for other at the same time.  With essence, it is not 
that, for example, external reflection is taken as something immediate opposed 
to something that is immediately positing reflection, and only then realised to be 
the truth of positing reflection.  Positing reflection is positing, external and 
determining reflection, and the same goes for external and determining 
reflection.  On the other hand, while we can say that the concept of something is 
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the concept of other and of alteration, we could not say that the concepts of 
other and alteration are the concepts of something in the same way that we 
could if these were determinations of essence.  Even though the concept of 
determining reflection is a more adequate concept than that of positing 
reflection, we can nonetheless say that determining reflection is simply positing 
reflection; whereas we could not say that the concept of alteration is simply the 
concept of something.  This is because the concept of positing reflection posits 
itself as the concept of determining reflection, whereas the concept of 
something does not posit itself as alteration, but simply turns out to be such.  
This is worth noting here, as it points out the externality of essence in relation to 
being: something must enter a process of transition, move away from itself, in 
order to reach its essence; whereas in the realm of essence such a movement 
need not occur, since the element that essence moves in is its own.   
 
It is for these reasons that progress in the logic of essence might be called 
“transcendental”: whereas in the logic of being, something must be taken to be 
immediately what it is before it becomes for other, with essence positing 
reflection is “always already” external and determining reflection, since what is 
posited in positing reflection must already be a positedness, as a condition for its 
being posited, and such presupposed positedness must be determined.220  It is 
impossible to explain this further here, but it is hoped that this digression will 
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prepare the reader for the discussion of the Concept in chapter 6: we will see 
that essence and being are re-united, so that being is properly thought alongside 
essence, in the Concept.  It will turn out that to think about what is actual, such a 
union of the logic of being (the logic of the immediate: concepts are simply what 
they are) and the logic of essence (the logic of mediation: concepts are always 
already what they are not) will be required so that we will have a notion of 
“development”: we have a concept of the actual as simply what it is, 
supplemented by the logical development of the actual, that is manifested in our 
attempts to come to terms with the actual as we look at the way that each 
concept of what is actual turns into yet another, and the rationality of the actual 
is therefore described. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have seen how transition becomes positing, and through this 
have been able to see how reflection works, for Hegel.  We saw that transition 
involves two-sidedness, where there are two sides between which we move, 
while positing involves two-foldedness, where the two sides are always already 
identical.  Because the two sides are always already identical, it is better not to 
think of them as sides at all: instead, we should see reflection as relating to itself.  
As we saw, the most difficult thought of the logic of essence is the notion of 
reflection as “always already” what it is not: reflection is not simply what it is 
since it is always reflecting upon itself: reflection is both immediate and 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 176 of 365 
 
thoroughly mediated.  For example, we saw that positing reflection must always 
already be positedness: any process of reflection implies further processes, and is 
always already identical with these further processes.  This follows from the 
absolute nature of reflection: since reflection is all that there is, it is always 
already anything that is other than it.  If this seems strange, we should note that 
this fits with our ordinary conception of way it means to posit: if I posit 
something, I am not claiming to have created that thing, but I am instead 
claiming that that thing was already there (so if I posit that there is, say, a parcel 
at the bottom of the moat, I do not mean to bring this parcel into existence but 
mean to claim that it already exists, at the bottom of the moat): similarly, 
reflection’s act of positing is not absolutely separable from the positedness (that 
is, what is posited) upon which it turns out to be grounded. 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that the logic of being dealt with traditional 
metaphysics: that is, the logic of being deals with entities that simply are what 
they are in the hope of reaching a fixed and stable truth.  However, we also saw 
that, when it comes to thinking, being fixed and stable at the same time is 
impossible: fixed concepts turn out to be tautologies and so are unstable, since 
they cannot stand up to the relentless questioning of reflection.  In the current 
chapter, we have seen that the logic of essence deals with thinking that is not 
fixed, and is always already moving.  Thus an examination of reflection, we might 
say, looks different to an examination of traditional metaphysics, since the 
former does not consist in a series of attempts to fix a concept of being, but 
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describes the various stages of the fluid movement of thinking.  The logic of 
essence thus makes explicit what we saw was implicit in the logic of being: rather 
than allowing us to have a fixed definition of being, the examination of the 
(supposedly fixed) concepts of being gave us instead an illustration of the 
movement of reflective thought.  The various concepts of being turned out to be 
contradictory (and so the attempt to find a fixed concept of being failed), but 
what lay behind these various contradictory concepts was the movement of 
reflective thought: the way in which these concepts were found to be 
contradictory illustrated the way that reflective thinking works, that is to say, we 
found illustrated in the logic of being what the demands of modern reflective 
thinking are, by seeing what was found to be contradictory in the process of 
relentless questioning carried out by reflection.  In the logic of essence we look 
at reflection itself, and each concept examined is not supposed to be fixed, but is 
part of the complex process of reflection.  Thus the descriptions of reflection 
given above in the current chapter do not refute each other so much as 
complement each other: they describe the complexity of reflection so that we 
get a sense of why reflection must render all fixed things unstable.  Reflection 
involves positing reflection, external reflection and determining reflection, and 
these three processes (of positing, relating to what is external and determining) 
are all part of the same process of reflection.  Whereas with, say, pure being, 
there is something wrong with trying to think being as pure (in that it does not 
meet the demands of reflection), with positing reflection we do not discover that 
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the process of positing is false but that it is only part of the overall process of 
reflection. 
 
Obviously, we cannot get a full and fixed picture of reflection: this would be 
contradictory, since it would reduce reflection to a category of being, to a “self-
subsistent entity”.  In the next chapter we will see the consequences of this: 
reflection must continue to posit itself in different ways, until (see chapter 6 
below) it finally refutes itself altogether.  It is only once reflection, as thinking 
that is positing and absolute, has refuted itself that we can properly grasp that 
the movement of reflection constitutes a “development” of thinking, and it is this 
important concept that takes us from the logic of essence into the logic of the 
concept, where the relentless questioning of reflection becomes a calm 
development of thought that takes us closer to the truth, rather than moving 
aimlessly.  In the current chapter we have seen our conception of what 
“thinking” means move closer to this conception of thinking as development: we 
go from thinking reflection as a self-subsistent entity, as a simple fact about the 
modern age (“this is just how we think in the modern age”, we might say), to 
thinking more carefully about the structure of reflection and seeing it not as a 
fixed fact about modern thinking but as a process with a certain structure that 
we can gain insight into.  It is by gaining this insight that we open up the 
possibility of changing the way that we think: thinking, we will see, need not 
merely be the restlessness of reflection, but can move in such a way that it takes 
us in a direction of our own choosing, so that by thinking we can become free.  
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Thinking, done properly (“speculatively”, to use Hegel’s own term), can be a 
progress towards a goal, rather than a fixed fact or a restless movement. 
 
We will be able to see more clearly in the next two chapters how what we have 
seen in the current chapter relates to the Deleuzian ideas described in chapter 1.  
We saw in chapter 1 that, for Deleuze, no concept is fixed, but each concept is 
determined by its relation to a structure.  Concepts are determined by the 
structure of thought in which they subsist at any given time.  If we take a 
Deleuzian view, reflection might seem to be arbitrary: it is a historical accident 
that we think in our “modern” way.  For Hegel, on the other hand, reflection 
refutes itself and becomes speculative thinking: arbitrariness is thus sublated and 
becomes logical development.  This will lead us to think about being in a 
different way: the logic of the Concept follows the logic of essence, just as the 
logic of essence followed the logic of being.  The logic of being took the concepts 
of being each to be fixed and stable entities; the logic of essence takes these 
concepts to exhibit different aspects of the process of reflection itself (this will 
be discussed in the next chapter); the logic of the Concept will show this process 
to be a logical development, so that we will finally see what is true about the 
different concepts of being, by seeing how they fit into a logical, developmental 
structure. 
 
In the current chapter, we have seen something of the role that “function” and 
“development” play in Hegelian logic.  The former term came up when I tried to 
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explain the relationship between being and essence: being, which is simple – 
that is, must have its meaning in itself (see chapter 3 above) – becomes 
subordinate to reflection (reflection dominates being and is superior to it), which 
is to say that its real meaning is explained when it is considered not to have its 
meaning in itself after all, but to find its meaning through the function that 
reflection gives it.  To put it another way, reflection has a certain structure, and 
the concepts of being are explained through their place in that structure.  This is 
distortion rather than destruction of the concepts of being: the concept of being 
is not eliminated due to the contradiction that is shown to belong to it (we could 
see this happening in the logic of being: the concept of pure being, for example, 
was shown to be inadequate, so that we needed a transition from the old 
concept to a new concept of being – determinate being – in order to start the 
examination of being over again); instead, the concept is allowed to survive, but 
what it was taken to be in itself is altered so that it fits with the demands that 
reflective thinking makes of it (so the concept is distorted, since it cannot simply 
be the immediacy that it is, but must conform to the demands of the mediation 
of reflection: the demands of reflection dominate the immediacy of being, so 
that the demands of reflection take priority over the immediacy of being).  
Reflection is “restless”, as we saw: there can be no fixed meaning in itself and 
meaning can only be found where concepts are taken to be subordinate to the 
eternal movement of reflection.  In later chapters we will see how this 
restlessness becomes development: that is to say, this eternal movement will be 
shown to have a structure that is fixed in a certain way, rather than a structure 
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that is eternally changing and chaotic.  Nevertheless, we will also see that a 
certain element of chaos (or contingency221) is a necessary part even of this 
“development”: this is one reason why we must grasp what “reflection” means if 
we are going to have an adequate sense of “development”. 
 
As I have suggested, another reason why we must grasp the concept of reflection 
is that “reflection” describes the character of modern thought as Hegel found it 
in his time (and as we still find it today).  One of Hegel’s aims is to describe 
reflection as it is: that is, reflection is circular and flawed, and yet is essential to 
modern thinking.  As we can see from Hegel’s introductory remarks to the Logic, 
Hegel wants to show that the way we think in the modern age has a certain value 
(since it can lead us to speculative thinking), and a certain historical necessity (we 
cannot escape from the way in which we are historically determined to think, 
which means that speculative thinking must be a development of reflective 
thinking, and not an absolute rejection of it).  (One thing we will see in later 
chapters is that, though we have seen that immediacy and mediation cannot be 
absolutely distinct according to the logic of essence, these concepts must 
nevertheless be distinguished in a certain way: the role that immediacy and 
mediation must play is something that is described by speculative thinking.  As I 
suggested, the “hardest thought” of the logic of essence is that the concepts of 
essence – that is, the concepts of being thought as subordinate to the function of 
reflection – must be taken to be immediate and yet thoroughly mediated: we will 
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 See quotation from Shestov in chapter 1 above: in the passage I quoted, the term “chaos” is 
used to describe the contingent nature of our inner life. 
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see that, in speculative thinking, this is taken into account.  We can only have a 
concept of development if we think the unity of immediacy and mediation in a 
certain way.) 
 
In the next chapter we will look at Hegel’s account of the “determinations of 
reflection”.  We will learn why these determinations are, for Hegel, too chaotic 
and arbitrary, and so begin to see why reflection must give way to a new way of 
thinking if we are to find stability and truth in our concepts.222 
  
                                                          
222
 The determinations of reflection are arbitrary because they are all always already each other, 
so that (for example) diversity collapses into opposition, and opposition into contradiction, and 
so on.  We might put it like this: these determinations are all too subjective without this 
subjectivity being explicit, so that these determinations are empty, since they do not tell us what 
they purport to tell us. 
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Chapter 5: Hegel on essence (II: Determinations of reflection, ground and 
existence) 
 
Introduction 
 
“Ground”, for Hegel, is a term used to describe essence as distinguishing “itself 
from itself”.  In this chapter we will look at this concept of ground: we will see 
how this concept arises when we consider the “determinations of reflection”.  
We have already seen, in chapter 4, that essence distinguishes itself from itself, 
since the logic of reflection has shown that essence, as determining reflection, is 
a unity of itself with itself that nonetheless includes the “external”.  In this way 
(as we have seen), reflection is not simply one “side” of a process, but describes 
a whole two-folded process: as we saw in the previous chapter, reflection, on the 
one hand, and immediate being, on the other, cannot be two independent sides 
since they depend on one another to be what they are.  This is what we learned 
from the logic of the essential and the unessential and the logic of illusory being: 
that reflection should be described as “two-folded” rather than “two-sided” 
because the two aspects of being – its immediacy and its mediation – cannot be 
absolutely separated.  We will see in the present chapter that this two-
foldedness of reflection – that it has two aspects, one of which takes the form of 
externality – means that reflection is always already ground.  The notion of 
taking the form of externality might seem a little vague at this stage: I hope that 
by the end of this chapter we will have a better idea of what this means.  I want 
to suggest that, for Hegel, what is external is what is necessarily complex to the 
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point of unfathomableness, and it is by identifying what is external – by 
identifying the ground – that we are able to think clearly and logically.  It is in this 
way that we move from ground to Concept, for Hegel: ground is the concept of 
what is unfathomable about essence and so points to the incoherence of modern 
reflective thinking (since it shows that reflection cannot explain itself), and this 
leads us to move beyond a logic of essence to a logic of the Concept, where the 
structure of externality and unfathomableness is properly taken into account. 
 
We have already seen that essence must be all that there is (reflection is 
absolute): by the end of the logic of essence Hegel will have shown us that 
essence, by always already being what it is not, necessarily comes back round to 
being simply what it is.  Ground, a concept that arises in the middle of the logic of 
essence and is then developed into existence, the thing, appearance and so on, is 
an example of a concept that is supposed to denote something that is what it is 
not, but ends up conflating being and non-being (ground and non-ground) in 
such a way that it is simply what it is and lacks the complexity that is essential to 
our concept of reflection (as described in the previous chapter: reflection is 
absolute (positing), external and determining and so is necessarily complex).  This 
pattern will keep emerging through the logic of essence so that we will see that 
the concept of ground (as well as the concepts of existence, the thing, 
appearance, and so on) proves to be inadequate.  For Hegel, it is not until we 
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grasp ground as Concept, and thus move from the logic of essence to the logic of 
the Concept, that we will have formulated essence adequately.223 
 
So: whereas, with the logic of being, we repeatedly tried to think being as simply 
what it is but were thwarted each time by reflection showing being to be other 
than it is, with the logic of essence reflection is repeatedly shown to be simply 
what it is, despite the fact that it cannot be simply what it is (see chapter 3: the 
notion of simplicity is flawed, since we cannot explain what it means) and despite 
our attempts to think it as complex and what it is not.  Each time reflection is 
shown to be simply what it is we have to rethink it so that we think reflection as 
the complex concept that it has to be.224 
 
“Identity” is the first concept that Hegel uses to describe determining reflection 
taken as a “determination of reflection”.  We saw in the previous chapter what 
such a “determination” is, for Hegel: reflection is determining when it 
distinguishes itself from itself by creating what is other than it out of itself.  This 
strange concept emerges from the dual demand that reflection must be both 
absolute and external.  Determining reflection was described in the previous 
chapter as arising from a dialectical play between absolute and external 
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 See Enc. Logic §115 (Note):The Absolute, for Hegel, should be understood to be “the identity 
that is inwardly concrete.  The latter… is first the ground and then, in its higher truth, the 
Concept.” 
224
 See previous chapter: is has to be such because this is how modern reflection sees itself.  
Reflection, by definition, reflects: that is to say, reflection must distinguish itself from itself.  It is 
“restless” (to use Nancy’s term that we referred to in the previous chapter: remember that, on 
my reading, “restless” means “determining”).  Reflection demands “explanation” (see chapter 3 
above) because it must be complex: complexity must be found as simplicity refers to nothing (it is 
a flawed concept, for Hegel, as I have suggested above). 
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reflection: when we try to think reflection in both these ways together we have a 
concept of reflection transforming itself into what it always already is.225  The 
rest of the chapter in the Logic on “determinations of reflection” tackles a 
problem that arises when we take essence to have this form: that is, how can 
what is other than something essentially belong to it?  We have seen (as far back 
as the logic of being – see chapter 3) that this must logically be the case, for 
Hegel; nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that conceptual problems arise when 
we try to think this thought concretely.  For example, as we shall see, if identity 
contains difference within it then the term “identity” appears to be meaningless, 
since everything, including difference, is reduced to identity.  Such a conception 
of identity I will refer to as “empty”, and I will argue that the section of the Logic 
that I am dealing with in this chapter can and should be read as an attempt to 
show the logical necessity of replacing an empty notion of identity with a more 
concrete one.  An empty conception of identity is not merely useless but also 
illogical, since an empty concept of identity cannot be said to be a mediating 
concept, since it fails to find an other with which to mediate (that is, what is 
other turns out to be simply identical to essence, and so it is not “other” in any 
meaningful sense).  Thus, if we are to think essence as properly distinguishing 
itself from itself, then we will have to come up with an adequate conception of 
the other of identity (that is, an adequate conception of what is external to 
identity); in order to think essence as distinguishing itself from itself, we will find 
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 Again, the reason this sounds so strange is that it refers to an inadequate way of thinking, 
which nonetheless must be thought through if we are to think concretely and accurately (when 
we think in accordance with the logic of the Concept). 
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that we have to think its unity with difference as “ground”, which is the concept 
of identity and difference mediated by an other.  However, as I will attempt to 
show, there still remain with the concept of ground problems arising from its 
suppression of difference (that is, ground conflates being and non-being, rather 
than separating them in a meaningful way); these are problems that will not be 
eliminated until we arrive at the logic of the Concept. 
 
In this chapter, then, I hope to show that many of the most common worries that 
critics have about Hegel – namely, those regarding the dangers that arise when 
we allow contradiction into our logical system – are dealt with in the parts of the 
Logic that deal with determinations of reflection, ground and existence, since it is 
in these parts that Hegel begins to confront the conceptual difficulties facing 
ordinary understanding when we follow Hegel’s lead and take contradiction 
seriously.226  I hope in this chapter to begin to show that such criticisms are 
aimed at the apparent “emptiness” of Hegel’s conception of identity, so that in 
the following chapters we can see how Hegel’s discussion of essence, and of the 
Concept that follows it, can, in principle, provide us with a convincing response to 
such criticisms.  In this chapter I hope to demonstrate that, at the very least, 
Hegel was probably aware of the problem of empty identity, since his logic of 
essence can be read as a logic that is driven by the need to solve this problem of 
emptiness: that is, the problem of the conflation of identity and non-identity. 
                                                          
226
 See Burbidge 1981 p.3: for example, Karl Popper writes that “Hegel’s intention is to operate 
freely with all contradictions.  ‘All things are contradictory in themselves,’ he insists, in order to 
defend a proposition which means not only the end of all science, but of all rational argument.” 
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1: Identity and difference as determinations of reflection 
 
The logic of essence, as we saw above, is the logic of relation.  We are no longer 
looking at immediate being and trying to put the relations to one side in order to 
grasp this immediacy, as we were with the logic of being, but doing the opposite; 
immediate being is put to one side since we have logically shown that it is the 
relations that are most important (indeed, we might say “essential”) while 
immediate being is false and transitory.  With essence, immediate being has no 
value taken alone (it is illusory) and only the relations that mediate being have 
reality.  In the logic of being, each immediate category of being gave rise to a 
new mediation, until it was finally shown that the absolute cannot consist in 
immediacy alone (the “unity” of measure was shown to be “self-sublating”, so 
that being has to be thought not as merely immediate but as “self-relation” and 
so as “mediation with itself”227).  Thus, as we saw in chapter 3, being cannot be 
simply what it is, and in fact cannot be thought separately from the mediation of 
being by reflection.  When Hegel says that “essence is being that has gone into 
itself”, he means nothing more than this: that immediacy has been shown to be 
what it is only when grasped as involved in a complex process of mediation. 
 
With the logic of illusory being, we saw that essence must minimally be a 
relation.  Essence is the relation of identity: this arises from the various logical 
demands that we encountered when looking at reflection.  Essence must be 
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absolute, must be all that there is (“absolute” or “positing” reflection), and yet it 
must have an object (“external” reflection): essence, or reflection, is two-folded 
because it is the identity of reflection with its object.  Once both positing and 
external reflection are recognised as necessary characteristics of essence, we 
arrive at determining reflection, with which concept we grasp essence as 
reflection that takes itself as its own object.  We will see as the logic of the 
determinations of reflection progresses that the absolute and external 
characteristics of determining reflection are, taken together, contradictory, and 
this will drive this part of the logic of essence.  The difficulty will be, we will see, 
that each time we try to unite positing and external reflection in determining 
reflection, we end up reducing external reflection to positing reflection.  Note 
that positing reflection is also called “absolute reflection” (see chapter 4 section 
4), so that when we talk of positing we are talking about the absolute relation of 
essence to itself (since – see chapter 4 – what is posited is what essence always 
already is).  Essence each time proves to be sheer self-relation but without 
properly taking itself as its own object, and so each time runs into the problem of 
empty identity (since what is external to reflection turns out to be identical to 
reflection). 
 
When we say that essence determines itself as identity, we seem to suggest that 
essence is “pure reflection”.228  That is to say, though we have established by 
now that essence always involves relation, we seem to be suggesting that 
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essence, as identity, is simply self-relation.  Essence is simply what it is, and what 
it is is a process of relating itself to itself.  However, since we are reflecting upon 
reflection, this process must be explained: it cannot simply be the case that 
reflection relates itself to itself, since we must be able to explain what it means 
for something to relate itself to itself.  Or to put it another way: reflection is 
external reflection as well as absolute reflection.  Essence is all that there is (it is 
absolute), but it must also have an object (it involves externality and so is 
external to reflection: see chapter 4).  Reflection is complex because its absolute 
nature implies a further external nature.  What this means is that identity, as 
self-relation, must take itself as its own object, and so must be external reflection 
as well as being absolute.  Identity involves what is external to it: in this case, 
identity takes itself as its own object, so that the self-relation of identity is a two-
folded process. 
 
This is a reiteration, we might say, of what has been shown in the logic of being: 
that the concept of simplicity is inadequate.  Whatever identity is, it must also be 
non-identity if it is to be explained (that is, identity is not explained if all we can 
say is that it is simply identity), and so must be difference (which is what is other 
than identity). That is to say, identity is other than itself when it takes itself as its 
own object, and what is other than identity is difference.  Identity, we have seen, 
as absolute and external, is what contains its other within it (it is always already 
its other: see chapter 4) while difference is defined as what does not contain its 
other within it.  Difference is the “simple not”.  This is called “absolute 
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difference” by Hegel: such difference is simple.  When we claim to have identity, 
we must always make a distinction between the identical thing and itself.  Thus 
the negativity implied by the concept of identity means that identity is 
difference.  The first sort of difference is called “absolute difference” and is 
defined as essence that does not contain its other within it.  Difference is 
negative, but not in the way that identity is negative, since it does not contain its 
other within it; difference is negative because it is the “simple not”229; it is thus 
defined as not being identity.  We can see why the concept of absolute 
difference arises from the concept of identity: if identity contains its other within 
it, and what is other than identity is what does not contain its other within it, 
then identity turns out to contain difference within it (identity is identical to 
difference). 
 
However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, essence moves by positing 
rather than by transition, and so the concept of identity is not left behind.  
Identity is always already difference: it is always already this “simple not”.  This is 
because absolute difference shows itself to be identity as well as difference.  
Identity showed itself to be difference, that is, to be such that it does not contain 
its other within it, as a result of the fact that it does contain its other within it.  
Similarly, difference will turn out to contain its other within it (it will turn out to 
be identity) as a result of the fact that it does not contain its other within it.  The 
logic of this should be familiar by now from what has gone above: difference, as 
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simply not what is other than it is related to its other.  But since difference is a 
determination of essence, difference is all that there is, so that the other that 
difference relates to, what is external to difference, is difference itself.  Thus 
difference is self-related, and so it is identity.  It is for this reason that Hegel tells 
us that “difference in itself is self-related difference”: in itself – that is, at its most 
simple – difference is merely absolute – that is, purely self-related.230 
 
We have now looked at the first two determinations of reflection: identity and 
difference.  In the rest of this chapter we will look at the others – diversity; 
opposition and contradiction – until we get to the concept of ground. 
 
If we are to make sense of the logic of identity and difference, and so of the logic 
of ground that follows it, we must keep in mind that each of these logical stages 
– identity, difference, diversity, opposition, contradiction and, finally, ground 
itself, are all determinations of reflection.  In chapter 4, above, we saw that the 
logic of illusory being demonstrated that essence, as self-relation, must 
minimally take the form of identity.  The logic of illusory being showed not only 
that being is necessarily mediated, but that we must necessarily arrive at a 
concept of two-folded reflection.  The logic of such two-foldedness has been 
examined in the logic of reflection so far, which consists in various forms that 
sheer self-relation might take.  Such sheer self-relation is two-foldedness: 
reflection relates always to itself when it relates to another, since it is not merely 
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one side.  Positing reflection resulted in external reflection, but these showed 
themselves to result in determining reflection, according to which positing and 
external reflection form a unity: just as positing reflection showed itself to be 
external reflection, external reflection shows itself to be positing reflection (since 
what it presupposes is essence itself, and so it turns out to be just as much 
absolute as absolute reflection, albeit in a different and more complex way – see 
chapter 4).  With determining reflection we arrive at determinations of 
reflection, which are various ways in which the “reflectedness-into-self”231 of 
positing reflection relates to the “positedness” of external reflection.  That is to 
say (as I have stated above), we are trying to answer the question of how what is 
other than something can essentially belong to it. 
 
2: Diversity 
 
Hegel writes that “identity… immediately sublates its negating and in its 
determination is reflected into itself.”232  We have already seen what this means: 
though identity should exclude difference (since identity and difference are 
opposites: what is identical to something, insofar as it is identical, is not different 
to it), it nonetheless must incorporate what it excludes and thus we have a 
moment of difference (externality and otherness) and identity (reflection back 
into self).  The necessity of thinking essence (or reflection) as both identity and 
difference means that we require a new determination of reflection: diversity.  
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According to the concept of diversity, identity is the “ground and element” of 
difference233: what is diverse is regarded as different, but on the basis of an 
identity that grounds the comparison.234 
 
The reason that identity must be the ground and element of diversity can be 
found in what we have already said about identity so far.  Identity cannot be 
simply distinct from difference, since if it excludes difference then it is identical 
to it (see above).  It is therefore uninformative to talk of the identity of something 
if we take identity to be absolute, since the term “identical” also means the 
opposite of “identical”, i.e. “difference”.  Identity is thus characteristic of 
everything; thus the term “identity” is an empty one, with the sense of “empty” 
that was described above in the introduction to this chapter (that is, what is 
“empty” is both what it is and what it is not, in such a way that these are 
conflated and thus cannot be separated).  Identity, as we saw above, is what 
contains its other within it, but this sense of “other” could be described as 
empty, since we are describing an otherness that is immediately identical to 
identity.  There is another sense of “other”, however, which is that sense which 
belongs to the otherness of difference; that is, otherness that is external to what 
it is other than.  The search for a conception of essence that is not empty, we will 
see, is the search for a sense of unity with other, where other does not have the 
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 See below for a discussion of the concept of “ground”; with diversity we have an inadequate 
notion of ground (as we will see when we see that the concept of diversity fails to solve the 
problem of empty identity), since the concept of ground, we will see below, must be the concept 
of what is radically other than identity.  The failure of diversity and opposition to solve the 
problem of empty identity will demonstrate the need to think ground in this more adequate way. 
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former, empty meaning; if we are to have a satisfying conception of essence, 
then it must be absolute and yet related to its true other.  The sublation of 
absolute identity and difference must thus be a concept of identity alongside 
difference, or “identity within difference”, since only in this way can we take 
both senses of “other” into account.  However, since reflection is all that there is 
(it is absolute) everything is identical, and all difference belongs to this 
identity.235 
 
That reflection is identity, and thus everything is identical, and so to talk of 
identity is uninformative, makes up one of two truths that have emerged from 
the discussion of absolute identity and difference.  On the other hand, we have 
the fact that everything is different.  In this way the identity of absolute identity 
and absolute difference has been divided into two; on the one hand we have 
identity and on the other we have difference.  Identity and difference are finite 
because they turn out not to be entirely self-contained since they are 
understood as complementing each other.  With the concept of diversity, 
identity and difference have turned out to be infinite only when abstractly 
understood, and, concretely understood, turn out to be finite.  This division of 
identity from difference thus arises from the demand that we think essence (that 
is, reflection) as absolute (we cannot settle for a definition of essence as part of 
the whole, as identical while what is not essence is different, since the logic of 
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until we come to the logic of the Concept. 
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the essential and the unessential has been shown to be inadequate236).  The fact 
that essence must be absolute thus leads us from the empty claim that 
everything is identical to the less empty claim that everything is also different 
(and so everything is diverse).  Whether this “less empty” formulation allows us 
to escape the empty identity problem remains to be seen: we will see that we do 
not escape the empty identity problem until we reach the logic of the concept. 
 
The movement of difference is the logic of perpetual self-externalisation.  A 
moment is absolutely different in this way if it is not something or other, but is 
also utterly external to this something or other that it is not.  Thus what is 
different (and we must remember – see the previous paragraph – that 
everything is different) is also “indifferent” to what it is different from, since 
otherwise it would contain reference to its other within itself and so would 
contain a moment of identity.  We saw this indifference, characteristic of 
absolute difference, in the logic of absolute difference above.  This logic showed 
itself to be unsustainable, however, since difference, having been generated 
from identity, could not remain indifferent to it.237  Here, however, we attempt 
to sustain this logic by setting to one side this identity so that we can examine 
difference in its purity: that is, identity and difference are separate apart from 
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 See chapter 4 section 2 above 
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 See above: note that it is central to Hegel’s argument that identity is logically prior to 
difference, since essence shows itself to be identity, before it shows itself to be difference.  This 
can be seen from the argument above: essence is (see above) minimally a relation, and it can be 
a relation most minimally if it is taken to be the relation of identity. 
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the ground they share in diversity (see above).  Difference, taken finitely in this 
way (alongside a finite conception of identity), is “positedness”.238 
 
Taken finitely, identity is the unity of identity and difference, while difference is 
the distinctness of identity and difference, so that the unity of identity and 
difference is a relation of determining reflection; that is, identity and difference 
are distinct but united (by their ground: they are not absolutely united, as they 
would be if they were taken to belong only to positing reflection).  Hegel thus 
says that identity and difference become likeness and unlikeness: likeness 
describes the identity that all things share even while they are different, and so 
likeness is the moment of positing reflection, since it is an absolute unity 
(“everything is like everything else” can be truly said); unlikeness, on the other 
hand, describes the infinity of differences that make identical things separate 
from and external to one another and is thus the moment of external reflection 
(each diverse moment is an immediacy, since, as indifferent, it must be 
something taken on its own).  These two moments must belong to identity if we 
are to think identity alongside difference and not merely think sheer identity. 
 
However, it turns out that likeness and unlikeness are inseparable, so that to talk 
of “like” is also to talk of “unlike”. Unlikeness was supposed to be the positedness 
of diversity (that is, the moment of external reflection), which results from 
likeness, the latter being the absolute (or positing) unity of reflection-into-self: if 
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we are to explain what is going on here, then, we must remind ourselves what is 
meant by “positing” and “positedness”.  As I suggested in chapter 4, if I posit 
something, I am not claiming to have created that thing, but I am instead 
claiming that that thing was already there (to use my previous example: if I posit 
that there is, say, a parcel at the bottom of the moat, I do not mean to bring this 
parcel into existence but mean to claim that it already exists, at the bottom of 
the moat).  The positedness refers to what is posited which, in accordance with 
what I have just said, must refer to what is external to the act of reflection itself.  
That everything is “like”, or identical in some way, is what leads us to posit 
“unlikeness”, or a certain element of difference.  This is in line with what I 
suggested above: identity leads us to posit difference (so that the element of 
identity, likeness, is positing reflection while the element of difference, 
unlikeness, is what is posited as always already there in order for there to be 
identity). 
 
Unlikeness, as the moment of external reflection, is the “found” element of 
reflection that we discussed above in chapter 4.  With diversity we repeat the 
logic of reflection discussed in chapter 4, as we will with all the determinations of 
reflection discussed above.  Essence is all that there is and is absolute reflection, 
but this means that it must take itself as its object; the object, although it is 
reflection, must nevertheless be taken to be external to reflection, since it seems 
that the object must have some character or other before it is reflected upon.  
With diversity, the object judged to be diverse is taken to have a certain 
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character before it undergoes comparison and is judged to be like another 
moment (it is “indifferent”, and so what is indifferent is something external to 
reflection).  On the one hand, then, we have the utter likeness of every moment; 
on the other, we have utter unlikeness.  However, such a division, between 
reflection, on the one hand, and external indifferent objects of reflection, on the 
other, goes against the logic of essence.  Essence takes only itself as its object 
since it is all that there is, and so what is external must be thought as fully 
determined by reflection.  As a determination of reflection, then, the moments 
of diversity must be taken to be fully determined by reflection; reflection not 
only judges all things to be like, but also is responsible for determining the 
unlikeness of everything.  Everything, according to the logic of diversity, is both 
like and unlike, and is so due to the activity of reflection. 
 
Thus we end up with the same problem as we had at the beginning of the logic of 
identity: how do we avoid an empty notion of essence?  Diversity turns out to 
contain what is external and other within it, and difference has been, once again, 
reduced to identity, to absolute reflection. 
 
The problems that face the concept of diversity point to a possible solution: 
instead of taking one half of the opposition, likeness, to be absolute reflection, 
we take the two sides of the opposition to be external to one another while 
united in a third that is their ground.  Thus Hegel is led to explore the logic of 
“opposition”. 
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3: Opposition 
 
With opposition, then, the truth of the inseparability of likeness and unlikeness 
has been recognised.  Whenever we have likeness we have unlikeness, and so 
identity and difference cannot be held apart provided that we think of identity 
and difference merely as likeness and unlikeness.  And we must remember that 
identity and difference have to be held apart if the concept of identity is to have 
any meaning.  If we were to simply say that likeness and unlikeness were 
identical and that that was the end of it, then we would have reached an empty 
truth, and Hegelian thought could justly be accused of saying a great deal about 
nothing at all, since we would have to say that the only means of pointing to 
difference at our disposal in reality only pointed to identity, and what we mean 
by identity is identity and nothing more (since identity is all that there is).239  As 
we saw above, we have to give meaning to the concept of essence as including 
its other within itself if we are to reach a logical conclusion.  Fortunately, 
opposition proves to be a more satisfying way to think about difference, even if 
it, too, proves to be a logically inadequate one which will have to give way to yet 
another, more complex way of thinking difference. 
 
Likeness and unlikeness collapse into absolute reflection since they are both 
reduced to an empty form of identity.  However, we do not simply reduce 
unlikeness to likeness; we avoid this for the same reasons that we gave above for 
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not simply reducing difference to identity: such a formulation would be empty, 
so that to say that all unlikeness is basically likeness is true but is an empty truth, 
since the “unlikeness” that is reduced to likeness ceases to have a meaning that 
is distinct from the meaning of “likeness”.  The absolute unity of likeness and 
unlikeness (their identity) is thus thought alongside their difference.  This is done 
by taking them to be distinct not insofar as they are like and unlike, but insofar as 
they are aspects of the same unity.240 
 
With this step we move into the logic of opposition: talk of likeness and 
unlikeness is replaced with talk of opposed sides of the same thing.  Likeness is 
unlikeness and unlikeness is likeness, so that to point to either is to point to 
both.  If we do not take them to be aspects of the same identity, then they can 
have no meaning at all, since they do not have distinct identities of their own and 
each can only refer to the same empty identity.  With diversity, as we saw, we 
were talking about different aspects of identity, but now these aspects are taken 
to essentially belong to the same thing, rather than being merely external, 
indifferent moments in an identical ground and element.  Only in this way, by 
taking likeness and unlikeness to be defined as moments within a unity, and thus 
as opposites, can we have the unity that is required by the thought of essence as 
absolute.  With the thought of opposition we have the thought of essence as 
absolute, since it is absolute reflection and so is all that there is, and yet we can 
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talk about difference as distinct from identity, since difference tells us about 
different aspects of self-identical essence. 
 
With opposition, likeness and unlikeness become the “positive” and the 
“negative”.  This is the “external” moment of opposition.  With the absolute 
moment of opposition, the inseparability of likeness and unlikeness is 
recognised, since they are aspects of the same thing; however, these aspects 
must have characteristics of their own if they are to be distinguished from each 
other.  They are distinguished by the fact that they tell us different things about 
that identical thing.  These aspects must have a moment of indifference so that 
there is something peculiar to each by virtue of which they can be said to be 
distinct from absolute reflection.  What belongs to them prior to the self-relating 
activity of positing reflection is that one aspect is positive, while the other is 
negative (they are “found” to be such; they are external to reflection).241   Thus, 
if we are to avoid an empty conception of identity, the positive and the negative 
has each to be what it is “on its own account” as well as in relation to each 
other.242  If this were not the case, then the positive and the negative would be 
defined entirely according to their identity with each other, and thus we would 
have an empty conception of identity, since the positive and the negative would 
amount to nothing more than identity.  We would have the same problem as we 
faced with absolute identity and, following that, with diversity: the positive and 
the negative would collapse into each other and we would be left only with 
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empty identity.  Thus the moment of positing reflection becomes a moment of 
external reflection; the positive and the negative, though aspects of identity, 
have to have a value of their own (prior to their being absolute reflection), so 
that they do not merely amount to the same thing (that is, they must be more 
than mere expressions of the truth that essence is identity).  The activity of 
positing reflection (identity), thus results in something being posited (difference, 
as the positive and the negative).243 
 
The positive and the negative, then, are “self-subsistent”.244  As such, they are 
first of all the “found” or “external” element of reflection, since, as aspects of 
identity, they must have a certain determination (as positive or negative), before 
they are reflected upon and thus taken to be certain aspects of reflection.  What 
makes the positive and the negative distinct from absolute reflection is that they 
have a character prior to reflection.  However, we run into the same problem as 
we did with diversity: we cannot divide concepts of essence into what belongs to 
reflection (and so is essential), on the one hand, and what is determined prior to 
reflection (and so is unessential), on the other.  Any determination that the 
positive and the negative have, therefore, must be determined by reflection 
itself.  (Thus the logic of reflection, discussed in the previous chapter, is 
repeated: absolute reflection plus external reflection means determining 
reflection.) 
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The positive and the negative thus come together in determining reflection.  
They are not prior to reflection but are determined by reflection.  Each is self-
relating (identical) and defined by its not being the other (different).  These two 
aspects of absolute reflection are thus each absolute reflection, while at the 
same time being external reflections upon each other.  We are then, in a sense, 
back where we started, with an empty concept of identity (an identity that is 
absolute by virtue of its being what it is not).  The difference between this stage 
and the earlier stage at which we only had absolute identity is that now we have 
an explicit formulation of contradiction: contradiction is identity within 
difference, or the unity of the positive and the negative.  That is to say, the 
positive and the negative are identical, so that what is positive is negative, and 
what is negative is positive: thus we have “contradiction”.  With contradiction, 
we learn that any aspect of anything opposed to another aspect is identical to 
that aspect.  We see, then, that we have been dealing with contradiction all 
along; absolute identity was always already contradictory by virtue of its being a 
determination of reflection, just as determining reflection was always already 
contradictory by virtue of its being a unity of positing and external reflection.  
Essence thus shows itself to be, essentially, contradictory. 
 
Because essence is contradictory, we are told, it “has fallen to the ground”.  If we 
think back to what we have already seen, we can see that, due to the quasi-
transcendental method according to which the logic of essence proceeds, we 
have, in an important sense, got no further than the logic of reflection discussed 
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in the previous chapter.  Ground is the concept of essence as “immediately only 
distinction of itself from itself”245.  What the logic of opposition (and the 
resulting logic of contradiction) has shown us is that the determinations of 
reflection all unavoidably result in empty identity.  With the contradictory nature 
of the positive and the negative, we arrive once more at empty identity and now 
we call this empty identity “ground” for reasons that will become apparent.  In 
the logic of ground we will once again attempt to escape an empty notion of 
essence by finding a true other of identity. 
 
4: Ground 
 
Ground is the concept of a relation between two relations (between identity and 
difference), a concept made necessary when these two relations are shown to be 
immediately identical, since, in the logic of essence, any immediacy must be 
sublated into a higher mediation.  Since identity has been shown to be absolute 
and empty, I want to suggest that difference has been shown to be illusory (as 
has identity, insofar as it is difference).  And, as we saw above, “illusory”, for 
Hegel means “requires mediation” (“illusory” does not mean simply “false”, but 
refers to an aspect of what is absolute).246  So far, each step of the way we have 
only been able to talk about difference in so far as it is identity, and we have 
seen why we must get beyond this state of affairs. 
 
                                                          
245
 Enc Logic §120 
246
 See chapter 4 section 3 above 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 206 of 365 
 
We are told in the Encyclopaedia Logic that “the so-called principle of sufficient 
reason or ground… only asserts that things must essentially be regarded as 
mediated.”247  Ground, taken most abstractly, is the thought of identity and 
difference as mediated (note that we saw this above: the concept of diversity 
was the concept of identity as a ground for identity and difference).248  We 
arrived at the immediate unity of identity and difference with the culmination of 
the logic of the positive and the negative; identity is absolute and so empty, 
which means that there is no way of distinguishing, or mediating between, 
identity and difference.  Ground is the concept of the mediation of this 
immediacy (a mediation that is necessary given the logical history of the unity of 
identity and difference, since the logic of essence tells us that being must be 
mediated).  There is no more to the abstract thought of ground than this. 
 
Ground is a solution to the problems that relate to the determinations of 
reflection, given above.  If the concept of identity is to have meaning, then it 
must not be empty.  For this, it must have an other that is not merely reducible 
to itself (see above: this is what it means for something not to be empty).  We 
have already seen that difference cannot be this other, and it is for this reason 
that we introduce an other that mediates identity and difference, which are thus 
allowed to remain identical.  They are allowed to remain identical because we 
now have a concept of an other of identity, so that it is no longer necessary that 
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difference plays the role of the other of identity.  Difference has now been fully 
reduced to identity; as far as the logic of essence is concerned, difference will 
remain an aspect of identity.  The true other of identity (and difference) is now 
ground, though we will see that this concept, taken abstractly, is also 
inadequate. 
 
Up until this point it has been identity that has played the role of the ground that 
unites identity and difference (see discussion of diversity above).  However, we 
saw that this failed, since if identity is taken as ground then difference is reduced 
to identity and, with no other of identity, we find that we only have an empty 
conception of identity.  It is for this reason that ground should not be thought of 
as “abstract identity”249; it is clear that ground could be taken to be identity in 
some sense, since it is the unity (which suggests the identity) of identity and 
difference.  Even if this is the case (though I would suggest that thinking ground 
as identity is unhelpful), we must see that ground cannot be abstract identity, 
since ground must minimally be the thought of what is radically other than 
identity. 
 
We examined the relations of identity and difference, each being defined as not 
being the other.  This definition collapsed, however, and we were left with 
identity that is identical to and different from difference and difference that is 
identical to and different from identity.  It is not difficult to see that such a 
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definition of identity and difference is not going to be of much use as it stands; as 
we have seen, such a definition may be regarded as empty.  However, Hegel will 
show that, despite the apparent incomprehensibility of this formulation of 
identity and difference, we can gain something useful from it and reach a useful 
conception of difference, as united with identity and different according to its 
ground.  We see how the illusion of identity and difference is explained as 
belonging to the higher mediation of ground, so that we can talk about identity 
and difference, but only as grounded relations.  For example, we might say that A 
and B are the same, but have to appeal to grounds in order to do so 
meaningfully, since otherwise we are saying nothing, given that all things have 
been shown to have identity.  So, with grounds, we are able to say “given X and 
Y, A and B are identical”. 
 
“Ground”, then, has replaced identity as the unity of identity and difference.  
Ground can be thought of as a more complex formulation of identity than we 
have dealt with so far (bearing in mind the above warning with regard to thinking 
ground as identity at all), one that has learned from the mistakes that have 
necessarily been made so far, insofar as we can call logically necessitated moves 
“mistakes”.  We have learned by now that identity and difference are not 
separated by their difference from, opposition to and contradiction with each 
other.  Contradiction was a relation between identity and difference, but this 
relation resulted in an empty unity.  Ground is thus a new way of formulating the 
unity of identity and difference.  The higher concept of ground mediates the 
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empty unity of identity and difference in such a way that we can meaningfully 
talk about identity and difference, without denying the logic that shows that 
these are nothing more than an empty unity when taken without a ground. 
 
It is useful to use the term “illusory” to describe the status of identity and 
difference here, because it describes an immediacy that lies outside of essence 
(see chapter 4), and this is what identity and difference have shown themselves 
to be.  By showing themselves to be an empty unity they have shown themselves 
to be unessential determinations in one sense, since ground is now taken to be 
the unity of identity and difference (an other that unifies identity and 
difference), so that ground is absolute essence and identity and difference are 
what arise as the result of ground’s distinguishing itself from itself.  On the other 
hand, if this was all there was to the concept of ground, then it would be difficult 
to see how ground was a more advanced concept than the previous concepts of 
identity that we have dealt with, since a concept of ground that reduced identity 
and difference to itself would be an empty concept of ground as identity, just as 
the earlier concepts of identity that we looked at were empty.  It is useful to 
invoke the logic of illusory being here as it reminds us that even if identity and 
difference are illusory in relation to ground, they are nonetheless essential, just 
as illusory being was shown to be essential after all.250 
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“Illusory being” was defined as “reflected immediacy, that is, immediacy which is 
only by means of its negation and which, when contrasted with its mediation, is 
nothing but the empty determination of the immediacy of negated determinate 
being.”251  This is what the unity of identity and difference has shown itself to be: 
the unity of identity and difference is supposed to be a mediation of essence 
with itself, but, if we only have an empty conception of identity, we do not 
properly have a conception of mediation, since we do not have a proper 
conception of an other with which essence, as identity, can mediate.  In relation 
to ground, then, identity and difference are illusory since they cannot properly 
be said to mediate one another and so appear to be immediate, while ground is 
other than them and mediates them. 
 
5: Ground and unfathomableness 
 
As I have noted above, the abstract concept of ground is quite simple: ground is 
what mediates that which is immediate.  In this way, we can say, for example, 
that reflection is the ground of being (since being is, by definition, immediate) 
and that, according to the concept of diversity, identity is the ground of identity 
and difference (since identity and difference are shown to be an immediate 
unity).  Taken abstractly in this way, ground is indeterminate.  Furthermore, 
ground must be indeterminate: all attempts to determine ground in a certain 
way (as diversity, as something with positive and negative aspects and so on) 
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have failed, and all we are left with is the fact that identity and difference must 
be grounded if they are not to be conflated.  It is the logical necessity that ground 
be indeterminate that I refer to as ground’s unfathomableness.  Hegel writes as 
follows: 
 
The principle of ground reads “Everything has its sufficient ground,” i.e., the true essentiality of 
something is not the determination of it as identical with itself or as diverse, as merely positive or 
as merely negative, but the fact that it has being in an other, which (as the identical-with-itself 
that belongs to it) is its essence.  The latter also is not abstract reflection into self, but reflection 
into another.  Ground is the essence that is within itself, the latter is essentially ground, and it is 
ground only insofar as it is the ground of something, of an other.
252
 
 
We now have a new definition of “essence”: essence must be unfathomable, 
which is to say two things: firstly, that it must be the ground of an other, and 
secondly, that there is no more to essence than this.  To be essential is to be the 
ground for something and to be indeterminate (to have no determination further 
than the fact that it grounds an other).253  Since essence is ground, and essence is 
all that there is, Hegel is telling us that, according to the logic as it has developed 
so far, everything that is must have a ground: nothing is simply identical with 
itself but everything must find its ground in what is other than it. 
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However, since essence is all that there is – and essence is ground, so that 
ground is all that there is – a question arises: What grounds ground?  The 
necessary but unsatisfactory answer is that ground grounds itself: essence, as 
ground, is self-grounding.  It is a necessary answer because there is no other 
option: essence – which is ground – is all that there is, and so what grounds 
ground must be ground itself.  It is unsatisfactory because it leaves us with 
another conception of essence as empty identity: the other of ground that 
grounds it is ground itself.  Ground was supposed to help us by being a 
conception of an other that grounds identity so that identity is not just identical 
with itself.  However, we see now that the concept of ground leads by its own 
logic (by the fact that ground, if it is essential, must itself be grounded) back to a 
concept of empty identity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I will conclude this chapter with a brief explanation of how we get from the logic 
of essence (the second part of the Logic) to the logic of the Concept (the third 
and final part).  Since I do not have space to explain this in great detail, there is a 
risk that the account that follows will be a little confusing.  However, I hope it will 
nevertheless be useful as an introduction to what is to come in the next chapter, 
where some of these themes will be picked up again and discussed in more 
detail. 
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Where Deleuze writes in Nietzsche and Philosophy that “contradiction appears 
for what it is: a perpetual misinterpretation of difference itself”, on my reading 
this is also Hegel’s view: the concept of contradiction is flawed because it 
reduces difference to identity.254  Of course, Deleuze suggests that contradiction 
drives Hegel’s logic, and this is why it would, on his reading, be problematic for 
Hegel if the concept of contradiction were flawed and distorted our conception 
of difference.  But for Hegel, I have suggested, the concept of contradiction 
constitutes just one of the “determinations of reflection” and is not the highest 
concept of difference that we can have.  On my reading, when Hegel says that 
the concept of contradiction collapses and “goes to ground”, he means that the 
concept of contradiction cannot express the separation of difference from 
identity, and that we need to move beyond mere contradiction if we are to think 
difference in such a way that it is not merely reduced to identity.  This does not 
mean that Hegel rejects the concept of contradiction altogether, of course, but 
that the concept of contradiction is a concept of difference as reduced to 
identity, and that in order to think difference more adequately we need a 
concept of ground, which is a concept of what is radically other than and external 
to what is grounded.  In this chapter we have seen how we arrive at the concept 
of ground in Hegel’s Logic.  The problem is that, taken abstractly in the way we 
have seen, ground is not enough to solve the problem of empty identity.  Ground 
is reduced to identity due to the claim, implicit in the concept of ground as 
essence, that everything must have a ground (see above: it is implicit in the 
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concept of ground because ground is a concept of essence and so must be all 
that there is, so that everything must have a ground). 
 
The rest of the logic of essence is an attempt to think ground more concretely, so 
that the problem of empty identity can be solved.  Thus we move on to the 
concept of “existence”, which is the concept of a “world” that consists in the 
totality of the relations between the multitude of “existents” that serve as the 
ground of these existents.255  The world that grounds the existence is self-
identical and all that there is, while otherness is found between the existents.  
However, this totality of existents collapses into the “thing”, where all the 
relations in the world are found in one self-identical thing.  Thus we have 
another case of otherness collapsing into empty identity.  This process of positing 
otherness only for it to collapse into empty identity – what is posited as external 
turns out to be identical to the absolute reflection that posits – continues until 
we get to the concept of “actuality”, which is the concept of “the unity, become 
immediate, of essence and existence, or of what is inner and what is outer”.256  
Actuality is thus another concept of empty identity.  Once again, Hegel looks for 
a way to conceive actuality as more than this empty identity: in order to avoid 
conceiving actuality in an empty way, actuality is distinguished from possibility 
(that is, what is possible is the other of what is actual), but this distinction also 
collapses, so that any real possibility is only such due to the nature of actuality.  
Actuality is conceived as necessity, meaning that any possibility – any possible 
                                                          
255
 Enc. Logic §123; Taylor 1975 pp. 263 ff. 
256
 Enc Logic §142 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 215 of 365 
 
actuality – is determined by actuality itself: that is to say, actuality is necessity 
because it is only in what is actual that we find the conditions for real possibility. 
 
We pass from the concept of actuality to the concept of the Concept, which is 
the concept of something as self-relating and not dependent on what is other 
than it.  The Concept is the concept of actuality conceived as necessity: that is, 
the Concept is the concept of something that contains within it the conditions for 
its own development.  With the concept of the Concept, we move from the logic 
of essence to the logic of the Concept.  The culmination of the logic of essence 
was the demonstration that, according to the logic of essence, the problem of 
empty identity is unavoidable: as long as we operate with a concept of essence 
as both thoroughly mediated (always already other than what it is) and all that 
there is, the problem of empty identity cannot be solved.  With essence, 
whatever exists, exists necessarily: there is nothing other than – or external to – 
that which is actual, so that to talk of non-actual possibilities would be 
meaningless.  With the logic of the Concept we move beyond the logic of 
essence, and we do this by dropping the concept of actuality as all that there is: 
the concept of essence has been shown to be flawed, since we always end up 
with a concept of essence as empty identity.  Actuality as Concept (rather than as 
essence) is self-identical and thoroughly self-determining, but does not preclude 
the possibility that there is something external to it.  It is this that causes Hegel 
to describe the Concept as “free”: to be actual according to its Concept, 
something must be determined by its own necessity, rather than being 
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determined by what is external to it.  With actuality as essence, such a distinction 
is impossible, since to distinguish between inner and outer (or external) necessity 
could not be done, given the fact that actuality as essence is all that there is (so 
that to talk of what is inner is always already to talk of what is outer, and vice 
versa).  But with actuality as Concept, actuality is by definition free, since to be 
actual as Concept is not to be all that there is, but to be oneself, regardless of 
what else there is. 
 
It is in this being oneself, that we can trace a line between the concept of ground, 
examined above, and the concept of the Concept that I am now describing.  As 
we saw, the concept of ground was the abstract concept of an other, an other 
that was necessarily unfathomable because any attempt to qualify it would fail, 
and yet an other was nevertheless required.  Similarly, the concept of the 
Concept is the concept of something being what it is regardless of whatever is 
external to it.  With the development of essence into Concept, then, we do not 
so much move from the denial that there can be anything external to actuality to 
the affirmation that there is something external: instead, we move from the 
denial that there can be anything external to the indifference to the question of 
whether there is anything external.  That is to say, by ceasing to insist that what 
is external is identical to actuality, and so not truly other (which, as we saw, was 
the result of essence being all that there is), we allow ourselves to entertain the 
possibility that there may be something external, but insist that we are focussing 
on what is internal to the thing in question (that is, internal to the Concept).  
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How this procedure works, and allows for a more satisfying way of thinking 
about being, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
I want to suggest that it is this indifference to the question of what is external 
that ends the suppression of difference I mentioned above: difference is allowed 
to subsist, and we do not reduce this difference to identity by trying to explain 
how it relates to being.  What I am suggesting is that the logical necessity that, in 
order to grasp something according to its Concept, we focus on the inner 
necessity of something and exclude what is external is what allows Hegel to let 
difference be and – contrary to many readings of Hegel (including that of 
Deleuze) – to resist reducing difference to identity, contradiction, a ground, and 
so on.  In this way, as we will see in the next chapter, by focussing on the inner 
necessity of the Concept to the exclusion of what is other than the Concept, we 
take externality, unfathomableness and difference properly into account: we 
realise that any other way of treating what is external, unfathomable and 
different would be to reduce difference to identity. 
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Chapter 6: Hegel’s logic of the Concept 
 
Introduction 
 
At the end of the previous chapter we saw that, for Hegel, actuality is the 
immediate unity of the inner and the outer.  What this means is that, with 
actuality, which is the highest concept of essence257, the problem of empty 
identity has still not been solved: actuality is what it is (what is actual “just is”, 
we might say), but it seems that we cannot explain what this self-identity 
consists in, since there is no real other distinct from what is actual.  It is from the 
concept of actuality that we get to the concept of the Concept, which is the 
concept of the inner necessity of actuality.  The question that we must answer in 
the course of the present chapter is: if actuality is the immediate unity of the 
inner and the outer, so that we cannot satisfactorily distinguish between the 
inner and the outer, how can it make sense to define the Concept as the inner 
necessity of the actual?  Can it mean anything to talk of “inner necessity” when it 
seems that “outer necessity” must mean the same thing? 
 
The Hegelian answer, in a sense, is to say “no it cannot”: to talk of inner 
necessity is relatively meaningless (it is not sufficiently explained and so lacks 
meaning, from the point of view of reflective thinking), since inner necessity 
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actuality is introduced in the Logic, and so may be read as being higher concepts of essence, I 
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simply is what it is (since to be other than it is is to be outer necessity, which is 
identical to inner necessity – the concept of actuality suffers from the problem of 
empty identity, since even not being identical to inner necessity is to be identical 
to it, making the concept of identity relatively meaningless here).  With the 
concept of actuality, we have arrived at a concept of essence as actuality, as 
simply what it is, and as being made necessary by itself: actuality is itself and its 
own ground.258  The quest for meaning has left us with a concept that must be 
meaningless according to the criteria of reflection: the concept of actuality is 
meaningless for reflective thinking because it is what it is, it is self-identical, and 
yet this identity cannot be explained.  We have seen in previous chapters that, 
on my reading of Hegel, the logic of being and the logic of essence are both 
driven by the demands of reflection.  I argued for this in chapter 3: for Hegel, we 
do not use our reason in a vacuum, so to speak, but our way of thinking depends 
upon the historical conditions in which we find ourselves.  So, if our concept of 
being – actuality – does not meet the demands of reflection, then it must be 
sublated, just as all the other inadequate concepts have been sublated in the 
Logic so far.  Given the failures we have encountered in the logics of being and 
essence to find an explanation of being, we arrive at the conclusion that the sort 
of explanation demanded by reflection is flawed.  According to the reading of 
Hegel I have presented so far, reflection demands an explanation so that we can 
determine what “being” means: I am going to argue in the present chapter that 
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this quest for meaning must, for Hegel, be abandoned, and we must look for the 
function of our concepts of being instead. 
 
From a Hegelian perspective, the demands of reflection can never be met, since 
reflection will always ask more questions and demand more explanation.  We 
need to turn away from the question of otherness that arises from the obedience 
to the demands of reflection: Hegel uses the term “inwardness” to describe this 
act of turning away from the question of what is outer.259  Now, we must be 
careful about what this means: turning away from reflection and its demands 
does not mean showing that reflection is an out and out false way of thinking, or 
that reflection has no value at all.  The inwardness of speculative thinking (for we 
have now moved from merely reflective thinking to speculative thinking) is a 
mode of thinking that turns away from the demands of reflection while 
nevertheless affirming their legitimacy.  Speculative thinking acknowledges that 
coming up with the concept of actuality, as the meaningless identity of being 
with itself, is a necessary result of thinking rationally.  And as we will see, for 
speculative thinking, turning away from the demands of reflection will lead us to 
a solution to the problem of empty identity raised by reflection, and to an 
adequate conception of otherness. 
 
As far as reflection is concerned, then, there is nothing more to be done with the 
concept of actuality, for Hegel.  Actuality simply is what it is, despite being other 
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than it is.  We could say that the logic of being and the logic of essence have 
collapsed into each other: to explain what being meant we stopped trying to 
think of being as simply what it is and turned to the concept of essence – the 
concept of being as other than it is – but the concept of essence turns out to be 
the concept of actuality, which is the concept of being as simply what it is.  
Whether we think of being as immediate being – as we did in the logic of being – 
or as always already mediated – as we did in the logic of essence – being is 
nevertheless immediate, and so simply is what it is.  This does not constitute a 
dead end for thought, however: merely an end to reflective thought.  Or, more 
accurately, a development of reflective thought into speculative thought.  We 
can see how this happens by examining the concept of inwardness I mentioned 
above. 
 
We have seen that, for Hegel, we cannot explain what we mean by “being”.  We 
cannot distinguish being from what it is not – from non-being – and so we cannot 
talk meaningfully about being.  Nevertheless there is a distinction between being 
and non-being, and this distinction “manifests itself” even if we can’t give a 
satisfactory explanation of it, for Hegel: 
 
This inwardness or this in-itself, sublates the movement of causality, with the result that the 
substantiality of the sides standing in relation is lost, and necessity unveils itself.  Necessity does 
not become freedom by vanishing, but only because its still inner identity is manifested, a 
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manifestation which is the identical movement of the different sides within themselves, the 
reflection of the illusory being as illusory being into itself.
260
 
 
So, as we have seen, the two “sides” (being and what is other than being) cannot 
be thought as having any meaning on their own (they lack “substantiality”): 
Hegel calls the realisation that the sides of actuality cannot be separated the 
unveiling of necessity, because the necessary collapse of the one into the other – 
the fact that the conditions that make being necessary, the ground of necessity 
must be identical with being – has been revealed.261  But the truth of necessity, 
for Hegel, is freedom, and so the unveiling of necessity means the discovery of 
freedom in what is necessary.  As we see from the passage just quoted, necessity 
does not vanish so that necessity is replaced by freedom: necessity is shown to 
be freedom.  Necessity becomes freedom when the substantiality of the two 
aspects of actuality has been shown to be illusory, so that the two aspects are 
only manifested in the movement, or relation, between these two sides.  In other 
words, though we cannot say what it would mean to be a “side” of actuality, 
since neither side is anything in itself, the fact that actuality has sides is 
manifested in the relationship of actuality to itself.  There is something 
happening with actuality, there is a movement, even if we cannot adequately 
break this movement down into substantial parts.  Though it might sound 
strange (this is the most abstract conception of freedom that we can have, for 
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to that ground.  Also, it is perhaps worth adding another reminder here that, in the language I 
have been using, we would call these “aspects” rather than “sides”, since it has been shown that 
they are aspects of a “two-folded” process, rather than substantial sides of a “two-sided” thing. 
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Hegel), this is what freedom means according to the Hegelian view: freedom is 
the manifestation of the movement of what is indeterminate.  Being is non-being 
and so is indeterminate (Hegel describes being as “illusory”, because being once 
again cannot be distinguished from non-being: it requires further mediation if it is 
to have meaning, and so is indeterminate as it stands262).  In the current chapter, 
we will be exploring this abstract definition of freedom in more detail.  In the 
next chapter we will get a more concrete conception of what freedom means, by 
looking at how freedom is manifested in our political lives.  For something to be 
“free”, according to Hegel’s definition of the term, is for something to develop 
according to its own inner necessity: however, since the inner necessity of 
something, what it actually is, must be indeterminate (since we cannot give a 
meaningful explanation of what it is), we only discover what the inner necessity 
of something is by how freedom manifests itself.  We might say, then, that the 
logic of the Concept is like the logic of essence, in that being is distinguished 
from its manifestation: however, since the concept of being in itself has been 
shown to be meaningless, all truth is found in the manifestation of being, and 
nothing true remains hidden behind a “veil” of appearance. 
 
In the logic of the Concept we have a new definition of immediacy: for something 
to be immediately is for that thing to be what it is, but now we also say that what 
something is must manifest itself in movement.  We call this movement 
development, for Hegel, and I am calling the manifestation the function of the 
                                                          
262
 See chapter 4 above for discussion of this definition of “illusory”. 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 224 of 365 
 
thing in question.  I use the term “function” in the way I used it above: the 
development manifests itself in a process of applying concepts to the object of 
study and connecting these concepts to each other, and in this way we do not 
rely on discovering what these concepts mean in themselves but instead try to 
discover the way that they relate to each other, which is to discover the function 
of the concepts.  Being remains mysterious, but if it is allowed freely to develop 
in accordance with its inner necessity, then we can have a functional grasp of 
what the concept of being in question is.  Speculative thinking takes up the new 
sense of “immediacy” and deals with the development (and function), rather 
than the meaning, of being (though we must remember that function and 
meaning are not absolutely opposed, the functionalist approach is opposed to a 
simplistic account of meaning, where the nature of the relativity of individual 
terms is not taken into account – see chapter 1).  The new concept of immediacy 
that we have is immediacy that is free, and I hope in what follows to explain in 
more detail what this “freedom” consists in. 
 
To summarise: the logic of essence has shown that whatever is actual must be 
indeterminate to reflective thinking, since we cannot find an other of actuality 
that would explain it.  Actuality is what it is, and reflection is identical to 
actuality, since there is no distinction between what is inner and outer to 
actuality.  Nevertheless, what is actual does have a nature of its own and so we 
must think differently if we are to work out what this nature is (and are to say 
more of it than that it is).  It is for this reason that reflective thinking gives way to 
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speculative thinking.  As we will see by the end of this chapter, speculative 
thinking is thinking that, though it cannot break actuality down into substantial 
parts (and so cannot solve the problem of empty identity by pointing to two or 
more distinct things that would explain each other), it can follow its own process 
of trying to come to terms with actuality and in this way discover the movement 
of actuality as it manifests itself.  For speculative thinking, thought and being (or 
what is actual) are identical (the logic of reflection has demonstrated this), and 
so we can trace the nature of what is actual in the way our thought develops as 
we think. 
 
1: The universal 
 
The Concept is the actual that moves according to its own inner necessity, and so 
has become free in the way that has been described above.  The Concept is “an 
infinite, self-relating determinateness.”263  Hegel calls this the “universal”.  The 
universal is immediate, since it is not related to a distinct other, and so it does 
not determine, nor is it determined by, what is external to it (since inner and 
outer are identical), and so it only determines itself.264  This self-determining 
immediacy of the universal is described by Hegel as an “original unity”.265  Any 
determination of the universal, we are told, does not alter the immediacy of the 
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universal.  With the immediacy of the universal, which is immediacy that is self-
determining, we now have a form of immediacy that is, in a meaningful sense, 
non-mediated.  By thinking this immediacy as self-determining (as inner identity), 
we can think of it as not mediated except by itself, and so describe immediacy as 
non-mediated (that is, not mediated from the outside) while it is, nevertheless, 
mediated (that is, mediated by itself).  Thus we do not violate the principle that 
arose from the examination of the logic of being, that immediacy cannot be non-
mediated, and yet we have an opportunity to avoid the problems of the logic of 
essence, in which immediacy was thoroughly mediated. 
 
Hegel tells us that “the universal is the substance of its determinations; but in 
such wise that what was a contingency for substance, is the Concept’s own self-
mediation, its own immanent reflection.”266  We have seen above why we cannot 
say that there is anything contingent about the Concept: to talk of contingency is 
to talk of what is external to the Concept (or outer), and we cannot meaningfully 
talk of an inner/outer distinction.  Of course, there is a movement between the 
aspects of the Concept that manifests itself, but we could not find anything to 
justify describing either one of these aspects as “contingent”, and so more 
essential, or inner, than the other. 
 
However, though the outside as conceived in the logic of essence has vanished, 
owing to the failure of essential categories to distinguish between outside and 
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inside, this does not mean that we are forced no longer to talk of an “outside” in 
the logic of the Concept.  Hegel reminds us that, though we began with “inner 
identity”, the universal cannot only be this inner identity, otherwise it would 
amount to no more than “formless substance”.267  In other words, if we just took 
the universal to be inner identity that determines itself but does not manifest 
itself, the universal would be no more than the concept of actuality (since it 
would be the concept of what is merely self-identical), and would itself 
constitute a dead-end for thought, since we would end up without having solved 
the problem generated by the logic of essence: that is, we would have failed to 
make a distinction between what is inner and outer, essential and non-essential. 
 
Thus, rather than abandon the concept of externality altogether, we arrive at a 
new concept of externality that fits with what we have said about the universal 
so far.  The universal is self-determining and immediate, and this immediacy 
means that it only determines itself and is determined by itself.  Whatever is 
external to it neither determines it nor is determined by it.  Thus Hegel writes: 
 
The universal is therefore free power; it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but 
without doing violence to it; on the contrary, the universal is, in its other, in peaceful communion 
with itself.  We have called it free power, but it could also be called free love and boundless 
blessedness, for it bears itself towards its other as towards its own self; in it, it has returned to 
itself.
268
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Since the universal only determines – and is only determined by – itself, any 
relation to other it has must amount to a relation to itself.  With the logic of 
being, concepts were, when related to other, lost in that other (since concepts of 
being are what they are and no more); with the logic of essence, concepts were, 
when related to other, fused together and mutually altered each other (since any 
concept, taken immediately, was also mediated by other and so determined 
from the outside).  With the logic of the concept, however, a concept’s relation 
to other amounts neither to losing itself nor to being altered.  This is a free 
relation.  It is called a “free relation” because its relation to what is other is 
indeterminate: the universal is not determined by, nor does it determine, what is 
other than it. 
 
We have seen in this section that freedom emerges from the concept of 
necessity.  Inner necessity amounts to self-determination.  This self-
determination is free if, related to this inner necessity, there is something 
external that is not determined by the inner necessity, but is freely related to it.  
What this free sort of relation consists in remains to be seen.  For now we can at 
least say what this relation is not: it is not a relation of determination, and so we 
do not return to the logic of essence, and so we do not return to a model 
according to which what is self-determining determines what is other than it. 
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2: The particular 
 
When Hegel begins to discuss the particular, he tells us that we have had the 
particular in mind already in our discussion of the universal.  He tells us that “we 
cannot speak of the universal apart from determinateness which to be more 
precise is particularity and individuality, for the universal, in its absolute 
negativity, contains determinateness in and for itself.”269  If particularity is the 
determinateness of the universal, then it must belong to the universal, since the 
universal only determines – and is determined by – itself.  (In the passage just 
quoted, Hegel also mentions that we also have “individuality”: we will return to 
this below.) 
 
Thus universality necessarily involves particularity.  Nevertheless, we can 
abstract the moment of universality from the moment of particularity.  In this 
way the immediacy (universal) is taken to be distinct from its determinations 
(particular).  However, this leaves us with no more than immediacy alongside 
determinations that are external to it.  But this makes the concept of abstract 
universality identical to the concept of being, since it is the concept of immediacy 
that is only distinct from the determinations that mediate it.  Thus abstract 
universality is equivalent to the concept of being: or, to put it more accurately, it 
is the principle of abstract universality that governs the logic of being, since each 
concept is taken to be opposed to its determinations. 
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As self-determining immediacy, the universal is distinct from what is other than 
it.  As self-determining, the universal is not its other: it is distinguished from what 
is other than it.  The immediacy of the universal thus contains what Hegel calls 
the “first negation” of the universal, and this first negation is the particularity of 
the universal.  (We will see that it is called the “first negation” because it is one 
of two negations: there must also be a second negation, where the universal is 
determined as not determined by what is other than it.) 
 
The particularity of the universal constitutes its “character”.270  The universal, if it 
is not to be merely abstract universality, is not merely immediacy but is 
immediacy that has determined itself in a certain way.  Particularity, as 
character, is the self-determining of the universal. 
 
It is the character of the universal, its particularity, that determines the 
particulars that come under it.  Particulars are said to come under the same 
concept insofar as they are identical with the character of the universal.271  The 
“diversity” of particulars “exhibits” the character of the universal.  For this 
reason, Hegel describes the universal as a “totality”: each particular gives us the 
character of the universal as a whole.272  However, this diverse collection of 
particulars is not arbitrarily put together under the universal: the particulars 
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relate to each other and are constituted according to a “principle” that belongs 
to the universal and to its particulars.273 
 
It is in this way that a Hegelian account of the universal and the particular differs 
from a certain sort of non-Hegelian account.  A non-Hegelian account might tell 
us that particulars acquire certain characteristics from somewhere external to 
them (things are caused to be a certain way due to, say, natural processes), and 
are then brought under universals through our recognising marks belonging to 
the particulars that cause them to come under the universal.  So all things with 
the characteristic ‘x’ come under the universal “things that are ‘x’”.  The problem 
with this sort of account, for Hegel, is that it belongs to the logic of essence.  
According to this account, each particular is what it is, not on its own terms, but 
according to a presupposed category intended to classify it.  The immediacy of 
the particular becomes irrelevant, since it is only seen through the mediating 
category of the universal.  Certain characteristics of the thing are ignored in the 
attempt to classify it and bring it under a certain universal.  The immediate is 
altered in our thought by the universal that mediates it (and so we are thinking in 
terms of essence – see chapters 4 and 5 above), and so what is immediate about 
the particular is left out of the account.  The problem with this account is not 
based on some sort of demand that we account for the specificity of every 
particular, but on the fact that the account is internally in conflict: the particular 
is supposed to be described through the universal, but we know that something 
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must always be left out of the account, so that we never get to things “in 
themselves”.  Now that we have seen the problems connected with essentialist 
thinking (with thinking according to which what is immediate is distorted by what 
mediates it), Hegel can say that this way of thinking – according to which true 
being (being in itself) is distinguished from appearance – is inadequate, and a 
new way of thinking the universal must be found.274 
 
Hegel’s way of thinking the relation between the universal and the particular is 
thus a way of replacing the essentialist way of thinking the particular as 
dependent upon the universal with a way of thinking the universal and the 
particular in their freedom.  The universal mediates the particular, but according 
to a principle that belongs to the particular, since all the particular is, is the 
determination of the universal.  The universal and the particular are thus aspects 
of the same process of self-determination – rather than one determining the 
other – and so we do not run into the problems of distortion275 encountered in 
the traditional, essentialist account of universality and particularity. 
 
We saw above that particularity is only the first negation of the universal, and so 
only means that the universal is distinct from its other.  However, we also saw 
that, in order for the relation of universal and particular to make sense as a 
solution to the problem of essentialism, which it solves by conceiving the 
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particular not as determined by the universal but as being the determination of 
the universal, a second negation had to come into play, so that what is distinct 
from the universal (is not the universal) is also not determined by the universal.  
Without this second negation, the relation of universal to particular would be an 
essential relation, since the particularity of the universal, its relation to the 
particular, would be a relation to something that it determines or is determined 
by.  The universal thought as the second negation is the “individual”.  Though its 
role has already been explained in what has been said above (we think the 
universal as individual when we take the Hegelian, rather than the non-Hegelian, 
account of the universal and the particular), we will, in the next section, look in a 
little more detail at what “individual” means for Hegel.  To think of the particular 
as other than the universal would be to revert back to an inadequate conception 
of essence: we know that we cannot adequately conceive of the particular as the 
other of the universal because, since both are aspects of the same immediacy, it 
is impossible to find anything on which to base a distinction between them.  So, 
we have to negate the negation that we have here: the particular is not the other 
of the universal: particularity thought in this way is individuality. 
3: The individual 
 
Hegel describes particularity as “creative power”: insofar as it is particular, the 
universal determines itself and so can be called “creative”.276  This is the “second 
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negation”277: whereas the first negation was the distinction from what is other, 
the second negation is where we determine the universal as not determined by 
what it is distinct from (there are two negations here, since a distinction is a 
negation, and is the first negation in this sentence, while the “not” constitutes 
the second negation).  Taken as this negation of negation, the universal is an 
“individual”.    
 
The individual is immediacy determined as immediately determined (that is, as a 
self-determining immediacy, so that it is immediately what it is).  Universality, 
taken abstractly, is merely immediacy (it simply is): thus the concept of pure 
being is abstract universality and is lost once it is taken to be determinate (since 
it has no characteristics other than being immediate, and so further 
determination causes the original immediacy to be lost).  However, if we take 
universality to be determined as immediate and self-determining, we take it to 
be an individual.  Whereas particularity denotes the specific character that 
belongs to something immediate, and thus the immediacy determined as “such 
and such”, individuality is the immediate determined as immediately self-
determining per se.  If being is taken as an abstract universal, it is lost as soon as 
it is defined, as we saw in the case of pure being; taken as an individual, 
however, being is taken to be determined as immediate in a determinate way 
and thus is preserved even as it shows itself to have more determinations than 
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this determination of immediacy (or purity: the universal is not purely 
immediate278). 
 
Hegel points out that any immediacy can be taken to have individuality, provided 
that it is taken to have certain determinations that belong to its own particular 
immediacy.  Even abstract universality, Hegel tells us, is in truth individuality, 
since it is determined as immediate and no more, and so concretely is a negation 
of a negation.  According to the logic of the concept, then, sheer immediacy is 
concretely understood as negation of the negation.279  This explains why, when 
we leave the concept of pure being behind and arrive at the concept of 
determinate being (in the logic of being), we can say that we are grasping pure 
being according to its concept: concretely understood, the abstract universal is 
the negation of the negation.  The reason that this was problematic for the 
concept of pure being was that we were trying to think this concept as abstract 
and no more, in accordance with the concept of being we had to begin with.  
With the “concrete universal”, we have thought the logic of actuality through: 
instead of taking otherness to be one aspect of actuality, actuality is taken to be 
thoroughly identical, while what is “other” is defined as what does not 
determine, nor is determined by the universal. 
 
In sum: we have seen in this chapter that the logic of the universal describes a 
response to the problem of the actual.  We started with the universal as what 
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has inner necessity and simply is: the universal is the actual that moves according 
to its own inner necessity.  Particularity describes not what is other than 
universality (particulars do not exist independently of universals waiting to have 
universals applied to them), but instead describes the further logical aspects that 
must belong to anything that simply is in a determinate way: whatever is, is in a 
particular way.  Individuality describes a further element of this same 
universality: the universal, as actual, must be driven by its own inner necessity 
and so it must be creative, which is to say that its particular way of being must be 
determined by the individual itself and by nothing else. 
 
The story of the universal signals a move away from reflective thinking because 
this “creative power” is something that must, in a certain sense, remain 
mysterious.  We do not look for an ultimate explanation of the nature of 
individual things.  Instead, we take it that the universal, as individual, is self-
determining, and that therefore the way that the universal manifests itself 
reveals something about the nature of the universal.  Speculative thinking is thus 
a functionalist approach of sorts: something remains inexpressible (we do not 
have a complete picture of the individual thing in question), and yet we find that 
the development of our thinking as we try to come to terms with the individual 
object of study expresses the nature of that object in a certain way.  I describe 
this as functionalist for the same reason as we might describe Deleuze’s thinking 
as functionalist: we examine the way our thinking works in order to grasp its 
nature.  As Žižek writes: 
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When we try to establish the function of some organ in an animal, we are thereby repeating the 
“objective” process itself through which the animal “invented” this organ as the solution of some 
problem.  Our process of approaching constituted objective reality repeats the virtual process of 
Becoming of this reality itself.
280
 
 
That is to say, whereas reflection repeatedly asked questions in order to come to 
a full explanation, speculative thinking instead traces the movement of thought 
as it moves in accordance with its own inner necessity and thereby manifests the 
mysterious nature of the actual.  Speculative thinking means taking what is 
actual on its own terms, since it allows us to trace the nature of the actual in the 
development of our own thought.  Thus it turns out that, in retrospect, the Logic 
has been an exercise in speculative thinking, since in the Logic we have been 
tracing the development of reflective thinking as it comes to terms with itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
With the concept of individuality we have a full picture of universality and the 
beginning of a clear picture of the Hegelian concept of freedom.  In the account 
of the universal given above, we have seen that we are concerned with 
immediacy and determination, just as we were in the logic of being and the logic 
of essence.  However, in the logic of being, immediacy was taken to be non-
mediated, and so whatever belonged to something immediately was lost once 
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mediation could be shown to ground the immediate.  In the logic of essence, 
immediacy was taken to be necessarily mediated, but this meant that immediacy 
was necessarily always already distorted (that is, altered in such a way that it was 
always already not immediate).  Not only did this mean that the essentialist 
account led us to the view that knowledge of the immediate was impossible 
(since the immediate was distorted by the mediation of essence, so that the only 
truth is the processes that mediate knowledge of the immediate), but it showed 
itself to be inadequate, since mediation and the immediate could not be 
adequately distinguished: actuality turned out to be simply what it is.  Only in the 
logic of the Concept do we have immediacy that is free from being destroyed or 
distorted by mediation.281  The destruction of concepts found in the logic of 
being (the fact that concepts were lost as they became other concepts) was 
symptomatic of a radically unfree way of thinking, since whatever is is reduced to 
nothing; the distortion found in the logic of essence was a symptom of a way of 
thinking dependent upon hierarchy and domination, where freedom is only 
bought at the expense of servitude (of the immediate to the mediation through 
which it expresses itself: what is essential is not what is grounded but the 
ground, reflection and not immediate being).  With the logic of the Concept, on 
the other hand, the development of concepts proceeds while the actual object in 
question is allowed to remain simply what it is, so that the actual object is not 
distorted: no single concept is said to define the immediate object (as we saw, 
the particular is not subordinate to any universal concept), but the development 
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of concepts continues precisely because such a final and fixed definition is 
impossible, and so we can only get a sense of the nature of the object by seeing 
how the development of concepts manifests itself. 
 
In the next chapter we will look at the role that the categories of the Logic play in 
key parts of the Philosophy of Right.  The discussion provided above in the 
present chapter has hopefully served as a useful preparation for this discussion, 
by pointing to the way in which determination does and does not play a role 
where freedom is concerned.  What is free must be determined (otherwise the 
object in question will be destroyed by any determination), but must also not be 
determined (otherwise the object in question will be distorted by what 
determines it).282  This is the meaning of “self-determination” in Hegel.  In this 
chapter I have described the tools that allow Hegel to provide a speculative 
philosophical account: we will see in the next chapter how, by thinking in terms 
of concrete universality, Hegel believes we can think adequately about political 
concepts.  I have described the Logic up to the end of the logic of essence as a 
“quest for meaning”: we saw in the present chapter that this quest has failed, 
since no individual concept has been found that has a stable meaning.  The only 
hope we have for carrying out an investigation into something (in our case, this 
something is the political) is to think speculatively and look for the universal, 
which is to allow the truth of what is before us to unfold for itself.  The logic of 
being and the logic of essence have served to rule out any method other than 
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this, whereby a conception of being could be fixed prior to any investigation and 
determine the course of the investigation.  “Allowing what is before us to unfold 
for itself” might sound mysterious, but what it amounts to is quite 
straightforward, as we will see: it means not fixing upon any one concept as a 
principle with which to begin, but allowing ourselves to proceed dialectically, so 
that each concept that we apply is seen as part of a development, which means 
that concepts are systematically taken up and transformed as the investigation 
proceeds. 
 
We will see that the functional approach takes the unfathomableness of ground 
into account and so gives us a true conception of externality: the account of the 
political is, for this reason, always incomplete, in a certain sense, for Hegel.  As I 
suggested in chapter 5, the logic of the Concept gives us an adequate conception 
of essence: according to the logic of the Concept, in contrast to the logic of 
essence, what is essential does not determine what is other than it, and so the 
other to which what is essential freely relates must be taken to be 
indeterminate.  That is to say, a key element of speculative thinking (thinking in 
accordance with the logic of the Concept), is being able to establish how far our 
knowledge can take us: we will see that certain things must remain 
indeterminate for the political philosopher.  Fundamental to Hegel’s conception 
of political philosophy is the notion that the political philosopher looks at what is, 
rather than starting with principles that tell us what ought to be the case: for 
Hegel, we can only meaningfully make this distinction, between is and ought, if 
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we approach philosophy speculatively.  We focus on what is the case, for Hegel, 
and this allows what ought to be the case to manifest itself: we will see that our 
study of what is the case, of the actual, allows us to glimpse the conditions that 
allow what is to have come to be, the rational, even though we can never get a 
fixed and absolute picture of what it means to be rational.  For Hegel, our 
political development is always ongoing, and we cannot come up with a formula 
that would tell us what we should do in every case, even though through 
philosophy we learn to grasp that there must be a rational order of things. 
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Chapter 7: Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters we have learned a great deal about Hegel’s method.  
We have seen the way that Hegel proceeds: that is, dialectically.  Proceeding 
dialectically means thinking speculatively, and this means beginning without 
presuppositions, that is, letting the subject matter speak for itself.  By beginning 
with reflective thinking and allowing ourselves to be guided by the demands of 
reflection, it turned out that we were thinking speculatively, as we were taking 
reflection on its own terms (and taking the subject matter on its own terms is the 
purpose of speculative thinking).  In this chapter we will see how this method 
applies, for Hegel, to his exposition of “right”. 
 
The logic of the Concept, discussed in the previous chapter, illustrates how a 
subject matter – in this case the political concept of right – can be approached 
without bringing in presuppositions, or principles that distort the subject matter.  
As we saw in chapters 3 to 5 above, the Logic can be seen as a study of 
reflection: the Logic takes the reflective spirit of the modern age and tries to 
discover where it ends up.  As we saw in chapters 5 and 6 above, Hegel believes 
he has shown in the Logic that the reflective spirit is self-defeating, insofar as 
reflection must give way to a new way of thinking, that is, to speculative 
thinking.  Reflective thinking seeks objectivity by repeatedly questioning what is 
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before it: as we saw in chapter 3, the reflective spirit repeatedly asks “What 
is…?” about the thing in question.  The problem is that this question leads to a 
dead-end for reflection, to the concept of actuality according to which, despite 
the mediation of reflection, being is simply what it is.  In order to escape this 
dead-end, reflection must transform itself into speculative thinking, which is a 
type of thinking that is not characterised by the repetition of “What is…?” but 
which is able patiently to wait and see what emerges from what is actual.  There 
is nothing mystical about this patience with mysterious actuality, however (and 
what is actual must be mysterious, since we can, for reflection, say no more 
about it than to point out that it is despite its mediation by reflection): 
concretely, speculative thinking means taking seriously the claim that no concept 
has any meaning taken on its own, and so we will have to pass through many 
ways of thinking about the matter in hand until we get a reasonably full picture 
of the actual thing we are considering.  The truth of something is discovered not 
by hitting on the correct, fixed concept of that thing, but by recognising how the 
various concepts that can apply to that thing fit together in a process of 
development: this is what it means to think something in accordance with its 
Concept, for Hegel.  In the current chapter I hope to illustrate what this means. 
 
Hegel’s account of the political must be distinguished from “an ordinary 
compendium” of law.283  It is to be distinguished from such a compendium, we 
are told, by its “method”.  This is an important point to note, since it will be 
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shown to be a key point in what follows: Hegel does not want to provide a work 
that introduces radical new concepts to political philosophy so much as he wants 
to give a rational account of the actual ethical institutions that existed in his day.  
However, this does not mean that Hegel was uncritical of the ethical institutions 
that existed in his day.  Instead, it means that Hegel stuck to the critical method 
that we have been discussing in the chapters above: we can only properly 
criticise something by doing so immanently, by looking at what something is and 
seeing what the subject matter itself demands for its own realisation, that is to 
say, by methodically applying concepts to what is before us in order to see how 
this allows our sense of what is actual to develop.  It is by the methodical 
application of concepts that we develop a systematic grasp of the object of 
study. 
 
1: The will 
 
In accordance with the task he has set himself, Hegel proceeds to systematically 
examine all of the concepts that could be associated with right.284  The first 
concept to be discussed by Hegel is the concept of the “will”.  The will, we are 
told, is by definition free, and so we are beginning the discussion of right with 
the concept of freedom.285  Of course, since we are talking about freedom, it 
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looks like we have returned to a discussion of universality (see chapter 6 above).  
And sure enough, we are told that “the will contains… the element of pure 
indeterminacy” which is “the unrestricted infinity of absolute abstraction or 
universality, the pure thought of oneself.”286 
 
Hegel believes that we must think of the will as more than this indeterminacy 
(than this indeterminate “I” or “pure thought of oneself”).  The way in which he 
shows this demonstrates what is interesting about his method.  We must note 
that Hegel does not want to eliminate such indeterminacy, since it is a crucial 
moment of what the will is: instead he wants to fit this moment into a logical 
system, so that the role of such a moment can be determined.  “Abstraction”, we 
will see, is central to the concept of freedom, though its precise role can only be 
grasped systematically (that is, where abstraction is a concept that is grasped as 
one concept in a system of concepts).287 
 
We are told that “at the same time, the I is also the transition from 
undifferentiated indeterminacy to the differentiation, determination, and 
positing of a determinacy as a content and object.”288  What Hegel is stating here 
is his claim that even indeterminacy is a determination, since abstraction must 
have a content, even if the most abstract one (we saw this in chapter 3 above: 
                                                                                                                                                               
claim is justified in the Philosophy of Mind).  I simply point out here the correspondence of the 
concepts “will” and “freedom” for Hegel. 
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even “pure being” had a content).  We should notice the “also” that I have 
italicised in the text quoted here: while Hegel tells us that indeterminacy turns 
out to be determination (since it must result in a determinate content), he wants 
to say that this new moment exists in some sense alongside the earlier moment, 
so that both are true.  This is central to the concept of “dialectic”: earlier and 
later moments both belong to the system of concepts.   
 
Of course, from these two passages, on the indeterminacy and the 
determination of what is abstract and universal, we are effectively learning 
nothing new: as we have seen in chapter 6 above, this is the logic of the 
universal, according to which what is abstract develops into its negation and so is 
explicitly preserved in it.  However, perhaps we can now see a little more clearly 
the significance of the logic of the universal: this logic makes explicit the fact that 
this process retains the earlier moment, and what this means for Hegel is that we 
are proceeding systematically, that is, in such a way that each concept finds its 
place in a system, rather than each in turn being proved false and worthless.  As 
this chapter progresses we will see that this is important: human beings are the 
sort of political creatures that are essentially indeterminate even in their 
determinacy. 
 
And so we see in the next section of the Philosophy of Right that “the will is the 
unity of both these moments.”289  The will is not “always already” determined, 
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but contains this moment of universality, of abstraction.  What it means to say 
that the will “contains” the moment of abstraction is that we cannot give a full 
explanation of the will without accounting for this moment.  The will is something 
that is determined, but which has brought about this determination through a 
process of abstraction.  We do not say that the will is “always already” 
determined, since this would suggest that we had made a mistake in attributing 
this moment of abstraction to the will, and that its choice290, its fixing on a 
determination, was an illusion. 
 
So the will is not only abstract: it must become determinate.  But this new 
determination of the will is itself too abstract.  The will as it has been described – 
as a moment of abstraction alongside the determinate content arising from this 
– is called “the immediate or natural will”.291  The trouble with this 
characterisation of the will, is that the determinacy of its determinations turns 
out to be a certain lack of determinacy.  This lack becomes apparent once we 
realise that, according to the stages just described, any determination is equal to 
any other.  In other words, since all that arises from indeterminacy is 
determination, the will is indifferent to the precise character of the 
determination that arises.  Thus at this stage, the determinate content of the will 
is described as “a medley and multiplicity of impulses”292, with no additional 
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determinate content that would provide us with a principle for choosing 
between them. 
 
Now, since determinacy of this sort turns into a certain indeterminacy, we are 
faced with a contradiction.  The way that this contradiction is dealt with is 
through the “resolve” of the will: the will gives preference to an indeterminate 
impulse over other impulses and thereby gives determinate content to it.  Again 
it is worth taking care to note that this way of solving the problem, positing the 
will as something that essentially resolves upon its chosen course of action, does 
not mean saying that the previous, merely impulsive will was incoherent and so 
must be rejected.  Instead, this contradictory nature of the impulsive will is seen 
to be a necessary stage in the development of the will, which gives rise to the 
more thoroughly determinate notion of a will that resolves.  For Hegel it is 
essential that we see the logical organisation of the will, as a creature that 
resolves, or chooses, as arising from an essential contradiction and from an 
unstable creature of impulse.293 
 
The will, as something that resolves in this way, is connected in a certain way to 
its impulses.  It is not determined by them entirely (as we saw, the determination 
of an impulse can only go so far, and turns out to be quite indeterminate), but at 
the same time cannot be free of them.  Thus “it is tied to its content” but “it is 
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not tied to this or that content”.294  We should compare this to the logic of 
essence (chapters 4 and 5 above): impulse plays the role of what is immediate 
and external to essence, which keeps revealing itself to have an essential, 
determinate role despite the way that the concept of essence works against this 
alien essential determinacy.295  We have, when we consider impulses and 
resolve, a return to the logic of domination (the impulses are dominated by the 
resolve of the will), which as we saw was a contradictory position, but one 
nevertheless implicit in the concept of essence.296  We might note in support of 
this the widespread use of the language of domination when it comes to talking 
about our impulses and our “control” over them.  We should also note that both 
sides here – resolve and impulses – are sides of the will: it is not that the will 
dominates its impulses, but the resolve of the will dominates the impulses of the 
will. 
 
With this contradictory state of affairs we have reached the level of 
“arbitrariness” (“Willkür”).297  The most simplistic notion that I should be allowed 
to “do whatever I want” finds its home here.  The arbitrary will recognises 
freedom only in carrying out those impulses that it has resolved upon.  The 
problem with this position, however, is found in the contradiction that we have 
just identified: the resolve is in an unstable relation of essence, or domination, 
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with the multiplicity of impulses, and so the arbitrary will cannot be sure 
whether it is acting in accordance with its resolve or not.  The life of the arbitrary 
will is one of perpetual struggle for this reason.  Thus Hegel writes: 
 
What the will has decided to choose… it can equally easily renounce…  But its ability to go beyond 
any other choice which it may substitute, and so on ad infinitum, never enables it to get beyond 
its own finitude, because the content of every such choice is something other than the form of 
the will.
298
 
 
In other words, the resolve (the form of the will) must be dominant if the 
arbitrary will is to be able to say that it is free, that it is guided by its resolve and 
so is doing what it wants.  But the arbitrary will, no matter how it shifts its 
preferences, can never find a resolution that is more than one choice among 
many.  We can see, then, that the arbitrary will does not fully overcome the 
problem of the impulsive will, since its resolution does not manage to give 
enough determination to the chosen impulse so that it can be truly elevated 
above the others. 
 
We might say that this begs the question: surely, if we take the arbitrary will on 
its own terms, then the chosen impulse simply is the one that is elevated above 
the others and freedom is found in following the impulse precisely because the 
will says it is so.  However, this is to ignore the logic of essence and domination: 
the problem is not that Hegel is denying that the will can give such elevation to 
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an impulse, but that this elevation involves the struggle of domination, so that 
the arbitrary will can never be sure whether it is its own resolve or sheer blind 
impulse that guides him. 
 
So far, then, we have looked at what we will refer to as the “abstract will” (the 
will as utterly indeterminate), the “impulsive will” (the will as a multiplicity of 
impulses – the “immediate” or “natural” will) and the “arbitrary will” (the will 
that chooses an impulse arbitrarily from the multiplicity available to it).  We have 
seen that each of these is an essential element in the complex nature of the will, 
since the most complex concept of will so far, the arbitrary will, can only be 
explained with reference to the earlier stage, the impulsive will, while the latter 
can only be explained with reference to the abstract will.  Thus the explanation 
of the arbitrary will involves an explanation of all three levels, and only through 
such an explanation do we begin to get a clear picture of what the will looks like 
for Hegel.  This illustrates the systematic nature of Hegel’s exposition, which 
arises from the dialectical method. 
 
Next, Hegel contrasts this endless struggle of the arbitrary will with the project of 
the “purification of impulses”.299  While Hegel says that the demand for the 
purification of impulses is “vague”, it nevertheless constitutes an improvement 
on the arbitrary will.  A demand for purification of impulses would involve finding 
criteria according to which impulses could be deemed worthy or unworthy of our 
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acting upon them.  In this way, impulses can find the determinacy they lack both 
in the impulsive will and the arbitrary, according to which they are each 
ultimately just one impulse alongside another.  Hegel is saying, then, that the 
impasse that we have reached with the struggle of the arbitrary will is such that 
it calls for external criteria, or a principle, according to which impulses can be 
determined.  In other words, the impulses cannot find their determination in 
themselves, and so must be judged to have a certain determination according to 
something external to them. 
 
Universality thus re-enters the picture here.  In response to the arbitrary will’s 
struggle for domination, we must look for an abstract principle according to 
which any given impulse can be judged.  We have here a sort of moral will, 
though we will see that the “moral will” does not properly arise until later on in 
the Philosophy of Right.  I will thus refer to this stage of the will’s development as 
the “abstract moral will”.  Thus the development so far goes: abstract will, 
impulsive will, arbitrary will and abstract moral will. 
 
“Only in freedom of this kind”, Hegel tells us, “is the will with itself without 
qualification, because it is related to nothing except itself and so is released from 
every relation of dependence on anything else.”300  Note that the will is properly 
free because it is no longer dependent (as least not in the way that it was 
before): the logic of domination that was evident in the arbitrary will has been 
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overcome.  Instead of being determined by impulses, the will finds universal 
principles and acts only in accordance with these if it is to be free.  Once again, 
we should note the dialectical nature of the process that Hegel is describing: the 
logic of domination does not simply vanish, but remains as the very aspect of the 
will that necessitates the move to acting in accordance with a universal principle. 
 
In fact, it is quite clear at this stage that the struggling, domination-seeking 
aspect of the will remains in the picture.  The will remains, in a sense, split here, 
since the impulses stand on one side, while the universal principle stands on the 
other.  “The will is then universal”, we are told, “because all restriction and all 
particular individuality have been superseded within it”.301  But when Hegel tells 
us this, he is describing the point of view of the abstract moral will.  From our 
point of view, we can see that the arbitrary, particular side of the will remains.  In 
other words, while the appeal to a universal principle arises quite legitimately in 
response to a demand that impulses find a determination, this principle can only 
determine the impulses at the cost of splitting the will into its particular and 
universal side.  The impulses can thus only be said to be properly determined 
from the point of view of the abstract moral will and not in and for themselves.  
What this means is that the abstract moral will is in a sense arbitrary, and so has 
not fully escaped the essentialist logic of the arbitrary will.  We still find, in other 
words, that the determination of the impulses here depends on our accepting 
the domination of the impulses by a moralising will.  The concrete problem with 
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this is that one could refuse to recognise the authority of such a will on the 
grounds that it ignores the essential indeterminacy of the impulses.  While such a 
refusal would in a sense be irrational (since it would accept an unstable 
determination of the impulses as “determined as indeterminate”), it finds its 
justification in the fact that subordinating the impulses to a universal principle 
does not in fact solve the problem of the indeterminacy of the impulses, but 
merely asks us to arbitrarily take up a determination for these impulses, so that 
the indeterminate side of the impulses becomes inessential. 
 
Thus the problem we are faced with at the level of the abstract moral will is the 
fact that the “self-conscious side”, or the will “for itself”, which acts according to 
principles, is separated from what the will is “in itself”.302  In order to overcome 
this unstable concept of the will, we must think the will as “in and for itself”.  In 
other words, this split between the impulses and the universal principle must be 
“thought away”, so to speak.  However, this must not be done in yet another 
arbitrary way, otherwise, we will remain caught in the logic of domination.  The 
problem is that the will is, on the one hand, determined as indeterminate, and so 
is contradictory; on the other hand, it is fully determined, but according to a 
principle that is not its own (or at least, that does not belong to any of the 
impulses that constitute the will).  In order to overcome this problem, the 
principle that is not its own must be recognised as necessarily its own.  Since, as 
we saw, the very indeterminacy of the impulses led the will to look for an 
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external principle, we can see already that the external principle of the abstract 
moral will is the will’s own, since it arises in response to an internal need of the 
will.  As we have seen, the problem is parallel to the problem faced by the 
arbitrary will in that, while the fact that a principle is required is necessary, the 
particular choice of principle itself is not.  Why this principle and not another?  
However, if this problem is allowed to remain, then we can get no further, and 
impulses, and our pursuit of impulses, must always remain arbitrary.  What is 
required is that we recognise not only that a principle is necessary, but that in 
seizing a principle, this principle must be concrete and so a particular principle.  
The principle is not arbitrary, since a principle is needed and must have a 
concrete form. 
 
This requires more explanation, since it is a truly radical moment of Hegel’s 
thought and runs counter to the intuition of many philosophers today, even of 
many seemingly sympathetic Hegel commentators.303  To return to the abstract 
moral will: we have, on the one hand, the side that is contradictory, since it is 
determined as indeterminate.  This is the side of the impulses.  Even the arbitrary 
favouring of impulses by the will cannot elevate these impulses so that they are 
properly determinate, since the arbitrary will does not do this according to any 
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fixed principle but must by definition be allowed to change its mind regarding 
which impulses it favours.  On the other hand we have the side of the abstract 
moral will that acts according to a fixed principle.  This fixed principle allows the 
will to be fully determinate, since we can fully explain why we are performing an 
action, and arbitrariness is eliminated.  But arbitrariness slips in through the back 
door, so to speak, since the principle itself is one among many principles.  So 
what is required is a principle that is necessary, and not one among many 
principles.  By saying this, we have in effect said that the very “indeterminate 
determinacy” (or “determinate indeterminacy”, either way is fine) of the 
impulsive and arbitrary will demands a principle that is necessary.  If the story 
presented so far is correct, therefore, the appearance that we in fact have more 
than one choice of principle must be illusory: by arriving at a universal principle 
according to which our impulses become fully determinate, we demonstrate that 
the impulses must necessarily be pursued (or rejected) according to this 
principle. 
 
To put it another way: the universal principle, once it has been chosen, 
“conceals”, so to speak, the other options that seemed to be available prior to 
the selecting of this principle.304  To some, this may seem to be an irrational 
claim to make, since Hegel may seem to be saying “yes, we have a choice, and 
ultimately our choices are arbitrary, but we must pretend that we only have one 
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 This concealment of the other possible principles makes our principles “ideological” in the 
sense that Žižek uses the term: “‘ideological’ is a social reality whose very existence implies the 
non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence” (Žižek 1989 pp.15-6). 
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choice in order to save ourselves from relativism!”  However, Hegel is not really 
saying this.  In effect, what Hegel is describing is the familiar social phenomenon 
that finds perhaps its best example in Martin Luther’s words: “Here I stand, I can 
do no other.”  To be Hegelian, I am arguing, we must take seriously that there is 
a sense of “necessity” that is often not recognised by philosophers, that 
describes this social phenomenon.  When we say something is necessary in this 
Hegelian sense, we say “yes, of course I could, in some sense have acted in that 
way, but who I am precludes this.”  So, for example, I could tomorrow go and join 
a terrorist organisation (“there is a possible world in which Lee joins a terrorist 
organisation”, we might say), but at the same time I really could not do this, since 
my character, including my conscience, but also simply the way I have been 
brought up and the social choices I see as realistically being available to me, 
precludes this option.305 
 
It is this that Hegel means when he talks of “the free will that wills the free 
will”.306  The free will is not imposed upon my irrational impulses, but is 
genuinely (not just seemingly, unless we only take the pre-Hegelian concept of 
necessity to be valid) elicited by my impulses, so that the only way I can respond 
to these impulses is to proceed according to this freely chosen principle.  In sum: 
the positing of the principle as necessary is required to avoid contradiction (the 
principle must be the only one: see above) and an example of this is a social 
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abstract aspect of what is involved in such a concrete choice. 
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norm that is contingent in one sense, but necessary in another.  In this way, the 
will is free because “it is related to nothing except itself”: it is not dependent 
upon a principle that is external to it, but it takes up a principle that must belong 
to it necessarily, since without this concrete principle it would not even be the 
impulsive will that it is.307  That is to say, in moving from the abstract moral will 
to the free will (the latter being the free will that wills the free will) we gain a 
conception of the will that is self-related, since the principle according to which it 
determines itself is not taken to be simply external to it. 
 
This concludes the discussion of the “will” in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in a 
sense, since we now move on from will to discuss “right”.  But this concept of the 
will remains throughout, and we will see that the concept of will develops as we 
examine these concepts that describe more than will, since they describe 
external social practices.  Most importantly, we will see that Hegel’s elaboration 
of the concept of right solves some of the problems that we might seem to face 
with this Hegelian concept of necessity, namely: can’t we justify any action with 
this logic?  Can’t we effectively say that even the most evil action is justified 
because “I can do no other”?  We will see in what follows that the existence of 
concrete social practices precludes a reading of Hegel of this sort and in fact 
eliminates the capacity to justify evil that remains, for Hegel, implicit in many 
philosophical systems. 
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In this section I have tried to highlight some aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that, I 
hope to show in the following sections, are essential for grasping what  is most 
interesting about Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.  I have tried to show how Hegel’s 
attention to the form and method according to which we examine political 
concepts allows us to gain a systematic grasp of the political, rather than one 
based on principles that we have presupposed and thus distort our grasp of the 
facts of political philosophy.  Hegel’s systematic approach means that we grasp 
the will not merely as, say, moral (and so guided by absolute moral principles), 
but as a will that brings such principles into play as a result of its impulsive 
nature, and which sticks to such principles, therefore, owing to a kind of 
necessity.  Rather than beginning with principles that we take to be absolute, 
then, Hegel shows us the proper place for principles in our conception of the will.  
Without such principles, we could not fulfil the logical demands placed upon us 
by the very fact that we consist in a multiplicity of impulses.  But just as there can 
be no multiplicity of impulses without principles  with which to control them, so 
there are no principles without such a multiplicity: for this reason, the fact that 
we are impulsive creatures gives a certain form to human self-determination.  
That is to say, we are only able to get a clear picture of the way that human 
beings determine themselves by examining the moments of indeterminacy that 
define us to some extent.  We are moral and rational creatures, but this morality 
and rationality arises in response to and alongside the abstract, impulsive and 
arbitrary nature of the will.  We will see below, especially in the discussion of 
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ethical life, that this is very important if we are to grasp the reasoning behind the 
picture of the state that Hegel gives us. 
 
2: Abstract right 
 
In order to be free, then, the will must act in accordance with a principle.  What 
this principle is precisely, is difficult to elaborate for good logical reasons.  The 
principle according to which the will acts finds its necessity in the act of choosing 
and not merely in its initial, formal character: for this reason we do not begin 
political philosophy with an ethical or moral principle, since one principle is as 
good as another until it is chosen.  However, we will see in what follows that the 
very fact that this principle arises from the will, and that the will must be 
characterised in the way described in the previous section, means that the 
principle according to which we act does in fact take on a certain shape, so that 
we are mistaken if we think the account given above amounts to a certain “any 
principle will do as long as we stick to it” sort of story.308  We will see that while 
this initial self-concealing choice is an essential aspect of the ethical will, it can 
only be seen to be so on the basis of the development the will undergoes as a 
result of this choice.  I use the term “self-concealing” to describe what we saw 
going on at the end of the previous section: the fact that the principle is one 
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among many is concealed when the principle that has been chosen is recognised 
to be necessary. 
 
Hegel describes the process of choosing and concealing choice as the 
development of the “subjective” into the “objective”.309  It is not the case, for 
Hegel, that we proceed with political philosophy “by the assertion that various 
things ‘exist’ and then by the ‘application’ of the universal to extraneous 
material”310; instead, when we say that something is “objective” we mean (if we 
are using the term in a Hegelian way), that the thing is concrete.  The principle of 
the free will is objective in this way: its authority comes from the fact that it is 
“actualised” in the ethical choices that we make.  As we saw, abstractly speaking, 
a principle is one principle among many; objectively, it is an actual decision, a 
decision determined by my character.  The Philosophy of Right does not, 
therefore, depart from the examination of the will to look at things “out there” 
and see if our concept of the will corresponds to them, so much as it continues 
to develop the concept of the objective, necessary universal principle of the will, 
and by doing this first and foremost we will get a sense of what objectivity means 
and only then will we be able to see how this corresponds to our pre-
conceptions about what the world is “actually” like.  This exercise in 
correspondence, of matching the objective with what is “really out there” will 
not be decisive in testing Hegel’s theory: for Hegel, our pre-conceptions about 
what the objective world is like are in no way superior to our rational conception 
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of the world developed through dialectic thinking, and in fact reality is tested to 
see if it matches up to the concept of reality.311 
 
In the last section I divided Hegel’s discussion of the will, in the “Introduction” to 
the Philosophy of Right, into five stages: the abstract will; the impulsive will; the 
arbitrary will; the abstract moral will and the free will (though the term “will” 
always refers to something free for Hegel312, I am using the term “free will” here 
as shorthand for “the free will which wills the free will” described in the previous 
section).  In (most of313) the rest of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel explores the 
concept of “right”, which is the will considered more concretely, just as the will is 
the concept of the Concept (of universality, particularity and individuality) 
considered more concretely.  So with the concept of right we revisit the forms of 
the will that we looked at above, but we do so by looking at the will in relation to 
others.  We will see that abstract right takes on certain forms, the first of which 
is that of the “person”.314 
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 “most of” because this excludes the section on world history 
314
 On this point there is a contrast between my reading and that of commentators such as 
Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, who suggests that “the emergence of ‘others’ at this point in the 
text is in anticipation of a further development” (Peperzak 2001 p.228).  On the subject of 
property as it is discussed in the “Abstract Right” part of the Philosophy of Right, Peperzak writes: 
“The reference of someone’s property to other persons who should respect it if they exist (i.e., its 
reference to the abstract concept or possibility of other persons) was anticipated in Hegel’s 
definition of property, but the interpersonal relations that develop from it were not yet made 
explicit.” (Peperzak 2001, p.264)  On my reading, however, a stark contrast between the mere 
possibility of other persons and the explicit involvement of others should not be made: the 
emergence of the concept of the will and its relationship with others is a gradual one, as will be 
seen below, and the reference to others will become more explicit as we continue.  As we will 
see, on my reading there is always room for a further “fleshing out”, so to speak, of the 
conception of the individual agent in relation to others: will becomes person (in the “Abstract 
Right” sections), which becomes subject (in the “Morality” sections) which becomes human (in 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 263 of 365 
 
 
The concept of the person is the concept of the will as the simple thought of 
itself as one among others: it is “the inherently individual will of a subject”.315  It 
is thus the concept of right parallel to the concept of abstract will, which was 
“the pure thought of oneself” (see above), the difference being that this is the 
pure thought of oneself among others.  This individuality, the person, is “the self-
conscious but otherwise contentless and simple relation of itself to itself in its 
individuality.”316  Note this “in its individuality”: the concept of right is not just 
the thought of oneself but the thought of oneself as an individual, and thus as 
existing freely alongside others.317  As a person and no more, however, there is 
nothing determinate to distinguish myself from other persons.  We must note 
that each person will have determinate characteristics, such as age, place and so 
on318, but I will have these only insofar as I am “this” person.  Since personality is 
the simple relation to self, and not a determinate relation to self, in so far as I am 
a person (rather than “this” person) I am no more than the abstract relation to 
myself, as one among others. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
the “Ethical Life” sections), and the conception of the human can always be developed further.  
In sum, in contrast to Peperzak, I would suggest that there is no value in distinguishing Hegel’s 
discussion of the possibility of other persons from his discussion of other persons proper: instead 
we should distinguish Hegel’s treatment of persons from his treatment of subjects, humans and 
so on, and take it that otherness is always involved where we have these concepts, even if it is 
treated more concretely as we approach the concrete concept of the human. 
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Now, since as a person there is nothing to distinguish myself from others, each 
person is identical as a person.  It is from this fact that the principle “Be a person 
and respect others as persons” arises.319  If we are to be capable of considering 
ourselves in this abstract way, if we are to be a person, then it follows from the 
fact that we cannot distinguish between ourselves and our fellow human beings 
that all persons must be allowed to be persons, and so must be respected as 
persons.  However, at this abstract stage this principle doesn’t mean very much, 
since respecting others as persons means no more than thinking of others as 
persons too, and no more concrete right than this is attached to this principle at 
this stage.  However, this abstract step will turn out to be necessary and will 
remain part of the complex story of right that will develop in what follows. 
 
So, all that the demand that we respect others as persons means at this stage is: 
“Do not infringe personality and what personality entails.”320  Since personality 
entails no more at this stage than the individual’s relation to itself, no properly 
moral or ethical demands are explicitly demanded by this rule.  (Such moral and 
ethical demands will, we will see, turn out to be implicit.)  As Hegel puts it, we 
are dealing here only with “possibility” rather than actuality when we are talking 
about the abstract concept of the “person”: in order to be actual, the concept of 
the person will have to be filled out, so that what is implicit in this concept can 
emerge.  But note the dialectical method: as we saw in the previous section, this 
mere possibility is not something that we can forget about once we find a more 
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concrete concept of the human being (of the moral and ethical individual), since 
this abstract element of sheer possibility persists in the later more concrete 
concepts of the individual, so that we will see that it is the very fact that the 
human being is the sort of being that has possibilities available to her that makes 
her the sort of ethical individual she is. 
 
All that the abstract person is, then, is this self-relating individuality, which is to 
say that she relates to herself as one among others.  But, as we have seen, 
insofar as the person is a person, she is indistinguishable from other persons.  
We have here, then, a case parallel to what we saw in the discussion of the will in 
the previous section: the indeterminacy of the person (it is self-relating 
individuality and no more) is nevertheless determinate, since she is an individual 
among others (development of what is abstract into a multiplicity), but we can 
find nothing about simply being a person to distinguish one person from 
another, and so must seize upon what is contingent in order to distinguish 
persons (development of the multiplicity into arbitrary distinction).  In order to 
do this, the person defines herself by what belongs to her: through “possession” 
or “property ownership”.321 
 
I have described this initial determination of persons by their property as 
“arbitrary”, and so it is.  At this most abstract level of property ownership, we 
must consider human beings to have an “absolute right of appropriation” over 
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“things” (objects that are not human), since we have not yet got a principle 
according to which property is divided.322  “I make something my own”, Hegel 
tells us, “as a result of my natural need, impulse and caprice”.323  Thus, as with 
the development of the will discussed in the previous section, impulse, and the 
arbitrary prioritising of one impulse over another, brings about the initial 
determination of the indeterminate will.  However, this arbitrariness must turn 
into something necessary if it is to tell us something essential about what it is to 
be a person.  Just as the arbitrary will implicitly demanded the appeal to an 
external principle in order to justify the choice of impulse, so the arbitrary 
division of property implicitly demands an appeal to something external that can 
determine possession of property and thus adequately determine the individual 
person.  Now, since we are proceeding dialectically, we should not be surprised 
that the right of appropriation does not vanish: all persons, however concrete, 
have this right.  However, this right is limited to things that are not already 
claimed by another person: “private property” 324 emerges as a result of taking 
possession, and the fact that private property exists limits the application of the 
absolute right of possession (note: the right itself is not limited, but its 
application is). 
 
The transformation of the arbitrary division of property occurs when we arrive at 
the concept of “contract”.  “The sphere of contract”, Hegel tells us, “is made up 
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of this mediation whereby I hold property not merely by means of a thing and 
my subjective will, but by means of another person’s will as well and so hold it in 
virtue of my participation in a common will.”325  With the concept of contract we 
arrive at the next dialectical step: the determination of the person was lacking 
(so that we had a person determined as indeterminate) and so the person gave 
rise to the concept of property, according to which possession of property gave 
the person determination; however, since property is determined by the 
arbitrary will of the person, we find that property does not in fact solve the 
problem of the indeterminacy of the person, since the person is still ultimately 
defined by his indeterminate will (the domination of the person’s will over the 
thing); so the necessity of my having property is found to rest upon a principle, 
and this is the principle of “contract”. 
 
Now, Hegel does not propose a concrete principle according to which property 
should be divided, but is more interested in the “recognition” that allows 
property, however gained and divided, to belong necessarily to a person.  We 
must remember that it is not the amount of property owned or what is owned, 
but ownership simpliciter that gives the person her determination.  So, in 
describing the concept of contract, Hegel does not describe a concrete principle 
upon which contract should be based, so much as explain why principles upon 
which property ownership is based are necessary, and that these principles are 
what are referred to as “contract”. 
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Contract allows for a more determinate concept of personality through the 
introduction of “absolute difference between independent property-owners”.326  
What this means is “that each, in accordance with the common will of both, 
ceases to be an owner and yet remains and becomes one.”327  To grasp this, we 
need to refer back to the concepts of identity and difference discussed in the 
section on “essence” in the Logic (see chapter 5 above).  As we have seen, the 
problem with the concept of personality is that it is too indeterminate: the 
person in its very determination cannot be distinguished from another person.  
The introduction of the concept of property fails to solve this problem, since its 
essential element is still the arbitrary will of the person and so is still the concept 
of what is determined by the indeterminate will.  With the concept of contract, 
the unity of the persons into a “common will” is granted, so that the persons are 
in this sense indeterminate and are not distinct from each other, but it is 
precisely this common will that “posits” their difference: that is to say, the form 
that contract takes dictates the way that individuals are determined.  This should 
bring to mind Hegel’s logic of identity: the identity of the person with itself (and 
with any person), results in the positing of an internal difference.  In other words, 
I, an individual will, gain my determinate identity from the identity of the 
common will, that posits such a determinate identity. 
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We should also note the parallels between this and the discussion of the will in 
the previous section above.  Just as the arbitrary will demanded, for dialectical 
reasons (because the arbitrary will was contradictory, since it was both 
determinate and indeterminate), that a principle external to it be posited, so the 
arbitrary possession of property demands (because it is still both determinate 
and indeterminate) an appeal to an external principle.  This is what the 
differentiation of the common will through contract amounts to: a difference is 
posited since the common will is contradictory, since it is sheer self-identity, and 
thus both determinate and indeterminate (that is to say, it is determined as 
identity, but this sheer self-identity is empty and so is indeterminate).328 
 
Though this description of contract is very abstract, we can see how this fits with 
a more concrete conception of what “contract” means.  With the concept of the 
person, the person was the immediate bearer of rights, so that, in order to 
respect rights, as we saw, we must respect others as persons.  Then we saw that 
in order to have a determinate conception of what a person is, we had to 
conceive the person as the owner of property.  However, this conception of the 
person is too indeterminate, since the possession of property is based on the 
subjective decision of a still indeterminate person.  The answer to this problem 
arises with contract, according to which we respect others as persons according 
to what we have agreed constitutes the person’s rights.  We now have a less 
abstract concept of what it is to respect another: by contractual agreement we 
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arrive at the point where we know concretely what it means to infringe the 
rights of another, since I now know what things I may use and otherwise interact 
with without obstructing the rights of others.  This moment of positing that 
contract introduces allows us to conceive of a system according to which we 
respect the rights of others according to a set of explicit rules that have been 
posited by us. 
 
Thus: “In contract right in itself is present as something posited, while its inner 
universality is there as something common in the arbitrariness and particular will 
of the parties.”329  This is in line with what we have seen above, and what we 
know about Hegel’s dialectical method.  What Hegel is saying is that the very 
arbitrariness of the person is what gives rise to the demand for an external set of 
rules for determining the person, and so what is posited is posited as something 
that applies to the “arbitrariness” of the person (we do not abandon this 
arbitrariness and replace the arbitrary person with some sort of higher rational 
being: the “higher rationality”, if we want to call it that, belongs to the still 
arbitrary and indeterminate person, since this arbitrariness remains an important 
part of what the person is: the point of contract is that it negotiates the very 
arbitrariness and immediacy of the person, and so this arbitrariness and 
immediacy remains as an essential part of what it is to be a person.). 
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Contract thus gives a sort of external necessity to the determination of the 
person through his possession of property, an external necessity that is posited 
by the “common will”, or by the mutual recognition of persons.  The next 
concept to arise is the concept of “wrong”.  Wrong first arises when the rights of 
one person “clash” with those of another.330  Hegel divides the different sorts of 
wrong that he identifies into three types.  First of all comes “non-malicious 
wrong”.  Non-malicious wrong is relatively unproblematic: since there is a 
“common ground”331 (as we saw that there must be where there is contract) that 
both parties recognise, it is simply a matter of separating particular, and so 
arbitrary, demands from those that are made by the common, mutually 
recognised right.  With non-malicious wrong, we are effectively still in the realm 
of contract, since these “clashes” arise from misunderstandings of the 
recognised authority of the law, rather than wilful rejection of the law. 
 
However, the possibility of misunderstanding of the law points to a larger 
problem, which is parallel to the problem of the external principles of abstract 
moral right discussed in the previous section.  What it points to is the fact that, 
although the positing of rules by the common will in the form of contract gives 
necessity to the determination of the person, which particular rules are posited 
is nevertheless, ultimately, arbitrary.  Remember, it is the positing of rules that 
lends necessity to the determination of the person through property, not the 
rules themselves (as we saw, the rules themselves arise arbitrarily, but they are 
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then affirmed and “retroactively” determined as necessary).  Thus the individual 
person can fail to see what is right at first, until what has been agreed in 
common has been explained to her.  Once again, then, we have a split in the will: 
on the one hand we have the particular, indeterminate conviction of the will, 
while on the other we have the posited right that in fact gives the person 
determination.  It is this split that allows for the possibility of wrong. 
 
Non-malicious wrong becomes the second type of wrong, “fraud”, when the 
ultimate lack of necessity of what is posited is taken to reduce right to something 
“merely subjective, and so inessential”.332  Just as the common will can arbitrarily 
decide on who owns a piece of property, so can the fraudulent will.  As an 
“Addition” to the Philosophy of Right has it: “In the case of civil and non-
malicious wrong no punishment is imposed, because in such cases the 
wrongdoer has willed nothing in opposition to right.  In the case of fraud, on the 
other hand, punishments come in, because here it is a matter of the 
infringement of right.”333  In other words, with non-malicious wrong the problem 
is that the indeterminacy of the person’s individual will reigns until right, that 
truly determines the person, is pointed out; with fraud, on the other hand, the 
person takes himself to be determined by his own will in opposition to the 
common will.  Thus right is infringed, since the fraudulent will opposes itself to 
right334, rather than simply being indeterminate through its neglect of right. 
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“Coercion” and “crime”, which together constitute the third type of wrong, 
reflect the problem of the possibility of wrong in a different way.  Again, the 
problem is the split in the person, so that the ultimate lack of necessity of 
contract can be seen.  Coercion involves the subjection of a thing (whether an 
object or the body of a person – though, Hegel notes, never the free will of a 
person335) to an arbitrary will (and again by “arbitrary” I mean the determinate 
and yet indeterminate will of the person not yet determined by contract).  Just as 
with fraud, coercion can only be possible given the split in the person we have 
identified: the person can fail to see (or wilfully ignore) the essentiality of the 
contract, and so can act on the basis of his indeterminate will.  Of course, such an 
act is contradictory for Hegel, since it is to act according to a will that is both 
determinate (it makes a choice) and indeterminate (since the person can not be 
properly said to be determinate without contract, for the reasons given above).  
Thus Hegel writes: 
 
Since it is only insofar as the will has an existence in something determinate that it is Idea or 
actually free, and since the existent in which it has laid itself is freedom in being, it follows that 
force or coercion is in its concept self-destructive because it is an expression of a will which 
annuls the expression or determinate existence of a will.
336
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In other words, coercion effectively reduces all determination to the pre-contract 
level of indeterminacy, since it destroys the binding principles of contract by an 
arbitrary act of will.  However, we should note that it is not enough, for Hegel, to 
say that this means we should simply (at least at this stage) defend contract and 
reject coercion for the wrong it is, since the very possibility of wrong points to 
the problem that we have identified with contract (that it can be taken to be 
ultimately arbitrary).  “Abstract right” we are told “is a right to coerce”337: we 
must remember what we have learned above, namely, that the arrival at the 
concept of contract does not mean that we are now talking about rational beings 
elevated above their initial, arbitrary selves, but instead should note that 
contract arises dialectically, so that the abstract person is not eliminated from 
consideration, but is precisely what remains and is negotiated with in contract.  
In other words, since abstract right remains, so does the arbitrariness of the 
person, and thus so will an element of coercion.  Coercion is only wrong, we are 
told, “taken abstractly”338, that is, in abstraction from the contractual relations 
that negotiate abstract right and personality and so provide the principles 
according to which property may be physically taken, kept or used by the 
subjective will. 
 
When coercion is concretely wrong, it is called “crime”.  Crime is, for Hegel, “an 
exercise of force which infringes the existence of freedom in its concrete sense, 
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infringes right as right”.339  In other words, crime is coercion that is not mediated 
by the posited contractual rules that have arisen as a result of the mutual 
recognition of persons.  Stephen Houlgate reminds us that “crime… is based on 
an illusion – the illusion that my own freedom can be abstracted as I please from 
the intrinsically universal freedom of personhood.”340  From what we have seen 
so far in this section, we can see that crime can be said to be based upon an 
illusion: without the posited universal law of contract, we have seen, the person 
cannot have a determinate identity, and yet the criminal asserts his will against 
the law in spite of this.  The very idea, then, that the criminal serves his own ends 
is, for Hegel, an illusion.  At the very best, the criminal serves a very 
indeterminate notion of “person”, a notion that cannot be said properly to 
belong to him due to its indeterminacy.  Houlgate continues: “In so far as I 
succumb to this illusion and do so abstract from the universal character of 
freedom I cause the universal character of freedom as right (which must be 
respected) to be reasserted against me in the form of just punishment.  By not 
allowing my criminal violation of the rights of others to stand, and by thus 
‘negating’ my crime, punishment reestablishes the authority and validity of rights 
as the rights of all persons that have to be respected by all persons.”341  Through 
punishment then, the criminal is able to find his true self despite the illusion he is 
under: through punishment the criminal is once again determined by the law.  
Houlgate further suggests that “what is interesting about crime and punishment 
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in Hegel’s account is that, by abstracting themselves from the universal 
dimension of their own freedom as persons, criminals turn that universal 
dimension of their own freedom against themselves, that is, turn it into an 
abstract, external power or ‘essence’ that negates their purely personal freedom 
in the name of the universality of right.”342  We might add to this what we have 
seen above: that crime arose precisely because this possibility of turning 
universal right against the abstract person showed itself in the very logic of 
contract, since contract arises from positing, which is ultimately dependent upon 
the will of persons (so, just as we are free to posit contract, we are also free to 
break the rules we have set for ourselves).  This is what I referred to above as the 
“split” in the person, a split that arises between the indeterminate and 
determinate person due to the fact that the person can always (so to speak) 
reassert himself in the knowledge that he is the creator of law. 
 
We are now approaching the end of the discussion of “Abstract Right” in the 
Philosophy of Right.  I have tried in this section to bring out similarities between 
the development of the logic of abstract right and the logic of the will discussed 
in the previous section.  Just as the abstract moral will posited necessity, so the 
person posits necessity with contract.343  The discussion of wrong (including 
fraud, coercion and crime) is the discussion of the failure of this positing alone to 
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give us necessity.  We will see that the move Hegel makes next should be familiar 
to us, if we are familiar with the logic of the will’s development discussed in the 
previous section. 
 
Hegel’s next move is, of course, to formulate universal and necessary right in 
such a way that it can be said to be absolutely right.  In order to grasp this step, 
we have to grasp how the fact that the criminal causes universal right to be 
brought against him leads to the claim that the criminal deserves and needs to be 
punished.  As we saw, the criminal arises as a logical result of the split in the 
person, of the fact that the law of contract posited by the common will can be 
seen to be ultimately arbitrary.  There is a genuine problem with the attempt to 
explain law as necessitated by common will, since the choice of the common will 
is ultimately arbitrary.  Nevertheless, this arbitrary common will must punish the 
criminal for the reasons discussed above (that is, because the law must be shown 
to be universal if it is to be coherent), whether it is truly necessary or not.  To the 
unrepentant criminal, this presumably gives the law a tyrannical and spiritless 
aspect, since it punishes due to the brute fact that it exists in the way it does, 
rather than because it is justified by a real necessity.  Nevertheless, even without 
such justification, the law in fact is able to assert its own necessity through the 
fact that its punishment demonstrates its universality.  In this way, the law 
becomes “actual” and the will learns to be lawful “for itself”.344  Though initially 
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only posited, the law thus demonstrates its necessity through its effective 
elimination of opposition to it (and through its potential elimination of even 
those criminals it does not catch).  Just as in the previous section we saw that the 
principles of the abstract moral will were shown to be necessary once they were 
willed by the free will, so the posited laws are necessary once the individual will 
recognises the effective necessity of the will as it exists. 
 
Once again, this may seem to be a strange argument that dodges the question 
that we are raising: that is, “Why these laws and not others?”  And once again, in 
a sense this is precisely what Hegel intends to do: he is showing that this 
question is the wrong question, and is pointing to a form of necessity that exists 
in society neglected by this faulty line of questioning.  This is the necessity which 
we invoke when we say “I can do no other”.  The law may be contingent in its 
origins, but as members of society we can construct no logical way to describe 
the law, other than in terms of necessity.  If we really believed the law to be 
contingent, then law would cease to exist, and so would society as we know it.  
Such destruction of society simply lies outside of the bounds of “actual 
possibility” for us, and so it is necessary that we recognise the necessity of the 
law.345 
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We might explain this Hegelian logic in a different way.  We have already seen 
where the positing of the law comes from: it comes from the logical necessity – 
the internal demand – for an external solution to the contradiction of the 
determinacy and indeterminacy of the abstract person.  The lack of necessity can 
be pointed out, since the specific form of law that is posited (the specific 
character of the law that this particular group of people has come up with) is one 
among many that could have been posited.  However, the fact that the common 
will could have resolved differently does not in fact mean that the individual can 
cause the common will to will differently.346  The law is necessary due to the fact 
that it is the only law we have.  The choice available to the individual will is thus 
to obey the law or not to obey it: to behave in accordance with right or to 
behave wrongly.  Since behaving wrongly leads to indeterminacy, so that the 
wrong-doer cannot even properly be said to be helping himself, the individual 
must necessarily act in accordance with right. 
 
The will that recognises the truth of this is what Hegel calls the “moral will”.  
Houlgate describes the moral will as “the will that acknowledges and internalises 
the explicit difference between individual arbitrariness and universal individual 
freedom and right”.347  The moral will “internalises” what it sees as the only way 
                                                          
346
 Note: of course, some of the greatest criminals, e.g. Napoleon, acted on the knowledge that 
they could in fact change the common will.  But for this reason they could never be happy – see 
e.g. Philosophy of History pp. 26-7: “The History of the World is not the theatre of happiness.  
Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony – periods when the 
antithesis is in abeyance.”  In other words, in order to be happy one must be content and not 
oppose the common will in such a way that historical changes occur.  
347
 Houlgate 1995 p.872 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 280 of 365 
 
to be free (or, to stick to the language we have been using so far, to be 
“determinate”).   
 
So we have seen in this section that the positing of law gains necessity 
“retroactively” (to use the Deleuzian/Žižekian term348).  The necessity means 
that, in practice, the moral person has a stark choice between being moral or 
not, and does not in fact have the opportunity to create his own values (to draw 
on the infinite range of possible options that are abstractly available to him).  
Thus we are concretely presented with an unalterable and necessary set of moral 
rules.  Just as we saw with the material discussed in the previous section, this 
move describes something seemingly undeniable about the necessity we in fact 
claim for our actions in everyday life.  If the process of granting necessity by 
concealment of possibility seems unsatisfactory, we will soon see that it is the 
very unsatisfactory nature of this move that points to the truth of it.  We will see 
below that Hegel is effectively claiming that if we think about the meaning of 
“absolute knowing” incorrectly, then we will remain unsatisfied. 
 
In section 1 we saw that, for Hegel, we must not begin our examination of the 
political with principles that we take to be absolute, but must arrive immanently 
at the reasons for the positing of such principles.  The use of the term “positing” 
fits with what we saw in chapters 4 and 5 above: positing is, for Hegel, an appeal 
to something external, but the latter arises due to the immediate character of 
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that which posits.  In the case of contract, this arises as something that must 
mediate the will externally, even though it arises due to the intrinsic 
requirements of the (arbitrary) person.  (In the case of the abstract moral will, as 
we saw in section 1, principles determine the will externally, but these principles 
arise due to the intrinsic requirements of the arbitrary will.)  Also discussed in 
this section was the concept of “self-concealment” of the origin of principles, 
which was used to describe the way in which the move from abstract moral will 
to free will, or contract to the necessity of contract (morality), involves a 
necessary sublation of the possibility of choosing different principles or laws.  We 
say that this possibility is “sublated”, rather than merely “cancelled out”, since 
abstraction, or possibility, remains an essential part of the systematic picture 
that Hegel gives us of the political subject.  As we saw in section 1, we are 
impulsive creatures as well as moral, law-following creatures and this (as we will 
see below) determines the sort of law-following creatures that we are.  By the 
end of this chapter, we will see that the Hegelian concept of “absolute knowing” 
is important for this reason: we must know ourselves in a certain way if we are to 
know ourselves while taking into account the necessary concealment of our 
impulsive and arbitrary natures. 
 
  
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 282 of 365 
 
3: Morality 
 
With the “person” of abstract right, we were dealing with what we might call a 
“one-dimensional” creature.  As we saw, the person is the abstract will put into a 
social setting.  The person either gets its way, or is hindered from doing so by an 
external “principle”.  At the end of the section of abstract right, where the 
principle is internalised (since, as we saw, it is recognised as necessary as a result 
of the universality of the law) we move from consideration of the person of 
abstract right to the moral will, which is, we might say, “two-dimensional”, since 
it retains the character of the person, by opposing itself to “principles”, and yet 
has made these principles internal to it: the moral will thus recognises itself to be 
both impulsive and law-following.  The moral will always has these two sides, so 
that it is defined by this relation to itself, by this relation of its principles to its 
person.  We might bring out the contrast between abstract right and morality by 
comparing this with the contrast between being and essence in the Logic: while 
abstract right was governed by the necessity of making the simple being of the 
person determinate (just as in the logic of being was governed by the necessity 
of finding a determinate concept of simple being), morality is governed by our 
thinking about the very movement that arises from the determination of the 
person in this way (just as essence was governed by our thinking about the 
movement according to which indeterminate being was rendered determinate 
by what was external to it). 
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It is for this reason that Hegel tells us that, with morality, “a higher ground has 
been determined for freedom”.349  Freedom is no longer sought merely in the 
being of the determinate person, but in the very movement that allows such 
determination of the person to exist.  To refer to the Logic again, we are thus 
talking about morality as the realm where principles are seen as what is essential 
to the determination of personality (the latter being, on its own, indeterminate 
and contradictory). 
 
With morality we move from examination of the mere “person”, to the 
examination of the “subject”.  “Subjectivity” is the name Hegel gives to the 
movement through which the person can be determinate.  The subject and the 
person are opposed, so that the subject “demands” certain things of the 
person.350  The person is the “object”, so that the formal principles of the subject 
are realised when they are objectively realised, when the person acts in 
conformity with them.351 
 
However, we have a problem here which should be familiar from our discussion 
of essence in previous chapters.  If a person is only determinate due to moral 
principles, what can we say that there is about the person that guarantees that it 
will in fact conform with such a principle?  In other words, we have split the will 
into the determining side of the subject, on the one hand, and the determined 
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side of the person, on the other, so that the person has no concrete character 
taken on its own.  The person, as what we might call the “raw material” of the 
determining principle, can thus be of a character such that it is incapable of 
meeting the demands of the moral subject.352 
 
So, by expressing this problem I am re-stating the position that the person was 
shown to be in at the end of the discussion of abstract right: without external 
determination, the person is contradictory and indeterminate.  Subjectivity (so, 
the moral will) is now “the will’s ground of existence”353, and so the person can 
only be said to be in any determinate way if it is in conformity with the moral 
will, though there is nothing about the person that guarantees such conformity.  
We can put this in the terms of “domination” that correspond to relations of 
essence: a strong moral will is required that can control the person, since the 
person, as indeterminate, cannot bring itself to act freely but must be forced to 
be free. 
 
When the moral will, or the subject, dominates the person in such a way that its 
moral “purpose”354 is achieved, the result is “action”.  Action, as Hegel defines it, 
must have “an essential relation to the will of others”.355  We cannot have action, 
Hegel tells us, until we have moral will.  This might at first seem strange, since 
what is contract if not a relation to others demanded by social rules?  However, 
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contract was “grounded in arbitrariness”356: as we saw, contract arose from the 
demand that the person have property, but the details of what is seized by a 
person and how much were arbitrary, until the posited law of contract was 
posited as necessary, at which point we arrive at the moral will.  It is only with 
moral will, then, that the necessity of contract can be recognised, and contract 
can be seen as an essential relation to the will of others, and not an arbitrary 
one. 
 
The story we have so far of morality, then, allows us to fill out, as it were, our 
story of the way that contract works.  Prior to morality, contract had a certain 
“content”, which might appear arbitrary to the individual person, and thus, as we 
saw, wrong might arise (either through ignorance of the law, or through fraud 
and crime, which actively oppose it).  Prior to morality, contract established 
certain rights, but the individual had no right to question the authority of the 
law, since the law was what ultimately established what right was.  With 
morality, now that the law has been shown to be necessary, we can talk of the 
“right of action” according to which “the content of the action, as carried out in 
immediate existence, shall be entirely mine, that thus the action shall be the 
purpose of the subjective will.”357  If I am acting morally, then the action I take in 
accordance with contract is recognised by me as necessary, so that my relation 
to others, mediated by contract, is seen as essential by me.  Thus my own 
purposes, in accordance with the law, are met by the act of obeying the law. 
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We have seen, then, that the Hegelian story runs as follows: persons each have 
their own aims and intentions, and these aims and intentions must be mediated 
by contract if the persons are to have a determinate existence.  Contract is 
required so that determinate persons can have their desires realised.  Once the 
necessity of contract is recognised, I develop a moral inclination, a desire to act 
in such a way that the laws are obeyed.  Since I act in such a way in order that 
the needs and desires of determinate persons can be met, the purpose of the 
moral will is the “welfare” or “happiness” of myself and others.358 
 
However, welfare turns out not to be enough, since it can, in certain 
circumstances, conflict with abstract right.  If one’s life is in danger, then one has 
a “right of distress”, according to which property rights can be ignored in order 
to protect life.359  Hegel stresses that this is “a right, not a mercy”360, which 
means that we have a contradiction: consideration of welfare brings into play 
new rights that can contradict the old ones.  Right and welfare, which were both 
supposed to be necessary (since right must be universal, and the welfare of all is 
what logically emerged from the concept of right), thus turn out to be 
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contingent.361  Again we have a contradiction, since right and welfare are both 
necessary and contingent. 
 
From this contradictory state of affairs arises the “good”, which is “freedom 
realised, the absolute end and aim of the world”.362  It is the unity of right and 
welfare: not only does the will that wills the good will according to the interests 
of others, but also wills in accordance with right.363  However, this does not 
mean that we think each (right and welfare) in abstraction from each other, and 
then put these abstract concepts together, since we have seen that this cannot 
work (since abstract right and welfare can conflict when life is threatened).364  
The good, then, is something that stands above abstract right and welfare and 
mediates their relation to each other.  We might put it as follows: since it turns 
out that right and welfare are contingent they are indeterminate; we need to 
appeal to something other than right and welfare in order to determine the 
necessary rules according to which right and welfare are dealt with.  Without 
something to mediate right and welfare, we can find no necessary rules for their 
application, that is, we can never be sure that we withhold right or welfare justly 
in those circumstances where a conflict emerges.  The good is the principle, 
external to right and welfare, which arbitrates the application (again, not just 
enforcement and provision) of right and welfare.  The good will does its duty, we 
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are told, when it acts in accordance with right and promotes welfare; however, 
the good will must do more than this since it must perform its task of mediation 
of right and welfare, and the search for a principle according to which this 
mediation can be carried out leads to the question: “what is my duty?”365 
 
For Hegel, to do one’s duty is precisely to mediate right and welfare in 
accordance with the good, and we can say very little more than this, for Hegel.  
“All that is left to duty… is abstract universality, and for its determinate character 
it has identity without content, or the abstractly positive, the indeterminate.”366  
The good must determine right and welfare by providing necessary principles 
according to which they are determined, thus saving right and welfare from the 
indeterminacy and contradiction in which they were sunk.  In this way we have, 
with the good, once again a moment of positing an external rule in response to 
the immediate demands of the prior concepts, in this case right and welfare.  The 
problem is, once again, that although the good can provide a principle according 
to which right and welfare can be mediated, the good itself is indeterminate and 
so arbitrary. 
 
All that the good will amounts to, for Hegel, “is the subject’s absolute inward 
certainty of himself, that which posits the particular and is the determining and 
decisive element in him, his conscience.”367  It might be helpful to compare Hegel 
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and Kant on this point: Kant’s categorical imperative, on a Hegelian reading, does 
no more than provide such certainty for the moral agent.  It does not, for Hegel, 
in fact provide a coherent and determinate notion of the good.  The categorical 
imperative is, for Hegel, an “empty formalism”368, since it only provides an 
“absence of contradiction” in the rule which, if the principle of non-contradiction 
is central to your logic, will give the moral agent the sense of certainty.  For 
Hegel, then, Kant’s moral philosophy cannot demonstrate to us the nature of the 
good (since the concept of the good must ultimately be “indeterminate” and 
“abstractly positive” when taken on its own – that is, when taken as the highest 
principle), but can provide a model for developing a sense of moral certainty. 
 
This sense of moral certainty – “conscience” – is the “formal side” of the good 
will; the good itself would be the content of the good will.369  Both conscience 
and good will are indeterminate, so that, as long as my conscience can posit 
something as non-contradictory, the moral will can justify just about anything.  
The will can take up what is good, or can simply act in accordance with its own 
particularity: since it has no principle for telling one from the other (since both 
are indeterminate), reliance on conscience can thus result in “evil”.370 
 
We end up at a point, then, where the will recognises its own activity as self-
motivated and self-justified, in such a way that it can either take up what is good 
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as its principle, or else take up its “own particularity” or “self-will” as its principle, 
and so the moral will is capable of evil.  Just as we saw that the capacity of the 
will of abstract right to do wrong pointed to a contradiction in the concept of 
abstract right, so the capacity of the moral will to do evil points to a 
contradiction in the concept of will.  Once again, the moral will turns out to be 
indeterminate in its very determination: though the moral will is defined as the 
will that acts in accordance with principles, it can take these principles from 
where it chooses and so lacks determinacy. 
 
Once again, then, we are in a familiar position.  The moral will finds its 
determination in the posited principles according to which it acts, but the 
necessity of these principles themselves, by being essentially in question, leaves 
the moral will indeterminate.  Once again, the posited principles have to be 
posited as necessary, which is done by recognising the lack of choice that the 
moral will has.  The moral will cannot in fact determine the externally posited 
principles, but must either accept these principles or be evil. 
 
The moral will must thus recognise that it finds its determinacy necessarily in the 
good that is posited.  Thus to define “subjective will” as something separated 
from the good is to give an indeterminate definition: the determinate subjective 
(moral) will is the good will, where the good is posited (we might say “pre-
posited” or “presupposed” – see chapter 4 above) as external to the moral will 
and not created by it, but only “determined” by it, in the sense that it is actively 
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taken up by the moral will (again, see chapter 4 above: this is the logic of 
“determining reflection”). 
 
Morality thus becomes ethical life, when the moral will recognises that the 
determinate “good” that it requires in order to be determinate itself cannot be 
found in or created by the activity of the moral will, but must come from the 
outside, must be found by the moral will in the ethical life in which it finds itself. 
 
In sections 1 and 2 we learned that the systematic treatment of political 
concepts by Hegel allows us to see that we are impulsive creatures, as well as the 
sort of creatures that follow laws (as we saw in chapter 6, we only think freely, 
for Hegel, when we think systematically in this way and allow ourselves to see 
many sides of a situation, that is, to recognise various steps in the development 
of the Concept).371  This truth becomes explicit to the moral will, as we have seen 
in this section.  We have seen that when these two sides (the impulsive and the 
law-following) are taken in relation to each other as belonging to a unified whole 
we have the political “subject” proper (though subjectivity and objectivity were 
discussed prior to discussion of the moral will we do not, for Hegel, have a full 
picture of the political subject until we have a picture of the moral will).  We have 
seen that with this subject we have something essential, that takes up the form 
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of domination that characterises essence (the impulsive and arbitrary side of the 
will is governed by moral principles).  We have also seen that the moral will is the 
form of the will that desires to act in accordance with the law, so that its laws 
belong to it (the laws are “mine” for the moral will).  Moral action, we saw, 
consists in the mediation of right and welfare (human happiness – welfare – thus 
comes into the picture so that we are not only concerned with what people have 
a right to, but also how they can be happy), and to do one’s duty is to act in such 
a way that this mediation can occur in accordance with what is good.  However, 
this consideration of what is good turns out to be arbitrary, unless our certainty 
of what is good is made necessary by what is external.  In the next section we will 
examine the ethical life, external to the moral will, that makes good action 
necessary. 
 
4: Ethical life 
 
“The concrete identity of the good with the subjective will, and identity which is 
therefore the truth of them, is ethical life”.372  In ethical life the “the ethical 
substance and its laws and powers are, on the one hand, an object over against 
the subject, and from the latter’s point of view they are – ‘are’ in the highest 
sense of self-subsistent being… On the other hand, they are not something alien 
to the subject.  On the contrary, his spirit bears witness to them as to its own 
essence, the essence in which he has a feeling of his selfhood, and in which he 
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lives as in his own element which is not distinguished from himself.”373  This is 
because the good found in ethical life has been posited as necessary by the 
moral will, so that ethical life is not merely external, but is something willed by 
the moral (now “ethical”) will, as that which makes the will determinate.374 
 
Ethical life brings with it “duties”, since the recognition by the will that it must be 
determined by ethical life means that it must obey the rules of ethical life, the 
objective rules of society, that exist externally to our subjective inclinations.375  
Now, Hegel tells us the following about “duty”: 
 
The bond of duty can appear as a restriction only on indeterminate subjectivity or abstract 
freedom, and on the impulses of the natural will or of the moral will which determines its 
indeterminate good arbitrarily.  The truth is, however, that in duty the individual finds his 
liberation; first, liberation from dependence on mere natural impulse and from the depression 
which as a particular subject he cannot escape in his moral reflections on what ought to be and 
what might be; secondly, liberation from the indeterminate subjectivity which, never reaching 
reality or the objective determinacy of action, remains self-enclosed and devoid of actuality.  In 
duty the individual liberates himself so as to acquire his substantial freedom.
376
 
 
I have considered it worthwhile to quote this passage in full since here we find a 
clear justification of the reading I have offered so far of the Philosophy of Right as 
developing in accordance with the concept of freedom as determination.  That is, 
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the individual is free in doing her duty because it is in this way that she escapes 
the indeterminacy of one who merely follows her impulses or subjective aims: 
the one who does her duty is free because she is determinate, because the 
ethical good allows the will to escape the indeterminacy of the will that follows 
arbitrarily decided principles. 
 
By acting in accordance with ethical rules, the ethical individual follows 
“custom”.  Such custom is a “second nature” for the ethical individual: what 
Hegel is pointing out is the fact that the ethical individual does not need to 
create principles like the moral will does, but merely follows the rules that are 
available to it.377  Of course there is nothing preventing the will from calling 
custom into question, but when it does it acts morally rather than ethically.  
Now, this does not mean that the ethical will (insofar as it remains ethical and 
does not revert back to morality) blindly follows rules.  We must remember at 
what point the ethical arose: it arose when the moral will looked for a principle 
that could determine the good that mediates right and welfare.  Thus the ethical 
will can only exist where ethical rules exist in society that so in fact mediate right 
and welfare for the sake of the good.  Of course, the will is also capable of 
obeying laws that do not meet these criteria, but insofar as it does this, the will is 
not ethical.  Such a will would be “evil”, since it follows a principle that negates 
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right and welfare (decides when right and welfare must be limited) according to 
a principle that exists for its own sake and not for the sake of the good.378 
 
The ethical individual should not, then, be viewed as a mindless creature that 
obeys orders, but as someone who recognises the good to be found in the 
ethical institutions and practices of his day.  “For, when his character is ethical”, 
Hegel tells us “he recognises as the end which moves him to act the universal 
which is itself unmoved but is disclosed in its specific determinations as rationally 
actualised.”379  The ethical will looks to the universal just as the moral will does, 
but recognises the universal in the institutions and practices of her day, rather 
than trying to capture the universal in a principle as the moral will does. 
 
In ethical life, as we have seen, the will need not create principles for itself but 
can find them instead.  The ethical will does not seek certainty through rigorous 
application of principles in the way that the moral will does, but recognises good 
in existing institutions and practices.  One way that the will can find such 
principles is in the “family” through “love”.380  Love shows us how to act through 
feeling, and the will is able to recognise its actions in the family as good by 
allowing itself to be guided by this feeling.  This feeling is described in an 
Addition as a sort of “consciousness”: it is “the consciousness of my unity with 
another, so that I am not in isolation by myself but win my self-consciousness 
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only through the renunciation of my independence”.381  So, through feeling we 
are reminded that, independently of the duties brought upon us by fellow 
human beings we are indeterminate and so unfree. 
 
Of course, we are not bound to all of our fellow human beings by love.  “Civil 
society” denotes another form of ethical society based not on love but on self-
interest and recognition that my self-interest is bound up with the interests of 
others.  Of course, the moral will has already recognised this, which was, we 
recall, where the concept of “welfare” came from.  However, civil society 
describes the determination of such interests not by a subjective principle, but 
by an objective set of rules embodied in ethical life.  As objective and ethical, 
such rules will have been found by the moral will as already existing, just as all of 
ethical life is, and these rules take the form of necessity due to the will’s 
acceptance of the necessity of being governed by ethical life for the sake of its 
own determination.  Within civil society we find the “system of needs”, which is 
where we first arrive at the concept of the “human being” proper.382  Until now 
we have dealt with abstract aspects of the human being – her personality, her 
subjectivity – but the human being is, unlike these aspects, concrete and 
objective.  By saying that the human being is concrete we should note that Hegel 
does not mean that she is the sum total of all the abstract aspects of the will that 
we have seen so far (though she is all of these), but that the human is properly 
objective, in the sense that the humanity of the person or the subject is 
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something external to personality and subjectivity, and which subjectivity can 
only reach by making the move described at the end of the section on morality: 
by recognising what is external (and “found”) as the principle that determines it.  
As concrete, the human being will have concrete needs that are not determined 
by the abstract character of the person (by right) or by the subject (by morality), 
but which are wholly external to these aspects. 
 
In order to clarify what Hegel is getting at with the concept of the human being 
we might put it as follows.  We could perhaps describe this “finding” as 
something stupid about our logical development383: we abandon our own 
principles and accept something contingent and ready made, the “human being” 
with its concrete needs, and so something made not according to rational 
principles, but accepted on the basis of such principles.  In other words, what we 
have learned from the logical development of the Philosophy of Right is that pure 
rationality leads to rationality being determined by what is concrete and 
contingent, though made necessary by an act of will.384 
 
With civil society we see a sort of repetition of what has gone in previous 
sections, only now we are not dealing just with the abstract concepts of right and 
welfare, but are talking about what is concrete (that is, this “real” element that is 
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Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 298 of 365 
 
determined, in the way that I have described, by what is abstract385).  As we have 
seen, these abstract concepts give way to what is concrete, so that their limits 
can be determined and the will can be determinate.  In order to satisfy need 
work must be done, but this work will be determined by “the nature of the 
material worked on” as well as “the arbitrary will of others”.386 
 
But how, we might ask, is this determination by material and by arbitrary will 
conducive to the good?  We must remember that the will is determinate insofar 
as its actions are governed by a principle that can mediate right and welfare in 
accordance with the good (and so not arbitrarily, which would lead to “evil” – 
see previous section).  For it to be the case that our being governed by such 
contingent circumstances is good, the conditions of work must be regulated by 
“the administration of justice”, which provides the principles according to which 
right and welfare can be mediated in accordance with the good.387  Now, the 
administration of justice cannot simply bypass the contingency and arbitrary 
nature of needs and work: justice must be administered in accordance with the 
concrete demands that reality makes.  “In civil society”, Hegel writes, “property 
rests on contract and on the formalities which make ownership capable of proof 
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and valid in law.”388  It is only with the introduction of such contingent 
formalities that we move from contract considered as abstract right to 
contractual law proper. 
 
With this concrete conception of law comes the concept of “danger”.389  With 
abstract right the requirement for law (for “contract”) was absolute, since with 
the concept of the person was abstract and simply demanded that each 
individual “be a person and respect others as persons”, alongside the recognition 
that a person is defined by the fact that she owns property.  Of course, in a 
sense, given what we know about the meaning of “dialectic” for Hegel (see 
discussion above of Hegel’s systematic approach), concrete law also has this 
absolute character, since we can take it abstractly if we wish.  But in addition to 
this abstract, absolute character, law now protects the concrete social (and 
economic) situation in which we find ourselves.  Thus crime is not just an 
absolute breach of right, but creates a danger for the stability of the concrete 
conditions of society.  Now that the law has this concrete character, is embodied 
by its task of protecting the concrete social (and economic) situation, it exhibits 
more “leniency” than before: the level of punishment will be related to how 
strong the society feels itself to be and how dangerous the crime is.390  It is 
precisely this pragmatic character of ethical life which differs from the abstract 
and moral notions of right: since the realisation of the abstract and the moral is 
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found in the concrete, the law cannot cling to the abstract and absolute 
conceptions of right but must make decisions based on how right realises itself in 
concrete ethical conditions.   
 
Thus, “by taking the form of law, right steps into existence”.391  However, there is 
a problem with this, namely: who decides what the nature and strength of the 
concrete social situation is?  With concrete law (and ethical life in general) we 
have entered the realm of contingency, and one contingent factor is the 
perspective of the individual in that society, determined by (among other things) 
their social and economic standing.  In other words, the concrete and contingent 
reality of right is necessarily embodied in self-interested individuals.  Necessity is 
found within contingency through the “court of law”, which serves to eliminate 
“the subjective feeling of particular interest” from consideration when passing 
judgements.392  This is done by appealing to the demonstrability of the right in 
question: the right is only recognised if it can be proved to the satisfaction of the 
court, which has its own procedures for deciding whether or not a right has been 
sufficiently demonstrated.393  Of course, there is a certain element of 
contingency involved here, and we are told in an Addition: “A person may be 
indignant if a right he knows he has is refused him because he cannot prove it.  
But if I have a right, it must at the same time be a posited right.  I must be able to 
explain and prove it, and its validity can only be recognised in society if its 
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rightness in itself is also posited.”394  So the contingent element is the fact that, 
for example, there might happen to be insufficient evidence available to prove a 
right; on the other hand, such contingency is necessary, since (as we saw in the 
previous section) the will must be determined by what is concrete.  We cannot 
rely on what is simply in our hearts, but must be able to explain our rights in such 
terms that fellow members of society can agree, and in this way we can say that 
our rights are posited (and, by our recognition of this, posited as posited) and are 
thus determinate. 
 
The court of law, then, determines what is right, and judges individual cases 
concerning right where right is disputed.  As such, it forms an essential part of 
ethical life, where, as we have seen, ethical life involves the concrete realisation 
of right.  With the court of law, then, we have a good example of the way in 
which the institutions of ethical life actualise right.  We see that, for Hegel, there 
is a huge difference between the pure concept of justice that the moral will 
might have, and actual justice as realised in ethical life.  For Hegel, this 
distinction is necessary, since the pure justice of the moral will has been shown 
to be problematic. 
 
We should note here that Hegel is not saying that we should settle for something 
that falls short of true justice.  Ethical institutions will always run the risk of 
letting people down, but they can be improved.  What Hegel is arguing is that, 
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given the logic of freedom, the moral sense of justice and the justice of (for 
example) the courts must relate to each other in a certain way.  We cannot 
impose an absolute sense of justice upon the courts, but must realise the 
limitations of the absolute sense of justice of the moral will and allow ethical life 
to be formed accordingly.  Thus we have freedom and not domination: the 
principle is determined by what is contingent.395  Ethical life comes into being 
due to the logical demand of morality, but does not directly embody the 
principles of the moral will.  This follows the logic of freedom because it follows 
the logic of the universal as described in the previous chapter. 
 
We have seen above the way in which, at different stages, the will demonstrates 
that its freedom lies in what is external to it.  So the abstract will fixes upon a 
principle that it presupposes; abstract right gives itself over to the moral law that 
it presupposes; the moral will accepts that it must presuppose the concrete 
social conditions according to which the good is determined and administered.  
In addition to this, we have already seen (in the previous chapter) the way in 
which logic moved away from being a logic of domination and dependence (a 
logic of essence) to being a logic of freedom (a logic of the Concept).  It is 
precisely this move from dependence to freedom that we see each time we 
make the step from a form of will to what is external to it.  To demonstrate this I 
will conclude this section by looking again at the moral will, and its transition into 
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ethical life.  Through doing this we will also be able to see what makes Hegel’s 
approach to political philosophy so different from other approaches. 
 
As we saw, the moral will can be described as the will that, first and foremost, 
seeks self-control: it is defined as a will that is divided against itself and operates 
according to necessary principles in order to bring its contingent side under 
control.  The moral will fails to act in accordance with necessity when it turns out 
to be dependent upon anything other than its own principles.  Thus, when we 
pursue our desires without consideration for the principles according to which 
we judge an action to be good, we fail to act morally, from the point of view of 
the moral will, and act in accordance with a pre-moral form of will.  Thus the 
moral will follows a logic of domination and dependence because of this one-
sidedness: the moral will is dominated by its principles that it depends upon for 
its freedom.  As we saw, the logic of morality breaks down when it turns out that 
the moral will is dependent upon socially determined rules for its conception of 
the good.  However, rather than the arrival of this social element (ethical life) 
meaning the destruction of the moral will altogether (which would be a 
domination, by ethical life, of the will that dominates and so would be subject to 
the same logical difficulties), it instead means a development of the logic of 
morality from a logic of dependence and domination to one of freedom.  Rather 
than taking its dependence on what is contingent (social norms) to be a 
refutation of its domination of contingent passions, desires and so on, the moral 
will (as it becomes the ethical will) wills this moment of contingency (its appeal 
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to external social norms) in order that it can control contingent passions and 
desires.  This is now a logic of freedom, since the contingent social factors are 
seen as themselves necessary, so that it is seen that they must be allowed to 
continue in their own way and do not need to be negated and dominated by the 
moral will, while the moral will nevertheless continues to follow its own path and 
perform its task of creating necessary principles for action.  Thus freedom is not 
the absolute negation of domination and dependence, but is what allows 
domination and dependence to find their proper place, as it were: the will to 
dominate finds that it cannot be absolute and is itself dependent on something 
external to it.  That is, the moral will is still the will of domination, but only on the 
basis of its concealment of the fact that its principles are found. 
 
We can compare this to what we saw in the previous chapter to see that this 
reflects the logical structure of freedom.  Morality has the character of essence, 
since what is immediate (an impulse, passion or desire) must be mediated (by 
moral principles).  However, as we saw, we cannot determine the nature of the 
good in this way, since the principles of the moral will cannot with certainty be 
said to mediate right and welfare.  The principles of the moral will are thus 
indeterminate, and the immediate requirements of the will, right and welfare, 
are distorted by the very principles that are supposed to guarantee them (and 
thus we can be misled into acting evilly, and even if we act in accordance with 
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good we do so blindly to some extent396).  In the same way we saw (in chapters 4 
and 5 above) that the categories of essence necessarily distort what is 
immediate, so that we do not get true being when we look for what is essential 
through the categories of essence alone, but the very vague and distorted view 
of being that essentialist thinking was supposed to avoid.  Now, in order to 
overcome this problem, we cannot, as we saw, return to an unmediated 
conception of being, since this view has been shown to be inadequate in the 
logic of being.  In the same way, we cannot abandon morality in favour of a view 
of the will as simply motivated by personal interest, drives and so on, since such 
a view of the will is inadequate (see section 2 above).  Instead we take this 
essentialist view – that being is necessarily mediated – to its logical conclusion: 
not only is the activity of the will mediated by necessary principles, but these 
principles are themselves necessarily mediated, and we cannot discover an 
absolute principle to which the moral will must conform.  As we saw in the 
previous chapter, this leads us to the negation of the negation: we learn that 
what is essential is not what is not determined (reflection brings itself into 
question).  This not being not determined differs from merely being determined 
(as being was – see chapter 3), since it reminds us that we have come back to 
determination through the logic of essence.  That is to say, we arrive at the point 
where we realise that the non-mediation of any principle is an impossibility.  
There are, in a sense, no absolutes, since moral principles are mediated by what 
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is contingent, while what is contingent is (by definition) mediated.  The 
knowledge of this is what constitutes “absolute knowing” for Hegel: we know our 
duties not through a transcendent knowledge of something non-mediated, but 
through the negotiation of what is contingent through the sort of concrete 
assessment described above (that is, we appeal to traditions, to tried and tested 
methods and rules).  Absolute knowing in this way constitutes a kind of wisdom, 
a sense of the way in which we can co-exist with our concrete, and thus 
contingent, surroundings.397 
 
It is important that we have come back to determination via essence because it 
means that we do not have the simple and inadequate view of determination 
that we had at the level of being, or abstract right.  The ethical will, just like the 
universal in the Logic, is what persists as it develops.398  So, it has a certain 
complete character, while also being subject to the contingent conditions in 
which it finds itself.  To say that it has a complete character is to say that it is 
absolute in a certain sense.  The character of the ethical will is what has been 
described above: it is abstract, impulsive, arbitrary, moral and free.  It is abstract 
because it always turns out to be indeterminate: as we have seen, for the ethical 
will, one principle turns out to be as good as any other.  It is impulsive because it 
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is always determined by immediate impulses and desires.  It is arbitrary because 
it must make a choice between these impulses one the basis of an indeterminate 
principle.  It is moral, because it will seek a necessity beyond itself for its 
indeterminate principle.  It is free, because it does all this while conforming to 
external conditions which are beyond its control (which it does not entirely 
dominate) but which it can nonetheless exist alongside. 
 
What this means is that the lesson of the Philosophy of Right is that political 
problems are ultimately solved non-philosophically.  That is to say, a complete 
philosophical account of the ethical will gives us an account of something that is 
incomplete, in a sense, since it is governed by what is contingent.  With 
essentialist philosophical thinking, such a claim could make no sense: philosophy 
gets to the truth, and the truth must be something eternal and unchanging as 
opposed to what is contingent, to the flux of daily life.  Hegel does not abandon 
the quest for the truth, but the truth is found when we discover the nature of 
freedom, and so when we discover that philosophical principles cannot be called 
upon to determine the nature of the just society, but only to remind us of the 
distance that must exist between philosophical truth and concrete good.  The 
important (for Hegel) concept of “duty” arose, we saw, when duty was thought 
of as the action that is determined to be good by our moral principles.  In this 
section, we have seen that duty comes to refer to those good actions that are 
determined to be good by ethical life.  To be free is (as we have seen all along) to 
be determined, and in this section we have seen that we must be determined by 
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ethical life, for Hegel.  Thus duties are followed not because they are deduced 
from rational principles, but because we are determined by ethical life to 
perform such duties due to “custom” which ensures that the performance of 
such duties becomes “second nature”.  However, this does not mean that we 
become automatons, incapable of assessment of whether certain actions are 
good or not: the rules that are found in ethical life are recognised as rules that 
allow for the mediation of right and welfare, so that ethical individuals follow 
ethical rules due to their (more or less explicit) recognition of the fact that these 
rules are good.  The love that exists between family members is an example of 
the less explicit manifestation of the good in ethical life: we do the right thing by 
our family members – respect them as persons and look after their welfare – by 
acting in accordance with the way that we feel about them.  In a different way, 
the rules of civil society guide us towards the good without us having to explicitly 
seek the good: we follow our own interests and, provided that we act in 
accordance with the law, the good is taken care of.  Both of these elements of 
ethical life point to a continuation of something we recognised as an important 
aspect of morality: good is now inseparable from desire, so that we act ethically 
when we not only act in accordance with right but when we desire this course of 
action, so that we desire our own welfare and the welfare of others.  This 
amounts to what I have described as the stupidity of the human condition: the 
fact that we find what is good in the conditions of the ready-made, desiring 
subject.  There are, abstractly considered, an infinity of possible ways in which 
one could realise the good, but concretely this realisation is determined by 
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contingent factors.  Thus the administration of justice involves a negotiation of 
material conditions that cannot be assessed in a merely abstract way: not only 
will the “danger” of a situation (the threat it poses to right and welfare, rather 
than an abstract judgement of whether it is wrong or right) affect the outcome 
of our assessment of it, but the fact that concrete procedures must be followed 
will mean that the ideal of “pure” justice that the moral will has is bound to be 
missed.  One might ask: “who decides what constitutes danger?” and “who 
decides on procedures?”, but we have seen that this would be to ask a question 
that misses the point, since what constitutes danger and the way that 
procedures are carried out (including the way that they alter over time) is 
determined to a large extent by established rules and traditions, by rules that 
were developed owing to rational human activity but which, due to the 
incoherence of abstract moral thinking, cannot and should not be determined by 
any given person or group of persons. 
 
Any moral judgement – any action which imposes rules on a given situation – 
must also be determined by established social factors.  Thus any act of 
domination also involves living in harmony with circumstances beyond the 
individual’s control.  I have argued that knowledge of this constitutes “absolute 
knowing” in the Hegelian sense: absolute knowing is not having the highest 
abstract principles, but knowing that these principles cannot themselves 
constitute the good, but only begin to do so when we learn, through wisdom, to 
negotiate between these principles and social conditions.  Neither principles nor 
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material conditions constitute what is “real”: instead, their relationship 
constitutes what is absolute, ideal and therefore most real. 
 
I suggested above that the advantage of Hegel’s philosophical system over many 
other philosophical systems is that we cannot justify evil practices through 
Hegel’s system.  In fact, it would be truer to say that the justification of evil does 
not exist in Hegel’s system because it is the only one that is truly systematic: that 
is to say, the one-sidedness of evil, the holding onto a principle for its own sake is 
precluded by the fact that each and every principle found in Hegel’s work is 
systematised, so that it is always mediated by the other aspects of the system.  
We learn in this way that the fault of morality is looking to principles as the 
highest guide for our activity, rather than, as Hegel does, look to the mediation, 
or negotiation, of principles for ethical truth. 
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Conclusion 
 
As I suggested in the introduction to chapter 1, my main aim in this thesis has 
been to present Hegel as a systematic thinker of immanence.  Furthermore, I 
have tried to argue that being a thinker of immanence means taking contingency 
to be “irreducible”.  To conclude this thesis, I will show how the reading of Hegel 
I have presented in this thesis achieves these aims.  I will explain how my reading 
responds to the Deleuzian criticisms of Hegel described in chapter 1, and by 
showing how my reading responds to these concerns I will explain how and why 
my approach offers a productive and viable approach to Hegel.  (Note that I am 
suggesting that my reading responds to these criticisms in a way that is 
productive for Hegel studies, not necessarily in a way that would satisfy Deleuze 
and Guattari.)  I will also try to show what contribution my thesis makes to the 
field of Hegel studies, by discussing some of the ways in which my reading differs 
from those offered by other commentators on Hegel. 
 
As we saw in chapter 1, Deleuze and Guattari might criticise Hegel for a number 
of reasons.  Firstly, they argue that contingency is real and irreducible, so that 
the Hegelian attempt to reduce everything to necessity creates an illusion, rather 
than accurately explaining how events come into being.  Secondly, ways of 
thinking are pre-conceptual for Deleuze and Guattari (they are unconscious 
“images of thought”), and so analysis of concepts and conceptual structures will 
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not provide a full explanation of the thought of a philosopher.  This means that, 
for Deleuze and Guattari, Hegel’s attempt to show that previous philosophical 
positions can be sublated and shown to be completed only in Hegel’s systematic 
thinking cannot work: Hegel does not account for the fact that the philosophers 
he studies had very different problems in mind to his own.  Thirdly, philosophy is 
not simply “thinking about thinking” but is a specific mode of thinking, and we 
cannot therefore assume that philosophy is the highest form of thinking.  Also, 
concepts create external relations between their components, and do not reveal 
anything essential or “implicit” in those components: since philosophy is not the 
highest form of thinking, there is no reason to believe that philosophical 
concepts reveal anything essential about their components.  We saw that 
Deleuze and Guattari also argue that we should think in terms of “interruptions” 
and not “flows” since no developmental flow is implicit in anything, and any 
construction of a story of development is imposed externally onto the 
components that the developmental story connects together.  We also saw that, 
for Deleuze and Guattari, “life” (or, more accurately “a life”399) comes before 
“idealism”: idealism imposes values on the world, and doesn’t take contingency 
into account; that is, idealism does not take into account the fact that our values 
are contingent and that new events do not emerge merely out of the structures 
that we find in the world, but also out of the disorganisation of these structures. 
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In sum, Hegel is criticised by Deleuze and Guattari because, they say, he 
presupposes a method and conception of philosophy which he then claims is 
necessary and represents the actual state of affairs: Hegel claims that the 
dialectic that he describes is real and is what generates events in the world, and 
ignores other real factors, such as the disorganisation that brings new events 
into being.  Hegel has created the “illusion” of immanence because he conceals 
the fact that he presupposes his dialectical method and so he claims that he is 
describing a real dialectic in the world: as Miguel de Beistegui puts it, “the 
greatest and possibly most dangerous illusion of all… is that of speculative 
dialectics, and of negativity, in so far as Hegel believes them to be the immanent 
source of movement and becoming.”400  My aim in this thesis has been to offer a 
reading of Hegel that responds to this concern, by showing in what sense 
contingency, and not a presupposed dialectic, is the “source” of Hegel’s 
speculative system. 
 
In chapter 3 I explained that part of what Hegel is trying to do is bring into 
question what it means to think.  We saw that Hegel lamented the death of the 
spirit of metaphysics in his time: metaphysics sought knowledge of the things 
themselves, but the reflective age in which Hegel lived (and in which we still live 
today) denied the possibility of such knowledge.  Also, metaphysical knowledge 
was supposed to be an end in itself, and the “critical spirit” of reflection denies 
                                                          
400
 Beistegui 2010 p.25 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 314 of 365 
 
that this is possible: for reflection, there is nothing that is simply what it is.  
However, as we saw, Hegel did not suggest that we turn away from reflection 
and go back to pre-reflective metaphysical thinking: instead, we must see that 
reflection has not gone far enough.  Hegel tells us in the Logic (see chapter 3 
above) that we must study reflective thinking systematically, and in this way we 
will see that reflection points to a new way of thinking beyond it: what he calls 
“speculative” thinking.  For Hegel, speculative thinking is systematic reflective 
thinking, and so we get beyond mere reflective thinking – to speculative thinking 
– by systematising reflective thinking.  Though Hegel’s Logic is an examination of 
reflective thinking, it is speculative from the start because it is a systematic study 
of reflection. 
 
We saw that speculative thinking is knowledge that involves knowledge of 
“spirit”: that is to say, speculative thinking involves knowledge of the process of 
knowing.  It is an improvement upon both traditional (or “classical”401) pre-
reflective metaphysics and critical, reflective thinking because it enables us to 
seek self-sufficient knowledge of things themselves by explaining what must be 
involved in such knowledge (rather than leaving the notion of things in 
themselves relatively vague, as traditional metaphysics does): speculative 
thinking connects knowledge of things in themselves with knowledge of the 
process of knowing, so that we cannot have the one without the other.  For 
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Hegel, we learn from reflection that our thinking spirit impacts on what we think 
about, and the speculative thinking that emerges from the systematic approach 
to reflection ends up reconciling this truth of reflection with the truth that 
metaphysical knowledge – knowledge of things in themselves – is possible. 
 
In the examination of Hegel’s analysis of “pure being” in chapter 3 above, we saw 
something of how Hegel’s systematic study of reflection proceeds.  We saw that 
Hegel’s analysis of pure being constitutes a study of reflection, because Hegel 
formulates being as sheer indeterminacy, and therefore as having no objective 
content of its own: to think about pure being thus allows us to think about 
thinking, since there is nothing objective about pure being to guide us and so we 
follow thought where it leads us.  I suggested that Hegel created the concept of 
pure being for this very reason: as a way to carry out an experiment in thought 
that allows us to think in a radically new way.  Hegel creates the possibility of 
reflecting upon reflection, and thus creates speculative thinking.  (It is in this way 
that logic teaches us to think speculatively, rather than simply dictating how 
speculative thinking should be carried out.  As Hegel tells us in the introduction 
to the Logic, thought requires practice if it is to learn to think speculatively.  We 
develop certain habits of thought, which lead us to make certain assumptions 
and we need to train ourselves if we are to learn to think in the abstract way 
required for speculative thinking.402) 
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For Hegel, reflecting upon the concept of pure being allows us to draw out 
necessary associations or connections between thoughts.  Furthermore, we learn 
what constitutes a necessary connection for thought (that is to say, we learn 
what “necessary” means, for Hegel), and so learn something about what it 
means to think.  I suggested that reflective thinking means looking for 
explanation, or looking for determinations that are implicit within what is 
indeterminate.  I showed that it is our attempt to explain what pure being means 
that leads us to identify pure being and nothing, according to Hegel.  Looking for 
“explanation” means eliminating mere tautology, I suggested, so that reflective 
thinking comprises a “drive” (“Trieb”) to get beyond mere tautology.  In the 
reflective age, thinking means explaining, and explaining means eliminating mere 
tautology. 
 
“Nothing” necessarily arises out of “pure being” because there is no way to think 
pure being without keeping in mind the thought of nothing, if “think” means 
“explain” (as it does for reflection).  Other terms that could be used to explain 
pure being are reducible to the term “nothing”, so that “nothing” is the only 
term that is what pure being irreducibly is, for Hegel.  I suggested that this way of 
describing a necessary connection between being and nothing tells us something 
about the Hegelian conception of “necessity”: pure being and nothing are 
identical not because they have been proven to be so, but because we cannot 
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prove that it is not so; it is for this reason that Hegel tells us that we are free to 
keep searching for another formulation of pure being, but until we come up with 
one we have to admit that pure being is simply nothing.  However, the fact that 
we find ourselves compelled to agree with Hegel tells us that Hegel has 
discovered something essential to our thinking, so that when we think pure 
being and discover it is nothing we discover that reflective thinking means 
explanation and therefore means elimination of tautology. 
 
I then looked at Hegel’s treatment of the concepts of becoming, determinate 
being, reality, negation, something, other and alteration, in order to show how 
we learn about the nature of reflection from the treatment of these concepts 
too, so that we see that the concepts of being (of the logic of being, as described 
in the “Doctrine of Being”) are considered unstable as insofar as they are 
tautologies, and cannot be explained.  The development of the logic of being, I 
suggested, takes place as reflection searches for deeper and deeper explanation, 
and rejects tautologies.  This is why, in the logic of being, a contradiction leads us 
to a new concept: reflective thinking will not accept that what a concept is and 
what it is not could be identical, since this means a concept is explained only 
through itself, and so we have a tautology rather than a real explanation. 
 
The reading of Hegel that I offer here responds to Deleuze and Guattari in a 
number of ways.  Firstly, I have tried to show that the logic of being does not 
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develop in the way it does due to sheer necessity: the identity of pure being and 
nothing comes into being as a result of an experimental strategy employed by 
Hegel, according to which he tries to explore the nature of reflective thinking by 
suggesting that we reflect upon an utterly indeterminate concept.  By telling us 
what is “necessarily” connected to the concept of pure being, Hegel is actually 
exploring the reflective way in which we in fact think, and is not telling us (yet) 
that we should think in this way.  At this point we are simply thinking: on my 
reading such simple, presuppositionless thinking does not rely on any claim that 
the way in which we happen to be thinking is a strictly necessary way of thinking.  
This is not to say that the transition between being and nothing might not be a 
strictly necessary one; what I am trying to point to is the way that Hegel’s 
argument works here; that is to say, Hegel argues that we should take being and 
nothing to be identical because this is where thought in fact leads us, and we are 
unable to think of any other way of formulating being.  At this point in the Logic 
Hegel has not got beyond saying anything that is ultimately contingent: he says 
that our thinking leads us to identify being and nothing, and this can be called 
“necessary” only because in fact we cannot think of any other way to formulate 
being. 
 
To deal with another of the Deleuzian criticisms, we do not need to assume that 
the view that Hegel is putting forward is one that is higher than or superior to 
other philosophical positions – for example, Parmenides, who would deny that 
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being and nothing could be identical and claim that being is simply being.  On my 
reading of Hegel, what is essential is not that Hegel proves Parmenides wrong, 
but that he shows us that, given our way of thinking, we cannot deny that being 
and nothing are identical.  (This is not to say that Hegel does not claim that his 
position is superior to that of Parmenides – he does that at length – but that his 
argument in the logic of being does not depend on that claim being true.  It is 
because I am not ultimately denying that Hegel does take his philosophical 
position to be superior to and truer than others that I am not offering here a 
refutation of Deleuze and Guattari on this point; I am only trying to show here 
how this particular Deleuzian criticism that I have identified does not apply here, 
to the beginning of the Logic, where we do not need to make any absolute claims 
in order to proceed in the analysis of being.) 
 
Also, we do not need to assume that the philosophical method we are employing 
here tells us anything essential about “being itself” in order to read it in the way I 
have.  So we do not need to assume that philosophy is the highest form of 
thinking in order to grasp what Hegel is saying here.  (Again, I am not denying 
that Hegel does in fact want to make claims about being itself and about 
philosophy’s role as “thinking about thinking”, but I am saying that, in the logic of 
being, Hegel has not got to a point where his argument depends upon such 
claims.)  For this reason we can also see  that we do not yet need to claim that 
this is the only way of thinking being that is implicit in the concept of being: on 
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the contrary, Hegel accepts that we can stubbornly refuse to develop being in 
this way and hold onto the claim that “being is being”; only, if we do this, we 
must accept that we are not being reflective in our thinking.  Also, as we saw, 
Hegel can – without harming his argument – leave open the possibility that we 
could think being differently. 
 
We should also note that nowhere in Hegel’s arguments about pure being does 
he put developmental “flow” before the “interruption” of thoughts by each 
other.  On the contrary, on my reading Hegel is suggesting that the concept of 
pure being is interrupted by the reflective way of thinking, so that we cannot 
simply say that “being is being”.403  Hegel will of course get round to explaining 
the history of ideas in terms of development, but he does not rely on an 
externally imposed ideal of development at this point.  Similarly, Hegel does not 
yet bring in an account of how we arrived at reflective thinking; on my reading, 
Hegel is trying to show us how reflective thinking works, but has not yet tried to 
prove that we must think in this way.  If we are not naturally compelled to follow 
Hegel’s argument then, on my reading, there is nothing for us in the Logic (and 
maybe we should start somewhere else, perhaps with the Phenomenology of 
Spirit).404 
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 See chapter 3 above: the notion that “being is being” calls for an interruption in the sense that 
we must start again with a new concept of being (determinate being, for example) each time we 
reach such a tautology, according to the demands of reflection. 
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On my reading, then, Hegel is being creative at this point in the Logic.  He is not 
trying to impose organisation onto our thought but is setting up what I have 
called an “experiment” in thought that would enable us to construct a 
speculative system of thinking.  Hegel does not describe what he is doing in these 
terms because ultimately he does want to claim that his speculative way of 
thinking is the best and only way of really thinking, but again he does not rely on 
this claim at this point.405   
 
In sum, in chapter 3 I described the way that Hegel opens his Logic and 
suggested that it is offering us no more than contingent truths, that is, things 
that happen to be true, given our way of thinking.  We saw that Hegel explicitly 
states that his aim in the logic is to systematise reflective thinking, and since he is 
proceeding without presuppositions he cannot assume at this stage that 
reflective thinking is necessarily the way we should think, he can only treat the 
way that we in fact think as a “brute fact” about us that he wants to study.406  In 
this way I hoped to show that “speculative dialectics” is not intended by Hegel to 
be the “source” of movement and becoming in Hegel’s system.  Instead, 
Hegelian logic begins with consideration of a contingent point, namely, the way 
                                                                                                                                                               
2005 p.49: “For Hegel… nothing is needed to begin presuppositionless onto-logic except a 
willingness freely to suspend one’s favoured assumptions about being and thought and to start 
from the bare thought of being as such.”). 
405
 So, Hegel does ultimately want to claim that the truths that emerge from the argument of the 
logic are necessarily true, but he does not rely on this yet.  See chapter 3 section 3 above for 
discussion of Hegel and his scientific and experimental approach to philosophy. 
406
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that reflection thinks sheer indeterminacy.  As we saw in chapters 6 and 7 above, 
dialectic proper is something that comes later, when we establish the need for 
logical necessity (for a systematic ordering of our concepts) in the logic of the 
Concept. 
 
(It is very important to note that I am not saying here that Deleuze and Guattari 
are mistaken in their reading of Hegel, since all I have said here is that we need 
to note that Hegel intends his logic to begin with contingency: the possibility 
remains that Hegel is deceiving himself when he claims that he is beginning with 
sheer indeterminacy and not with speculative presuppositions.  This is how I am 
using Deleuze and Guattari in this thesis: to help us sharpen our understanding 
of how Hegel wanted to be read – as a thinker of immanence – by showing us 
why it is that Hegel cannot be a thinker of immanence if we take speculative 
dialectics and negativity to be the “motor” or “source” of movement and 
becoming in the Logic.) 
 
There are many obvious objections that could be made to my approach to Hegel, 
some of which I will address here.  Firstly, it might seem that since truth is 
important for Hegel – the point of his logic is to get to the truth – then the fact 
that I am playing down the importance of necessity will be problematic.  
Houlgate writes that “the truth does not simply spring out at us; we must come 
to meet it in the right frame of mind”, and so it might seem to a commentator 
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such as Houlgate that I am neglecting the fact that there is, after all, a right way 
of thinking for Hegel.407  It is not just the case that pure being happens to 
transform into nothing in our thinking, the objection might continue: we must 
also note that pure being transforms into nothing because pure being itself is 
nothing, and Hegel’s speculative thinking allows us to see this truth about being.  
This leads us on to a second potential objection: the reason that I do not see 
that, for Hegel, the move from pure being to nothing is necessary, is that I fail to 
note that Hegel’s philosophy is speculative from the start, because I insist that 
Hegel begins by reflecting upon reflection.  That is to say, by beginning with 
reflection I fail to note that the Logic begins where the Phenomenology left off: 
that is, with the identity of thought and being, so that our thought of the identity 
of being and nothing arises because pure being is itself identical to nothing.408 
 
I will deal with the second of these potential objections first.  My response would 
be to point out that, on my reading, Hegel is thinking speculatively from the start 
(he is proceeding in such a way that the subject matter is allowed to reveal its 
own inner development), but that the object of this speculative thinking is 
reflective thinking.  I have pointed out above that Hegel introduces his Logic by 
saying that his aim is to systematise reflective thinking, and it is this claim that I 
focus on in my reading: I do not deny that, for Hegel, thought and being are 
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 See Houlgate 2005 p.50: it is the job of the Phenomenology to “show ordinary consciousness 
why it is rational, rather than perverse, to believe with the speculative philosopher that the true 
structure of being can be found within the structure of thought itself.” 
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identical, but I suggest that this identity does not need to be presupposed in 
order for the initial arguments in Section One of the Doctrine of Being to work, 
and that these initial arguments work if they offer the beginning of a systematic 
way of thinking about reflective thinking.  
 
But one might ask: what do I mean by “reflective thinking” anyway?  Alfredo 
Ferrarin points out that modern thinking, for Hegel, is higher than ancient 
thinking because “it starts from the concrete and individual subjectivity” and so 
is less “abstract” than ancient thought; however, in beginning with subjectivity 
some modern thinking allowed itself to introduce an opposition between 
thought and being (“of which ‘cogito ergo sum’ is the best illustration”).409  That 
is to say, “the subject is for itself free, man is free as man because he is in his 
individuality divine spirit”, and this sense of our own freedom leads us to oppose 
our essential, divine nature to the contingencies of everyday life.410  Ferrarin 
reminds us that, for Hegel, this “principle” of our freedom was unknown to the 
Greeks: it arose “with the dawn of Christianity”, and “with it man is infinite spirit 
regardless of birth, citizenship, rank, race or even culture”.411 
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It is this vision of man as infinite spirit that I take to belong to reflective 
thinking.412  On my reading, the logic of being describes the attempt to deal with 
pre-reflective concepts via reflective thinking, and it is the fact that we are 
historically determined as reflective beings that, for example, will not allow us to 
think of pure being as simple, absolute being, without also taking it to be 
nothing.  The logic of being thus reveals to us what reflective thinking is by 
revealing how reflective beings must think about non-reflective categories.  I 
described how this works in chapter 3.  Then in chapter 4 I described how this 
examination of pre-reflective concepts becomes an analysis of reflection itself: 
reflection now has to deal with its own principle of its own infinity stated 
explicitly, so that nothing is simply what it is.  In chapter 5 above, we saw how 
this examination results in the collapse of reflection, which is transformed into 
speculative thinking.  On my reading, then, I am trying to emphasise the fact 
that, for Hegel, speculative thinking is a development of reflective thinking, since 
Hegel never abandons the notion that we are “infinite spirit”.  It is this that 
drives my reading of the Philosophy of Right in chapter 7: I do not believe that 
we do justice to Hegel if we claim that, for him, “freedom” is the simply the same 
as doing one’s duty in an ethical state.  Yes, freedom does mean this, for Hegel, 
but it also means the sheer infinity of the will: when the abstract will is sublated 
it nevertheless remains, since it is an essential part of what it means to be an 
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 See previous paragraph: to say that man is “infinite spirit” for reflection is to say that he is free 
in himself, as an individual.  As we saw in chapter 7 this is only true to a certain extent, for Hegel: 
man must be free in himself, but a higher form of freedom is found in doing one’s duty to others 
in the state, and so man is not simply free in himself, and so is not simply infinite spirit, for Hegel.  
As we saw in chapter 7, it is the fact that we are infinite spirit and so free simply by virtue of 
being ourselves that we must have rights for Hegel: slavery is illogical for Hegel because it signals 
a failure to realise that all people are free in themselves. 
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individual, for Hegel.  My reading was intended to reflect this logical truth: it is a 
logical truth because it follows from speculative examination of reflection, that 
is, from a study that allows reflection to reveal its own logic and so reveal itself 
as systematised knowledge.413 
 
So, I am trying to emphasise in this thesis this aspect of Hegel’s speculative 
project: that Hegel has not only to allow being to speak for itself and develop 
according to its own inner necessity, but also has to allow for thought to speak 
for itself and develop according to its own inner necessity.  And the form that 
thought takes today is reflection.  As Ferrarin tells us: “Hegel’s system will have 
precisely the task of showing the actuality of the Idea, the Greek identity of 
thought and being, in the individual, in spirit”.414  So, on my reading, Hegel is 
indeed carrying out speculative thinking from the start because he is allowing 
these two truths – that thought and being are identical and that we are infinite 
as thinking beings – to reveal themselves in his examination of thought.  We saw 
in chapter 3 above that, for Aristotle, the question of the meaning of being was 
not a philosophical one, and anyone who felt the need to question the meaning 
of “being” too deeply (for example, by questioning the principle of identity) 
showed not a keen philosophical mind but merely a lack of education.  This is 
because the nature of being was taken to be something that revealed itself in all 
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414
 Ferrarin 2001 p.46 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 327 of 365 
 
of our thinking, because the ancient Greeks did not entertain the notion that our 
thinking might get in the way of a true conception of being.  Reflection does 
entertain this possibility, and it is up to Hegel’s speculative thinking to show that 
we can be infinite spirit and have a true notion of being. 
 
And this brings us back to the first potential objection I mentioned above: if I 
admit that, for Hegel, the identity of thought and being is a truth, and that it is 
being itself that is identical to nothing (and not merely the thought of it), then 
how can I ignore the fact that the transition from being to nothing must be 
something necessary?  If we follow Houlgate’s reading of Hegel, in the Logic we 
see that dialectical development occurs if we think about concepts in the right 
frame of mind so that we can see what is implicit in a concept and make what is 
implicit explicit.  History, including the history of philosophy, also develops in this 
way: for Houlgate’s Hegel, history (both world history and the history of 
philosophy), is the history of freedom being allowed to become more and more 
what it already (implicitly) is; that is to say, as history progresses people come to 
realise and make explicit what is implicit in the concept of freedom and come to 
live their lives accordingly (so that, for example, we learn that universal rights are 
essential to freedom and so we demand that slavery be abolished in the 
state).415  Similarly with the pure thinking that is described in the Logic: on 
Houlgate’s reading of the Logic, pure being becomes nothing because it already 
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implicitly is nothing.416  On Houlgate’s reading, in order to transform pure being 
into nothing we have to suspend all presuppositions and simply think, openly 
and self-critically (that is, in such a way that we are prepared to question any of 
the beliefs we might already have about the subject matter), about what is there 
before us, so that we can reveal what is already implicitly the case.417  
Furthermore, for Houlgate, when we talk about the equivalence of pure being 
and nothing we are not talking only of the thought of pure being but of “being 
itself”: Hegel’s Logic is an ontology, and not just a study of the categories of 
reflection.418  If Houlgate is right to read Hegel in this way, it might seem that 
Deleuze and Guattari are right and that Hegel does in fact turn out to be a 
thinker of the “cult of necessity”: for Houlgate’s Hegel it is indeed the case that 
the developments in thinking and in history arise because we discover – through 
the act of thinking – something about what a concept already actually is, so that 
the modern state arises as we realise what freedom must be and speculative 
thinking begins when we realise that pure being in fact is implicitly nothing, 
becoming, determinate being, and so on.  Development is thus determined by 
what is implicit in the actual state of affairs.  Since the cult of necessity is the 
practice of assuming that new events arise by virtue of the possibilities provided 
by the current, actual state of affairs, it seems that Houlgate’s Hegel – according 
to whom new events arise as a result of what is implicit becoming explicit – must 
belong to the “cult of necessity”. 
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thinking upon the subject matter buts waits to see how it will turn out of its own accord. 
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However, as I have stated above, part of what Hegel is trying to do in the Logic is 
bring into question what it means to think.   I suggested that “thinking” can mean 
different things for Hegel, and part of his task is to persuade us that speculative 
thinking is the best mode of thinking for modern times.  In his reading of Hegel, 
Houlgate describes what he thinks critical thinking consists in for Hegel, but it is 
important to note that this very notion of critical thinking itself has to be derived 
immanently in the Logic.   
 
So: the notion of what it means to think has come into question in the Logic.  
What I have tried to suggest in this thesis is that the way in which we think 
critically must be derived from reflective thinking.  As we have seen, on my 
reading of the logic the reflective mode of thinking has its own sense of what it 
means to think and it is this sense of what it means to think that the Logic seeks 
to examine.  It is reflective thinking that seeks to be fully self-critical by trying to 
make explicit what is implicit, by seeking for explanation of everything that it 
encounters.  This is why Hegel can say that we begin with the subjective 
“resolve” to think: Hegel is not asking us to be already initiated right at the start 
in the practice of speculative thinking, but only that we resolve to think and see 
how our own thinking is transformed by its own logic.  To do so is to think 
speculatively.  At the start of the Logic, therefore, Hegel asks us to resolve to 
think speculatively, but he does not ask that we begin with any speculative 
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assumptions. Though Hegel does in fact believe that pure being is in fact identical 
to pure nothing, he does not ask that we assume this at the beginning of the 
Logic, since the Logic is an attempt to systematise reflective thinking, and it is 
not until we have done this that we will arrive at the truth of speculative thinking 
and the fact that being and nothing are identical.   
 
It is also indeed true that Hegel believes that he has offered a proof that being 
and thought are identical in the Phenomenology (and so our immanent thought 
of being, as identical to nothing, would be the thought of being itself): 
nevertheless, on my reading of Hegel the Logic also stands on its own, and as 
long as we are prepared to reflect upon reflection we will be able to trace the 
development of reflective thinking until we see the truth of speculative thinking, 
and therefore the truth that being and thought are identical.  In short: on my 
reading, Hegel’s philosophy is indeed a “philosophy without foundations”, and 
therefore the fact that we have – in the Phenomenology – a potential foundation 
for the Logic does not count for anything in the final analysis, since foundations 
will not, for Hegel, offer any certainty that what is built upon them will be 
true.419  It is for this reason that Hegel distrusted prefaces and introductions and 
yet still continued to write them: though offering a basis on which to start can be 
helpful for getting us to begin thinking, they offer nothing certain on which to 
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base what follows.  I am suggesting that the Phenomenology should be read as a 
preface to the Logic, rather than as a foundation.420 
 
As we have seen, for Houlgate, thinking critically is thinking in such a way that we 
can see “the way thought itself develops” by thinking through “the intrinsic, 
dynamic determinations of thought”.421  In other words, our thinking is already 
determined in a certain way, and by opening ourselves up to this true way of 
thinking (rather than thinking according to presuppositions) we can allow the 
subject matter itself (thought) to develop of its own accord.422  In my view, the 
danger with an account like this is that it can be misinterpreted as a “classical 
metaphysical” approach.  That is to say, it seems to proceed by placing a 
principle – in this case, the principle of the identity of being and thought – at the 
beginning of our investigation.  In his Hegel’s Systematic Contingency, Burbidge 
tells us that Hegel opposes “classical metaphysics” by making history “primary” 
for philosophy.  Burbidge tells us that “for the first time in the history of 
philosophy, he [Hegel] has placed historical development at the heart of 
systematic thought.”423  For Burbidge, history proceeds not by one event logically 
flowing from another, but by a series of contingent “events” that radically alter 
the conditions in which we live and think.  Burbidge opposes this historical 
understanding of philosophy to the approach of “classical metaphysics”:  
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“whenever we take history seriously”, writes Burbidge, “we have to radically 
transform what we mean by philosophy.  Classical metaphysics and a respect for 
history are not compatible.”424  “Classical metaphysics” puts “rational principles” 
or “universals” first and claims that logical truths are what dictate the order of 
things.  Historical thinking, on the other hand, rejects the view that we should 
put universals first: 
 
When we make history primary, we reject the maxim of Dionysius of Halicarnasus that ‘history is 
philosophy teaching by examples.’  What happens is not simply an instance of a general rule or 
law of human behaviour.  Rational principles do not determine the order of things.  A single 
action, whether by an individual, a political institution or any social group, is decisive.  Into a 
situation formed by the past, the agent introduces something new.  Various constraints are 
confronted and transformed by a distinctive and singular happening.  To decipher what is 
significant about that event, we dare not ignore the novelty that the action achieves.  It is unique 
both in terms of the specific setting in which it takes place and in terms of its decisive initiative.  
What makes the action significant for history, therefore, is its unique particularity.
425
 
 
So, by putting history at the heart of thought, Burbidge tells us, Hegel is opposed 
to a (classical metaphysical) view that would claim that there are eternal 
principles that govern history: history is more than a series of examples of 
eternal principles put to work.  Instead, history proceeds by the creation of 
singular events, which themselves “transform” the “constraints” that previously 
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entangled thinking and thereby create new logical principles.  I would suggest 
that this rules out any position that would take the Phenomenology to be a 
foundation for the Logic because it shows us why we can never take a principle 
as a proven basis for further study: any “constraint” that has in fact been placed 
upon our thinking is always liable to be removed by unpredictable 
circumstances; that is to say, our way of thinking can be changed by contingent 
events.  The Phenomenology cannot be an absolute foundation for thought for 
the same reasons that I suggested that the identity of being and nothing cannot 
be a foundation in Chapter 3 above: Hegel must always leave open the possibility 
that something he has not thought of will allow for a new formulation of the 
concept of pure being, and the connection between being and nothing is 
considered “necessary” on the basis that our thinking currently offers us no 
other way of thinking pure being.  At the beginning of the Logic Hegel is only 
examining a way of thinking, and can consider nothing to have been proven true 
if he wants to carry out an immanent examination of this way of thinking.426 
 
Now, Hegel tells that the “unity of pure being and nothing” is “the primary truth” 
that “now forms once and for all the basis and element of all that follows”427  
This seems to clearly tell us that the identity of being and nothing is necessary: 
however, when discussing the thought of pure being in the logic of being, Hegel 
makes all sorts of claims about being, only some of which are strictly relevant at 
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this point in the Logic.  While it is important to note that these are all true for 
Hegel – it is necessary, its unity with nothing is absolute, and so on – I am arguing 
that we also need to note that Hegel cannot claim these truths to support his 
argument at this stage in the Logic: Hegel does not require that we presuppose 
that thought and being are identical in the logic of being, since the logic emerges 
not from the identity of being and nothing but from the subjective “resolve” to 
think.428 
 
In making the above arguments, I am suggesting that we should not follow Alison 
Stone, when she suggests that Hegel’s Logic “presupposes existence”.429  Though 
I agree with Stone that Hegel’s Logic is an ontology, I think that this turns out to 
be the case as the logical argument progresses, rather than being something 
presupposed at the start.  Even though the Phenomenology “proves” that being 
and thought are identical, I have explained above why I cannot agree with Stone 
that the standpoint of “Absolute Knowing”, or any other standpoint, can be 
“proven uniquely true”: we cannot “exhaustively” eliminate all rival conceptions 
in any given case, because any “constraint” placed upon our thought can be 
removed by unforeseen circumstances, opening up new possible rival 
conceptions, and forcing us to think again.430  (In this respect, Hegel’s thought is 
closer to Deleuze than is usually recognised.)  Also, in my discussion of “essence” 
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in chapters 4 and 5 above we saw why Hegel’s Logic cannot presuppose 
existence: “existence” is a concept that is not derived from the immanent 
unfolding of the Logic until we get to the Doctrine of Essence, and so existence is 
not something that Hegel can base his argument on at the beginning of the Logic, 
in the Doctrine of Being.  
 
In sum, it is necessary to follow Houlgate and read Hegel as a presuppositionless 
thinker, because if we do not then we lay Hegel open to the Deleuzian charge 
described above: that the “source” of the development of the Logic and the rest 
of Hegel’s system is a presupposed “speculative dialectics” and not the subject 
matter itself.  However, I have argued that if we do not see that the meaning of 
“critical thinking” is something in question for Hegel, then we do in fact, despite 
our best efforts, allow our thinking to be guided by presuppositions: we make it 
impossible for anyone to follow the argument of the Logic who is not willing to 
presuppose the identity of thought and being.  The identity of thought and being 
is the result of the Logic, and so we cannot take this as a first premise too, if we 
are to avoid making speculative dialectics the source of movement in the Logic.  
The identity of thought and being was also the result of the Phenomenology, but 
as I have argued we cannot take the result of the Phenomenology to have been 
“proven uniquely true” and so we cannot use the Phenomenology as a 
foundation for logical thinking, but must take the Logic on its own terms as 
something self-sufficient that will prove its own validity.  We think critically, for 
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Hegel, when we think reflectively, and so demand explanation for every concept, 
and demand that nothing is simply what it is.  Thus the Logic develops from a 
contingent, historical standpoint, that is, from the standpoint of modern, 
reflective thinking. 
 
So, on my reading, even this initial truth, that pure being and nothing are 
identical, is just as much a contingent as a necessary truth.  What we learn from 
the identity of being and nothing is that being and nothing are necessarily 
identical for reflection, and so this truth is necessary in one sense and contingent 
in another.  To put it another way: the identity of being and nothing is essential 
to reflection, but we cannot at this stage in the Logic go any further than this and 
make any claims about being itself (as I have suggested, these will come later, 
once we reach the speculative thinking of the Concept).  The Logic will show that, 
given that we are modern, reflective thinkers we can (and should) also be 
speculative thinkers.  But if we fail to see that reflection is the starting point, and 
bring in at the start the identity of thought and being, then we fail to proceed 
immanently. 
 
As I have stated above, it is the danger connected with Houlgate’s interpretation 
of Hegel that I want to draw attention to: I do not want to reject Houlgate’s 
approach; on the contrary, I want to say that something along the lines of 
Houlgate’s reading – according to which Hegel is a presuppositionless thinker – is 
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the only way to read Hegel as he intended to be read.  If we strip this demand for 
immanence away from Hegel, then I think we miss something vital about Hegel’s 
thought: Hegel did not intend for his thinking to be one point of view among 
others, which needs to be defended “externally” against other, equally valid 
points of view; rather, he intended his system to be self-sufficient and capable of 
ultimately proving its own validity.  When I suggest that we need to resist 
claiming that Hegel’s system is based on the view that being and thought are 
identical, I am trying to suggest that this is the only way that we can begin to 
prove Hegel’s system to be valid and self-sufficient.  The danger of the 
presuppositionless reading is that it can easily fall back onto presuppositions. 
 
As well as describing in what way Hegel is an immanent thinker, I also want to 
show that Hegel is a systematic thinker: more specifically, I wanted to show that 
we should read the Philosophy of Right in a systematic way.  On my reading, the 
fact that our reflective thinking should make us speculative thinkers should also 
lead us to a better conception of what it means to be free, since this new, post-
reflective way of thinking allows us to re-formulate the concept of right. 
 
In his Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of 
Right, Thom Brooks presents us with a “systematic reading” of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right.  Brooks offers what he calls a “weak” systematic reading, but 
doesn’t rule out the possibility that a “strong” systematic reading would be 
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possible: for Brooks, “a systematic reading of Hegel’s work interprets this work 
within the context of Hegel’s philosophical system”.431  According to even a weak 
systematic reading of the Philosophy of Right, it is vitally important that we 
recognise “the peculiar structure of Hegel’s argumentation”, and one way that 
we can do this is by looking at Hegel’s logical writing (the Logic and the 
Encyclopaedia Logic): a strong systematic reading, on the other hand, will 
advocate the same but will emphasise the importance of more “specific features 
of the system” than the weaker reading.432  In this thesis, I have made the case 
for a relatively strong systematic reading: the “peculiar structure of Hegel’s 
argumentation” is best understood, I suggested, by paying careful attention to 
the details of the Logic: I want to suggest that we have a better sense of the 
value of Hegel’s work when we have more than a “general picture of Hegel’s 
system and its relationship to the Philosophy of Right.”433 
 
However, not all commentators on Hegel think that a systematic reading of 
Hegel of this sort is possible.  Though Allen W. Wood – in his Hegel’s Ethical 
Thought – tells us that, if we are to grasp properly “Hegel’s theory of society and 
politics”, we must not neglect its “philosophical foundations”, he goes on to say 
that these foundations are not Hegel’s “speculative metaphysics”; instead, by 
“philosophical foundations”, Wood means “the ethical theory on which Hegel 
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rests his critical reflections on modern social and political life.”434  In this thesis I 
have tried to present a reading of Hegel that opposes Wood’s view: in my view, if 
we take the foundation of Hegel’s political thought to be an ethical theory and 
not a speculative metaphysics, then we end up with an account according to 
which Hegel is too dogmatic.  The reasons for this have been discussed above: 
Hegel’s speculative metaphysics allows us to think about the object of enquiry (in 
this case, modern social and political life) in a way that takes into account its 
various logical aspects and so does justice to the object of study.  On the other 
hand, basing our conception of modern society on an ethical theory (rather than 
on a theory of philosophical method) means that our account will always be one-
sided, since we will judge modern society to be more or less good, just, fair and 
so on, not on the basis of an objective study of society, but on the basis of our 
pre-established ethical theories.  My objection to Wood is that if we take Hegel 
to be basing his political theory on an ethical theory and not on a speculative 
metaphysics, then we are missing the fact that Hegel might have been justified in 
believing not only that he had a viable ethical theory, but also that this theory 
was borne out by an impartial study of the state, where the criteria for an 
impartial study are determined elsewhere in the system, in Hegel’s logical 
writings.435  As we have seen above in chapter 7, Hegel emphasises the point that 
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he does not think that it is the primary task of philosophers to determine what 
ought to be the case: any philosophical conclusions about what ought to be the 
case must arise from a “scientific” study of the state, where a “scientific study” 
denotes an examination of what is the case.  In my view, though Wood correctly 
tells us that Hegel’s ethical theory is one of “self-actualisation” – that is, a theory 
according to which what we are (and should be) as political animals develops 
logically out of what we are as creatures with free will – he is wrong to rule out 
the possibility that this ethical theory is based upon a more abstract logical 
theory which justifies this sort of “dialectical” approach to political philosophy. 
 
A writer who runs into similar problems, in my view, is Robert B. Pippin.  Unlike 
Wood, Pippin does not dismiss detailed study of Hegel’s speculative logic as a 
waste of time.436  In his Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, 
Pippin offers a detailed examination of Hegel’s “idealism”, which includes careful 
attention to the argument of the Logic as well as the Phenomenology.  However, 
in my view, Pippin fails to connect Hegel’s logic to his political philosophy.  As a 
result of this, Hegel comes across in Pippin’s Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: 
Rational Agency as Ethical Life as rather uninteresting as a political philosopher, 
since Pippin’s Hegel seems to be unable to defend himself against some quite 
simple objections.  For Pippin, the fact that Hegel defines freedom as doing one’s 
duty in accordance with the ethical principles of the society in which one lives, 
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means that he runs into a problem: what if the ethical principles of the society in 
which you live mean that “because I am a member of the National Socialist 
party” constitutes a justification?437  On my reading, this cannot arise as a 
problem for Hegel, since the speculative method – which we come to after we 
have carefully read and understood the Logic – tells us that we must not define 
freedom as simply doing one’s ethical duty, but must also see that freedom 
consists in the more abstract activities of the will, such as doing what you want, 
and doing the right thing.  On my reading, since “because I am a member of the 
National Socialist party” could only count as a reason for acting in an evil state, 
then it cannot count as a reason for a free person, since a free person lives in a 
society where laws are good, which means (see chapter 7 above) that laws are 
created for the purpose of “welfare” and “rights”.  In an evil state, as we saw 
above in chapter 7, moral certainty finds its basis not in good ethical institutions, 
but in mere conviction, and those who act on the basis of mere moral conviction 
are not free, for Hegel (though acting freely must include acting in accordance 
with one’s convictions, for Hegel, free action must be based on more than mere 
conviction: that is, free action must be grounded upon the existence of good 
ethical institutions).  Thus Pippin’s reading of Hegel has similar weaknesses to 
that of Wood, in my view, since it does not pay close enough attention to the 
way that the speculative method influences the argument of the Philosophy of 
Right. 
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In attempting to read Hegel in such a way that he is immanent and systematic I 
have, I hope, offered a reading that is consistent with what Hegel himself said.  
Throughout this conclusion, the main point I have tried to emphasise is that fact 
that, although Hegel makes all sorts of claims about the way he conceives being, 
thought, the absolute, ethical life, and so on, it is important not to be distracted 
by these statements of belief that Hegel makes and to look instead at the way 
that Hegel argues for these beliefs.  I am not trying to argue for what Hegel 
should have said against what he in fact said; however, I am saying that not every 
statement Hegel makes is an axiom with which we should begin an investigation.  
So, for example, the fact that thought and being are clearly identical for Hegel 
should not mean that we begin by assuming that this is the case, if we want to 
take Hegel seriously in his claims to want to proceed immanently.  That is to say, 
I am saying that we need to take care to work out how Hegel gets to the beliefs 
he has, and not to jump straight to his conclusions and work from there.  When 
looking at the “opening” of the Logic (Hegel’s discussion of pure being), this 
meant not taking the identity of thought and being as the first principle and 
instead looking at the original unity of “pure knowing” – pure reflection – that 
Hegel presents us with at the beginning of the Logic and seeing how we get from 
this “subjective resolve” to speculative knowing and the knowledge of the 
identity of thought and being.438  Above we looked at Hegel’s discussion of right 
and saw that, on my reading, we must not begin with what Hegel said about this 
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or that concrete political matter and must instead see how he gets from the 
abstract consideration of right to these more concrete principles.439 
 
This leads me to a certain sort of problem, however.   That is to say, it might be 
argued that I am not following Hegel if I begin with a conception of the way 
things are that is not Hegelian: Hegel did indeed have a concrete concept of 
freedom as duty, so why not begin with this concept of freedom, if you are trying 
to accurately describe what Hegel said?  Why begin with the abstract conception 
of freedom that Hegel rejects?  Thus, it might be argued that, by trying to 
conceive Hegel’s concept of freedom in such a way that it answers Deleuze and 
Guattari, I have misrepresented Hegel’s conception of freedom: perhaps I have 
formulated freedom in the non-Hegelian way that Taylor writes about: 
 
But this whole tradition, whether Marxist, anarchist, situationist or whatever, offers no idea at all 
of what the society of freedom should look like beyond the empty formulae: that it should be 
endlessly creative; have no divisions, whether between men or within them, or between levels of 
existence (play is one with work, love is one with politics, art is one with life); involve no coercion, 
no representation etc.  All that is done in these negative characterisations is to think away the 
entire human situation.  Small wonder that this freedom has no content.
440
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The answer to this sort of criticism would be that this is how Hegel himself 
proceeds: he believes that it is necessary that we work through the more 
abstract (and so relatively false) concepts of freedom to the more concrete.  
Furthermore, his notion that the more concrete notion of freedom sublates and 
therefore includes the more abstract conceptions of freedom means that we 
cannot get a full picture of what Hegel meant by “freedom” if we do not proceed 
in this way.  So in my view we miss an important aspect of Hegel’s conception of 
“freedom” if we begin with the concrete and ignore the systematic nature of 
Hegel’s thought.  And I believe that I have shown in this thesis that we can 
proceed in this way without ultimately rejecting Hegel’s more concrete claims 
about freedom. 
 
In this conclusion I have suggested that Deleuze and Guattari can show us 
something of what is required in an immanent approach: we must recognise the 
role that contingency plays and not try to proceed from a presupposed 
conception of what is necessary.  I suggested that Houlgate offers a reading of 
Hegel that responds to these Deleuzian complaints, since he argues that Hegel 
does proceed immanently, since Hegel claims to begin not with a conception of 
negativity but with the simple act of thinking.  However, I suggested that we 
need to emphasise that what “thinking” means is what is in question, for Hegel; 
otherwise we risk ending up basing Hegel’s logic on the truth of speculative 
thinking – that thought and being are identical – and so Beistegui’s claim, that for 
Lee Watkins Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Page 345 of 365 
 
Hegel the source of logical movement is speculative dialectics and negativity, 
might turn out to be true, and Hegel cannot even claim to be proceeding 
immanently (that is to say, the identity of thought and being turns out to be 
something we have to presuppose, and so the truth of speculative thinking turns 
out to be the source of all Hegel’s claims).  I suggested that we need to take the 
Logic to be an examination of reflective thinking and thus the study of something 
contingent if we want to maintain that it is an immanent study: immanent 
because it is the unfolding of an image of thought, and not immanent “to” 
something, such as being441).  We saw that Hegel still remains radically opposed 
to Deleuze and Guattari, since ultimately he does not share Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of freedom, of the image of thought (since Hegel believes 
that we can analyse ways of thinking by examining their structures, while 
Deleuze and Guattari believe that images of thought remain unconscious and 
disorganised442) and of many other things; also, I have only shown that Hegel 
claims to be immanent in the Deleuzian sense (by taking contingency to be 
irreducible at the beginning of the Logic) and have not shown that Hegel 
ultimately is not of the “cult of necessity” (since he tells a story whereby 
“retroactively” necessary development explains historical change, and so from a 
Deleuzian perspective Hegel does reduce contingency to necessity). 
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I have largely relied on what Hegel says in the Logic to justify the claims I have 
made in this thesis.  I have taken care to avoid arguments that claim that Hegel 
should have said this or that, and tried to make my reading fit with the text of 
the Logic.  My reading offers a way to read Hegel as he intended to be read (as 
presuppositionless) without falling into dogmatism (that is, onto hidden 
presuppositions), by re-interpreting the Deleuzian requirement that contingency 
be “irreducible”. 
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